Australian Politics Papers W-Z

Ian Ward

The University of Queensland

Talkback radio and Australian Politics

The first authorised broadcasting of telephone calls (with an obligatory seven second delay) occurred on April 17, 1967. Before then the law had proscribed the recording of telephone calls and, accordingly, the Post Master General’s department had squashed early experiments with talkback radio (Australian 17 April, 1997). Thereafter talkback radio quickly established itself as a popular morning format on commercial radio. In the latter 1970s and 1980s numbers of stations extended talkback programming across the entire day and established what is now a specialised ‘news/talk’ station format (Walkington 2001). News/talk radio has since established a ubiquitous presence. Half of all metropolitan stations and 38 percent of large regional stations carry talkback programs (ABA 2000). ‘[T]alkback is broadcast into factories, offices, in cars and in the home. The advent of mobile telephones had become another tool in its popularity’ (Thorp 1997, 5).

Today ‘news/talk’ radio stations operate in all major metropolitan markets and the programs of leading broadcasters such as 2UE’s John Laws and Alan Jones are widely syndicated (Day 1999, 6). Laws has remarked that in its early years talkback ‘had calls about gas leaks and local councils but we now have [callers wanting to talk about] major issues which involve Australia’. Perhaps because of the syndication of programs—Laws’ own program was ‘networked to about 80 stations across the country’ by the late 1990s—talkback is no longer an entirely local medium (Australian, 17 April 1997). News/talk or talkback radio is clearly a sizeable, commercially driven business (see Adams and Burton 1997, 24, 235-7). When Southern Cross Broadcasting acquired 2UE in March 2001, a news report observed that the ‘value of 2UE largely rests with its two stars, Jones and Laws, who pull in over $30 million a year … [warranting] the salaries paid to Jones and Laws of between $4 million and $5 million’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2001

). Its commercial success is one measure of the audience share that talkback radio attracts. It is this audience which has attracted the interest of politicians.

Prime Minister Howard’s use of talk radio

Politicians and their media minders were quick to see the advantages of a medium that allowed them to talk directly with voters. For example, at his media adviser’s (David White) behest, Gough Whitlam regularly used talkback radio during the campaign that brought Labor to power in 1972 (see Oakes and Solomon 1973, 197). However with the election of the Howard government in 1996, talkback radio emerged as an especially important forum for political communication. As prime minister, Howard ‘used talkback radio more than any predecessor’ (Gilchrist 2001, 6). It not only allowed him to evade close interrogation by well-informed Gallery journalists but also to play to his own strengths as a political communicator.

During his years in Opposition, and especially ‘when he was Liberal leader the first time around, from September 1985 to May 1989’, Howard endured a news coverage by some Canberra Press Gallery journalists which Gerard Henderson (1999) describes as ‘unfair at best, unprofessional at worst’ (also see Parker 1990, 94-96). As a consequence Howard developed a healthy distrust of the Gallery which he regarded as pro-Labor, unable to ‘come to terms with the fact that …[there had been] a change of government in 1996’, and as Canberra-centric and out of touch with ordinary Australians (see Howard 1997). Not surprisingly, as Prime Minister, he sought to by-pass the Press Gallery and to directly ‘connect with ordinary Australians’ (Hewett 2000). Talkback radio offered an ideal vehicle.

Although he took professional advice in order to make more effective use of television as a means of political communication (see the Courier Mail, 4 March 1999),

Howard lacked a commanding physical presence and a talent for delivering pithy ‘sound bites’, and was never entirely comfortable and relaxed before news cameras. His personal style was much better suited to radio. And as a Liberal party insider told the Age (25 July 1998), radio allows you to ‘get the message out live, you can get it across unedited. It is much easier than doing an interview with a print journalist where you have not control over the end product’. Talkback radio permits increased direct interaction with voters in ways ‘not mediated or filtered by journalistic intervention’. It is the ‘electronic sidestep’ which politicians are able to use in order to evade informed, persistent questioning by Gallery journalists—to ‘avoid the adversarial formats which are the foundation of traditional journalism’ (McGregor 1996, 83, 85). From the other side of the microphone, 6PR’s Paul Murray acknowledges that radio offers politicians ‘a chance to answer questions the way the want…. And live radio does not have the skew that politicians complain about in newspaper journalism or the editing of TV. They can … seek right of reply immediately if they hear an opponent bagging them’ (Australian Media, 20-26 April 2000, 3). This strategy of exploiting talk radio to gain unfiltered access to voters worked well during the Liberals’ 1996 election (Benchley 1999, Bradley and Meade 1996) and Howard simply continued with it once in power.

As prime minister Howard ‘set up a schedule of regular radio interviews … which ..[took] his voice around the country’ on commercial ‘news/talk’ stations such as 2UE in Sydney, 3AW in Melbourne, 4BC in Brisbane, 5DN in Adelaide and 6PR in Perth (Steketee 2001). He regarded Alan Jones top-rating Sydney 2UE program as sufficiently important a platform as to warrant nominating a staffer in his Sydney office as ‘a special point of contact’ to facilitate Jones’ access (Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 2000). He even launched his 1998 campaign for re-election on Jones’ program—and in return received four further interviews with Jones during the election to the Opposition Leader’s one (Sydney Morning Herald editorial, 17 July 1999; Sunday Age, 25 October 1998). Upon winning the election, in 1999 Howard established a purpose-built studio at his Phillip Street Sydney office so that he could conveniently and easily chat with talk radio hosts around Australia (Financial Review, 3 November 1999). According to one estimate in this same year he gave 149 radio interviews but just 49 ‘doorstops’ and press conferences (Australian Media, 12 January 2000).

Table 1 shows the pattern of Howard’s interaction with the media over recent years. It is based upon the transcripts listed by month and year in the ‘Newsroom’ of Howard’s website (Prime Minister of Australia 2001). The data shown in the table confirm his oft-reported reliance on radio—principally commercial talkback radio—to get his message across and signal that radio has become an important medium for political communication. In particular the ratio of press conferences to radio interviews underlines Howard’s preference for using radio ahead of more traditional news media.

Table 1. Prime Minister Howard’s media encounters 1997-2000

	Radio interviews	TV interviews	Doorstops	Press conferences
1997*	35	10	37	19
1998	87	35	43	15
1999	115	53	53	17
2000	105	34	67	25

Note: * 1997 data covers June through December only.

Source: Prime Minister of Australia (2001) and Frangenheim (2000, 42)

The conservative nature of commercial talkback radio audiences

There are several reasons why Howard and his media minders set out to fully exploit talk radio.

One was that they well understood that opinion polls show that radio and the electronic media out-rated newspapers as a political news source (eg. Age, 25 July 1998). Another was that Howard was able to use radio appearances made with a ‘TV camera trailing him into the studio’ to generate additional TV and newspaper coverage (Phillips 2000, 24; also see Benchley 1999). Above all Howard found talkback hosts relatively sympathetic. It is scarcely surprising that Howard took steps to make himself readily available to Jones, and that he even chose Jones’ program to commence his 1998 campaign for re-election (Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1999). Jones not only has a substantial Sydney audience but he is a former Liberal speechwriter who makes no secret of his conservative political leanings (Adams and Burton 1997, 215). In fact his 2UE colleague John Laws has publicly chided Jones for his Liberal sympathies (see the Sunday Age, 25 October 1998). Not all talkback hosts share Jones’ partisan leanings. However most gave Howard a relatively free reign. Talkback radio allowed him unfiltered access to listeners; to ‘talk to Australians over the heads of the press gallery, whose members are generally better informed, ask more difficult questions and many of whom’ he considered antagonistic or pro-Labor (Steketee 2001). It left ‘newspapers and TV reporters shut out of the interviewing loop’ and with no other option than to cover Howard’s radio appearances (Day 1999, 6).

However there is yet another, less readily apparent reason for Howard’s focus on talkback radio. Commercial talkback radio has an older, seemingly more conservative audience. Like any format news/talk is designed to attract specific demographic segments of the available listening audience. For example 6PR in Perth describes its audience as baby boomers ‘who grew up in the late 40’s, 50’s, and 60’s’ and who flourished within a secure, predictable and ‘comparatively prosperous post-war environment’. The station’s audience research suggests that 70 percent of its target 35 to 64 year old audience are in the workforce, almost half earn more than $40,000 each year and that more than half are home owners’ (6PR 2000). Phillip Adams and Lee Burton (1997, 243-45) reproduce AGB McNair ratings data for 1997 which show that talkback audiences are typically older and include disproportionate numbers of listeners in the ‘C’ occupational group which comprises modestly paid sales, clerical and paraprofessional workers. Many talkback radio listeners are retired (Goot 2001, 125-6). This is clearly an important Liberal constituency, and one that helped the party reclaim power in 1996. In short Howard’s talkback-reliant media strategy enabled him to target key constituency.

By and large talk radio provided Howard with a naturally sympathetic audience. Each week the Australian Media supplement publishes ‘The Rehame Report’ which reviews the most discussed issues on talkback radio (as identified by Rehame Australia Monitoring Service). Read carefully this column helps explain Howard’s preference for talk radio. For example, in June 2000, following Corroboree 2000, a hundred thousand or more people marched across Sydney Harbour Bridge in a gesture of support for reconciliation. Howard declined to take part. If the mainstream media gave the Harbour Bridge march extensive and essentially favourable publicity, Rehame’s summary suggests that talkback callers were not sympathetic. It records that in the week which followed ‘most callers [gave] strong support for Prime Minister John Howard’s continued refusal to offer an official apology to Aborigines. More than 40 percent of callers voiced approval for the PM’s stance, many describing him as a strong leader with views representative of the majority of the community’ (Australian Media 8-14 June 2000). This episode suggests that Howard’s preference for using talk radio programs is grounded its capacity to deliver him an audience, which is different—and inherently more conservative—than the mainstream media audience.

While talkback radio may have an older, more conservative audience, and the Howard Government a marked preference for using talkback as a means of political communication, it would be clearly wrong to suggest that the coalition has received praise alone on the airwaves. It too has been the target for disgruntled callers and populist talkback hosts. For example during 2000 the Howard Government’s GST initiative was the issue most frequently raised by callers. Rehame (2000) calculates that it was mentioned some 49,126 times: 90 percent of callers were unconvinced. The misuse of the Telecard allocated to Workplace Relations Minister, Peter Reith, dominated the airwaves for a few weeks in October and November of the same year. With 14,859 reports it was the third most often mentioned issue during 2000. Rehame scored some 96 percent of callers as ‘negative’. More recently Paul Kelly (2001) has noted that ‘John Howard has been bitten by his own medium’. He points to the coalition government’s sudden decision in late February 2001 to abandon the indexed excise on petrol that Howard had hitherto so staunchly defended. It was, Kelly argues, a concession to the public anger at the rising price of petrol fuelled by talkback radio hosts such as 3AW’s Neil Mitchell who had ‘campaigned for months’ on this issue. There will be other examples where the power of talkback radio has been mobilised against the Howard Government. The argument here is not that talkback radio has provided Howard with an always-supportive audience. It is that Howard found talkback to be a potent vehicle for communicating with a rather more conservative and ideologically sympathetic audience than he could have reached via more traditional media such as the ABC or newspapers such as the Age or Sydney Morning Herald.

Talkback as a ‘new’ news medium

Evidently Howard’s strategy of exploiting ‘talk back radio for day to day issues’ (Australian Media, 12 January 2000) was based on two broad assumptions: first it would allow him to evade close questioning by well-informed Press Gallery journalists specialising in covering politics and, second, it would enable him to ‘connect’ with an older, more conservative listening audience with whom he felt instinctively comfortable. Put another way, Howard and his advisers intuitively understood that talkback radio had emerged as a ‘new’ news medium with a very different logic to the ‘old’ news media driven by journalistic rather than by commercial values alone. The distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ news media derives from the work of Paul Taylor (1992) and, originally, from a Rolling Stone essay on the irrelevance of traditional news sources by Jon Katz (1992).

In analysing the emerging importance of the coverage of US political campaigns in nontraditional media, Taylor (1992, 39-40) described the ‘New News’ as that ‘hodgepodge’ of magazine and tabloid television programs, talk radio and call-in shows which are want to cover politics in a trivial, simple-minded, even trashy way. He suggested that in their search to boost ratings these commercially driven New News media had eschewed those established journalistic practices which are the hallmark of the ‘Old Media’, and instead covered politics as a "gotcha" cat and mouse game or as soap opera. As Judy McGregor (1996, 78) observes, the ‘old’ news media provide a more ‘traditional political reportage from press conferences, coverage of election meetings and activities, press releases and Parliamentary Press Gallery journalism’. She considers that the ‘evolution of political communication from "old" news to "new" news is a global phenomenon’ and argues that any discussion of journalism and political communication in New Zealand must now consider the role of ‘new’ news sources such as talkback radio (McGregor 1996, 78,81).

In explaining the emergence of Pauline Hanson on Australia’s political stage in 1996 and 1997, Glen Lewis (1997,10) also points to the role played by the ‘New Media’ which he, rather loosely, defines as ‘commercial television, talkback radio, and, to a lesser extent, the daily tabloid press’. These media stand, Lewis argues, in marked contrast to the ‘quality papers, some ABC programs, national current affairs programs, and cultural journals’ comprising the ‘Old Media’. ‘Old’ media carry ‘more considered’ commentary perhaps because they are mostly ‘reserved for political and business leaders, media and sporting stars, and columnists, celebrities or single-issue experts’ and leave ‘the vast majority’ of Australians unheard. They differ markedly from commercial talkback radio ‘which is often an avenue for the expression of grossly prejudiced and poorly informed personal views’ and forum for ‘outspoken’ and ‘prejudiced’ guest speakers (Lewis 1997, 11). Here Lewis appears to endorse a familiar critique of commercial talkback radio as a ratings-driven entertainment form, which is ‘inherently inimical to serious analysis’ (McGregor 1997, 80; Weiner 1995).

Table 2. Rehame’s list of top broadcast media issues 1999, 2000

Source: Rehame media release, 14 December 2000, and Australian 20 December 1999.

It would wrong to imagine that commercial and ratings-conscious talkback radio programs have a very different content than do the traditional news media. The broadcasting industry routinely uses the label ‘news/talk’ to describe the talkback programming format. As this might suggest, talkback radio draws extensively from the ‘old’ news media. Talkback broadcasters and producers frequently take up issues first covered in, and drawn to their audience’s attention by, the established news media. In 1999 Rehame monitored approximately three million broadcast items and concluded that the issues which dominated mainstream news were not identical to those which gained the most talkback coverage (Australian, 20 December 1999). Table 2 reproduces Rehame’s ‘top 10’ list of the most covered issues on both talkback and broadcast news programs across Australia for the years 1999 and 2000. While talkback radio does appear to have a rather different set of priorities, on this evidence, it does not focus upon a markedly different set of political issues than do broadcast news bulletins. This is a less than perfect measure but it does suggest that ultimately any differences between talkback radio and the ‘old’ media will lie in the manner in which stories are covered more so than in the issues which are scrutinized.

Indeed the very point of portraying talkback as a ‘new’ news media (and contrasting it with the ‘old’) is to underline that, while news/talk programs routinely examine current issues and political affairs, in doing so they ‘sidestep traditional news processes’ (McGregor 1996, 78). Although they interview politicians and routinely comment upon public affairs, leading talkback broadcasters do not pretend to be journalists (see Adams and Burton 1997, 215). In 1999 the Australian Broadcasting Authority established an inquiry to investigate contracts entered into by Laws and fellow broadcasters obliging them to promote on air the commercial and political interests of sponsors including—in Laws’ case—the Australian Bankers’ Association and Australian Truckers’ Association. Laws defended this practice, saying that he was an entertainer and not a journalist and therefore not bound by the code of ethics governing good journalism (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 1999). However the argument should not be overdrawn. The gap between traditional journalism and talkradio may not be as pronounced as imagined by critics who dismiss talkback as entertainment masquerading as journalism (see Salter 2000).

Having worked for some thirty years in print journalism before switching to talkback radio, 6PR’s Paul Murray is well placed to compare these two media. He considers that that ‘radio is just fantastic for getting that passion direct to the public’ which is invariably lost in printed news coverage of politics (ABC Media Report, 8 February 2001). Still ‘there are strong similarities … [as well as] strong differences between newspaper journalism and talkback radio.… From the perspective of a reporter, the journalistic similarities are initially marked. A good contact book, working up the round, and getting lucky tips are just as important in radio as they were in newspapers.’ However Murray says that, as a talkradio host, he is obliged to ask questions in a very different way than he did as a journalist. For in radio ‘the question is just as important as the answer, sometimes more so’ and that their ‘information-loaded’ questions allow talkback broadcasters to ‘tell much of the story’ (Australian Media supplement 20-26 April 2000, 3).

The ‘journalistic similarities’ between talkback radio and traditional journalism that Murray notes are in fact important. Like Murray some talkback hosts do have a background in journalism. While they may not proceed as journalists do, nor feel bound by the journalists’ code of ethics, talkback radio hosts typically represent their programs as forums for the serious consideration of political events and issues. Lewis (1997, 10) argues that development which has seen Rehame monitor and publish summaries of the issues canvassed on talkback radio programs is particularly interesting because it suggests that talkback has come to be seen as ‘a legitimate expression of public opinion, when for years … [it was] seen as disreputable’. Were it otherwise it is unlikely that John Howard and other prominent politicians would choose to use it as a prime vehicle for political communication. In the USA Bill Clinton ‘helped perfect the art of using the nontraditional press’ and appeared on shows such as Prime Time Live, Donhanue, MTV and the Arsenio Hall Show (Delli Carpini and Williams 2001, 168) just as in Australia Senator Natasha Stott Despoja used appearances on nontraditional programs such as The Panel to ‘connect’ with younger voters. However even if they have assumed a certain political importance, such nontraditional television programs disqualify themselves as an arena in which to seriously canvass political issues. It is difficult to imagine John Howard appearing on a program such as The Panel whereas he clearly feels comfortable discussing public issues on 2UE with Alan Jones. The difference of course is that talkback is now treated as a legitimate forum for the discussion of national public affairs.

Shock jocks?

While there may be ‘journalistic similarities’ between talkback and the more traditional news media, talk radio nonetheless operates with its own set of rules. Paul Murray’s observations that talkback permits a more passionate coverage of politics, and that questions have a far greater importance on radio, draw attention to what is a key difference between talkback radio and the ‘old’ media. That difference is the role of the broadcaster whose role is to ask questions and to inject passion. Leading broadcasters such as Jones and Laws are ‘stars’ in their own right as the extraordinary salaries they command, the lucrative personal sponsorships they obtain and the networking of their programs, all testify (Adams and Burton 1997, 23). Hutchby (1991, 1) has observed that talkback radio programs generally are ‘notorious for generating a high degree of controversial and confrontational talk between their hosts and their callers’ and Lewis (1992, 85) believes that Australian talkback is permeated by an ‘aggressive masculinity’. Even so there are subtle variations between news/talk programs airing on different stations and even across different time slots on the same station. Equally talkback hosts have different personal styles. By no means have all adopted the hectoring, abrasive and commercially successful style pioneered in the US by ‘shock jocks’ such as Rush Limbaugh. But there is a common ingredient found in all commercial talkback. Program hosts are highly opinionated. They express forthright opinions on political issues and events (see Adams and Burton 1997). The manner in which they do so differentiates them from journalists, even from those who write opinion-based and more entertainment-orientated pieces.

Most talkback announcers on Australian commercial radio are men. They often affect a forceful, authoritative style. Lewis (1992, 88) points out that they are their station’s ‘flagship personalities’ and that they secure this status by ‘winning public attention and holding on to it’. Having the prime minister as a regular guest is one way for a talkback host to grab and hold public attention and to signal his importance. Espousing black and white views on the issues of the day is another. Adams and Burton (1997, 8) suggest that on commercial radio ‘[c]ertainty plays better than complexity. Anger is more entertaining than reasonableness and blame beats explanation hollow.’ Talkback radio is ratings driven. ‘To get a sense of excitement on AM radio, to get the listeners active and people listening in, there is nothing better than generating a bit of outrage on an issue.’ The market, they say, wants ‘[a]ggressive opinion. Scoffing, sneering, scandalising opinion’ (Adams and Burton 1997, 46, 36).

Often the scoffing, sneering, anger and blame are directed at governments and at politicians. These provide a ready target given the climate of cynicism about politics, which prevails in the wider Australian community. As a result talkback on commercial radio tends to have right wing and populist flavour (see Adams and Burton 1997). The NSW premier Bob Carr (cited in Goot 2001, 126) complains that the staple diet of talkback radio is constant complaint that ‘the nation’s about to collapse, the blacks are bleeding the welfare system, too many migrants are getting in, [and that] criminals with diseases are taking over the country’. Beneath the flippancy of his comment lies a serious point. As Adams and Burton (1997, 238-9) argue, talkback hosts are predisposed to attack ‘policies that are complex and sensitive, and potentially divisive in the community.’ Lewis (1997, 19-20) points to their coverage of Pauline Hanson and One Nation as evidence that the ‘new’ media are prone to engage in ‘cheap talk’, and that their growing influence ‘increases the heat of political argument, but restricts it to issues that can be simplified and personalised.’

The wider question of interest here concerns the effect that talkback radio programs and the manner in which their hosts conduct them may have on political discourse. Paul Kelly (2001, 25) has written ‘[T]here was once a time when public opinion was mobilised at street rallies, town halls, from the pulpit or around the trade hall. Forget it. Radio jocks are the new mobilisers and organisers of mass opinion.’ Others appear to agree with his essential point. The former Labor prime minister Paul Keating once said ‘educate John Laws and you educate middle Australia’ (Day 1999, 6). 2UE’s program director says ‘Alan Jones and John Laws are the two most influential men in Australia outside Federal Parliament’ (editorial Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1999). In practice Howard’s approach to managing the media begins with an acknowledgment of ‘the political influence of the shock-jocks and the need to engage them’ (Steketee 2001). Adams and Burton (1997, 238) argue that talkback announcers ‘have the very real ability to influence the policy decisions of government’ and suggest that governments will sometimes test policy proposals against the likely response of key talkback hosts. Indeed in this vein the former Trade Minister Tim Fischer once acknowledged that his task of pursuing trade liberalisation was made all the more difficult ‘with every talkback jockey from Dallas to Darwin’ promoting a populist protectionist position (Australian 29 June, 1999).

Talkback and public opinion

It is clearly significant that politicians—and sectional interests such as the ABA and Truckers’ Association who paid Laws to spruik their cause—behave as though talkback radio programs can directly shape policy debate. However, while policy making is, as Ian Marsh (2001, 2) observes, ‘embedded in public opinion’, whether talkback radio can actually drive public opinion remains an open question. Possibly its influence on public opinion is overstated. As we have seen, during October 2000 the misuse of Minister Reith’s Telecard surfaced as a major issue and talkshow programs around Australia were besieged by angry callers. In a single mid-October week Rehame measured more than 500 calls on the subject ‘74 percent of which were negative’ (Australian Media, 25 October-1 November 2000). In the very same week in which Rehame concluded that ‘callers were swift and vocal in their condemnation’ Newspoll conducted an opinion poll which showed that ‘[s]upport for the Coalition ha[d] defied the two-week old furore over the … abuse of Peter Reith’s telecard’ and risen slightly (Australian 24 October, 2000). This Newspoll may signal that talkback radio does not always have the power to shift public opinion which is often assumed.

The question of whether talkback radio can shape public opinion is one, which clearly warrants careful empirical investigation. In the past political science in Australia has taken little interest in the effects of mass communication upon political behaviour, seemingly making an assumption that the media have a minimal effect (see Ward 1995, 32-9). However it is important that the influence of talkback now be clearly mapped for at least two reasons. First it now seems clear that the ‘pluralisation of Australian society’ has seen a disruption of ‘older patterns of strategic opinion formation’ (Marsh 2000, 127-8). Party identification has weakened and thus the premise upon which the comfortable assumption that media may reinforce but not significantly shape political behaviour no longer applies. Second there is the concern that John Howard raised in saying that Australia has to ‘have the capacity … to have a sensible discussion about long-term policy issues without everything being distorted and blown out of the water by misrepresentation’ (quoted in Marsh 2001, 1). If talkback radio does shape public opinion on political issues (as many commentators and politicians themselves appear to believe) then we need consider the argument made by Taylor (1992) and others who have pointed to its rising It is that the ‘new’ news media debases public discourse—in effect that a medium such as talkback contributes to that distortion and misrepresentation of the public conversation which inhibits state capacity for policy making.

The disruption of older patterns of opinion formation to which Ian Marsh (2001, 1995) points may suggest why talkback radio has evidently assumed a newfound political importance (measurable by the increased use made of it by politicians such as John Howard.) Political parties have largely lost their capacity to ‘set the strategic political agenda’ (Marsh 1995, 128). Their capacity to ‘cue public opinion’ (Marsh 2001, 7) has been eroded by the proliferation of interest groups and social or issue movements since the 1970s. The established parties have suffered a pronounced decline in their memberships. Fewer voters now habitually support them. Party identification has weakened. The parties themselves have recast their agenda and largely fallen into the management of ‘professionals in public opinion polling, and marketing and advertising’ (Marsh 2001, 9). Those voters who do still identify with the ALP or coalition parties are less likely to do so strongly. Voting behaviour is now more volatile than ever before. There are more floating voters. The evidence Marsh (1995, 108-31; also 2000) gathers is convincing on all these points. He argues that the root cause of the established parties’ loss of that opinion framing role they previously enjoyed lies in the ‘changing character of the electorate … [which] can no longer be conceived in lineal, left-right terms’ but which resembles a kaleidoscope of groups with different aspirations (Marsh 1995, 129). As a result of the pluralisation of Australian society and of the resultant ‘crosscutting sources of sectional or minority identity’ (Marsh 2001, 14), ‘people now respond to a wider variety of cues’ (Marsh 2000, 126).

Given the erosion of the ‘opinion framing’ once ‘mostly contributed by’ the established parties (Marsh 2001, 11), it is plausible to suggest that talkback radio programs may now provide some of the cues to which people respond. Marsh (2001a, 200) suggests that the media generally have acquired a new political influence because parties have jettisoned their opinion-forming role. Media ‘now constitute the dominant arena in which the battle for public opinion is waged’. They can shape the way in which some voters attach a priority to particular issues or view the relative qualities of the party leaders (Marsh 2000, 124). Nonetheless Marsh remains of the view that political institutions remain the ‘biggest single influence’ on public opinion (Marsh 2001, 2). The media, he argues, are ‘inherently reactive’ and therefore incapable of filling the gap and ‘leading the formation of public opinion about strategic issues’ (Marsh 2001a, 200). This may be substantially true of the ‘old’ media which adhere to the conventions of journalism. However it is less clear that ‘new’ news media such as talkback radio are purely reactive and unable to lead the formation of public opinion. The ‘new’ news media will often aggressively campaign upon, rather than report and analyse issues. For example a number of commentators (see Goot 2000, Lewis 1997, Kelly 2000, 152) consider that talkback radio did much to boost Pauline Hanson and the establishment of her One Nation party.

Occasionally—as in the case of their aforementioned campaign, which forced the Howard government to abandon an indexed rise in the excise upon fuel in February 2001 (Kelly 2001)—campaigns conducted by talkback hosts do appear to mobilise sufficient public feeling as to directly influence individual policy decisions. However talkback’s real influence may be more sustained and negative—to ‘blow out the water’ any serious discussion of issues, which offend the populist sentiments of the talkback hosts. Kelly (2000, 277) makes an important point in noting that ‘[r]adio gives politicians a voice, but it [also] devours them’. Howard may have considered ‘the radio jocks… his friends, but they … [were] really his enemies.’ On the surface this point sits uncomfortably with Howard’s clear preference for regularly appearing on talkback radio programs. However Kelly does not mean that talkback hosts such as Jones would fiercely challenge Howard, although as Bradley and Meade (1996, 13) observe ‘[p]oliticians unquestionably know what risks they take when an announcer wears his sympathies on his sleeve.’ Rather Kelly’s point is that their populist politics ultimately meant that ‘talkback jockeys’ could not support the Howard Government’s liberal economic reform agenda.

Kelly’s considers that talkback is an inherently populist medium and that its star announcers are able to enhance ‘their own authority and ratings’ by blaming ‘politicians for any social ill, real or imagined’ (Kelly 2000, 277). ‘The populist talkback industry … thrives on discrediting the system’. In search of ratings and commercial success ‘populist talkback jockeys’ will seek to ‘advance their own credibility by undermining the credibility of … established politicians’ (Kelly 2000,152). The result, Kelly (2000, 153) argues, is a ‘talkback culture’ which has ‘helped to convert Australia’s healthy scepticism about politics into a loathing’ of the system. It is noteworthy that Kelly’s analysis seemingly echoes Taylor’s (1992, 38) thesis that the habit of the ‘new’ news media to ‘sensationalise and trivialise public life’, to adopt a ‘bad-news bias’ in covering politics, and to canvass political issues in a ‘jaded voice’ all encourage listeners ‘to believe the worst about politicians and public life’ in a way which robs public discourse of ‘the dignity it deserves’.

Conclusion

Kelly is an astute and experienced observer of Australian politics. But his argument that talkback radio has fostered political cynicism is not grounded in any empirical study of the talkback radio audience. It is certainly possible that talkback radio does shape the way some voters see the world of politics and the issues that they regard as pressing. The evidence of social and political change which Marsh (1995, 2000) has gathered points to the fracturing of older patterns of opinion formation and to the emergence of circumstances in which talkback radio might exert a newfound, greater influence over public opinion. However the reality is that we do not know. As Harry Phillips (2000, 28) suggests, ‘theories that radio … [has lost] an important position in the "news circuit" need to be reconsidered’ given the fact that ‘[t]he Prime Minister, and several Premiers, have begun to employ radio as a major medium of communication’. Simply put the increasing attention paid to talkback radio by politicians such as John Howard has not been matched by an increasing interest in its political influence amongst political scientists. Talkback radio remains an unfortunate blind spot for Australian political science.

References

Adams, P. and Burton, L. 1997. Talkback. Emperors of the airwaves. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards.

Australian Broadcasting Authority. 2000. Commercial Radio Inquiry. Final Report of the Australian Broadcasting Authority. ‘2. The commercial radio industry in Australia.’ http://www.aba.gov.au/what/investigate/commercial_radio/report/html/industry.htm#_Toc489258983

Benchley, F. 1999. ‘Ruler of the (air) waves’ Bulletin 11 May.

Bradley, A. and Meade, A. 1996. ‘Talking up the campaign’, Australian, 26 January.

Burton, L. 1998. ‘Why Hanson is the shock jocks’ darling’, Age 30 June.

Davies, A. 1999. ‘Talking heads’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 0ctober.

Davies, A. 1999a. ‘Money talks’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October.

Day, M. 1999. ‘Mixed signal’, Australian Media, 29 July-August 4.

Delli Carpini, M. and Williams, B. 2001. ‘Let us infotain you: politics in the new media environment’ in W. Lance Bennett and R. Entman eds. Mediated Politics. Communication in the future of democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Frangenheim, F. 2000. Australian federal governments’ use of ’media management’ Unpublished Honours thesis, Department of Government, University of Queensland.

Gilchrist, M. 2001. ‘Talkback PM blames communication breakdown’, Australian, 20 March.

Goot, M. 2001. ‘Pauline Hanson and the power of the media.’ In M. Leach, G. Stokes and I. Ward eds. The Rise and Fall of One Nation. University of Queensland Press. St Lucia.

Henderson, G. 1999. ‘Press Gallery Perceptions’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 July.

Hewett, J. 2000. ‘Inside the picket fence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September

Howard, J.W. 1997. Address to the Melbourne Press Club, 27 February.

Katz, J. 1992. ‘Rock, rap and movies bring you the news’, Rolling Stone, March 5.

Kelly, P. 2001. ‘Shock-jock democracy’, Weekend Australian, 3-4 March.

Kelly, P. 2000. Paradise Divided. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards.

Lewis, G. 1992.’Talckback radio and John Laws’, in A. Moran ed. Stay Tuned. Allen and Unwin, North Sydney.

Lewis. G. 1997. ‘The media and the Pauline Hanson debate: cheap talk or free speech?, Australian Journal of Communication 24 (1)

Marsh, I. 1995. Beyond the Two Party System. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Marsh, I. 2000. ‘Political integration and the outlook for the Australian party system: party adaptation or system mutation?’, in P. Boreham, G. Stokes and R. Hall (eds.) The Politics of Australian Society. Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest.

Marsh, I. 2001. ‘State capacity for policy making: has it diminished? Can it be renewed?’, unpublished paper. Download from http://polsc.anu.edu.au/papers.htm

Marsh, I. 2001a. ‘Gaps in policy-making capacities: interest groups, social movements, think tanks and the media’ in M.Keating, J. Wanna and P. Weller (eds) Institutions on the Edge? Allen and Unwin, St Leonards.

McGregor, J. 1996. ‘Talkback and the art of "yackety yak" politics’ in J. McGregor ed. Dangerous Democracy. News media politics in New Zealand. Dunmore Press, Palmerston North.

Oakes, L. and Solomon, D. 1973. The Making of an Australian Prime Minister. Melbourne: Cheshire.

Parker, D. 1990. The Courtesans. The Press Gallery in the Hawke era. Allen and Unwin, North Sydney.

Phillips, H. 2000. ‘Political communication and the media: a radio perspective’, Legislative Studies, 14 (2) Autumn.

Prime Minister of Australia. 2001. Prime Minister of Australia [official webpage] Newsroom http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/main01.htm

Rehame 2000. ‘Rehame’s top reported media issues for 2000’ [press release] 14 December.

Rowe, D. 1992. ‘Radio talkback and its renditions’, Continuum 6 (1)

Salter, D. 2000. ‘Media bows to rule of Laws’, Age, 29 July.

6PR 2000. 6PR website. http://www.6PR.com.au

Steketee, M. 2001. ‘Minder over media. How the flacks control the political message’ Australian Media supplement, 8-14 March 2001.

Thorp, D. 1997. ‘After 30 years, radio salutes the gift of the gabfest’, Australian, 17 April.

Walkington, R. 2001. ‘History of professional radio broadcasting’ http://www.radioschool.com.au/ web6e.htm#TALK-BACK%20RADIO.

Ward, I. 1995. Politics of the Media. Macmillan.

Wiener,J. 1995. ‘Looking for the Left’s Limbaugh’, Dissent Spring, 160-164.

Paul D. Williams

University of Queensland

Metapopulism: Peter Beattie and the Reinvention of Queensland Populist Discourse

Introduction

The Queensland State election of 17 February 2001 undoubtedly will be remembered as a landmark poll for decades to come. In taking 66 of the Legislative Assembly's 89 seats with 48.93 per cent of the primary vote, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) under Premier Peter Douglas Beattie now dominates Queensland like no other since 1974 when the Liberal-Country [later National] Party (LNP) Coalition under Joh Bjelke-Petersen took 69 of the Parliament’s then 82 seats (Campbell 1996; ECQ 2001). In terms of Labor's own record, the electoral historian must hark back to 1935, when William Forgan Smith attained 46 of the Assembly's then 62 seats, to find a comparable result (Campbell 1996). Indeed, so comprehensive was Labor's victory that it has been suggested that "[t]his landslide outcome [has] positioned Peter Beattie to become Labor's longest serving and most powerful Premier in Queensland's history" (Preston, forthcoming). Even more remarkable, however, is Labor's success despite suffering, just months before, the ignominy of the widely publicized revelations of the Shepherdson Inquiry into allegations of vote rorting.

The research questions driving this paper are explicit: why did the Queensland electorate, in the wake of such potentially damaging developments, return the ALP to government so overwhelmingly? Why does the ALP continue to enjoy levels of public opinion support of around 70 per cent on a two party-preferred basis (Bulletin 31 July 2001, 23)? How has Beattie established a seemingly genuine rapport with the Queensland people in which he attained a personal pre-election approval rating of 66 per cent? (The Weekend Australian 17-18 February 2001, 4). It is intuitive that a host of inter-related influences drove electors' vote choice, including ALP unity, Coalition leadership and non-Labor disarray, and Federal factors such as fuel and the GST (Williams 2001). It remains impossible, though, to untangle precisely the mix of factors at work. Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper argues that Peter Beattie's leadership was a factor of major significance behind voters' motivation at the 2001 poll and that electors continue to respond favourably to Beattie's populist appeals. Specifically, this paper's central thesis is that Beattie, in his political communication with voters, has adapted traditional populism to the demands of an increasingly cognizant and sophisticated electorate by combining proven populist elements with his own characteristic strategies. This paper argues that Beattie, throughout his Premiership since 1998, has combined such traditional populist tenets as 'Strong Leadership', Queensland State 'chauvinism', 'Ruralism-Regionalism' and 'State Development' with his own populist inventions, namely an 'Everyman' image, a commitment to pluralism, and the pledge to make Queensland the 'Smart State'. This paper finds a key element behind Beattie's manifest rapport with voters is his ability to shift a traditionally successful populist discourse to a higher plane: one at which a self-aware Beattie not only accepts, but openly champions, his 'media tart' status so as to neutralize criticism. Through such self-acknowledgment, Beattie executes his leadership in a self-effacing manner to cultivate an 'Everyman image' with which 'ordinary' Queenslanders can identify. This form of populism, in which leader, media and voters are each conscious of the prevailing strategies, might best be labeled metapopulism, from the Greek meta meaning beyond.

Defining Populism

Populism as either an ideological tenet or a pragmatic tool of political communication is a well-worked theme in political science. A "notoriously vague" term (Canovan 1999, 3), populism has been defined broadly as any political movement that "celebrates the virtues of 'the people' and points to the iniquities and injustices caused by various oppressors and their 'enemies'" (Stokes 2000, 23) and as "an appeal to 'the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of society" (Canovan 1999, 3). In calling for a "return of political power to the people and away from the elites", populists identify ‘the people' as being "distinguished by not being members of the intellectual establishment" (Stokes 2000, 23, 27). This anti-intellectual, anti-cosmopolitan disposition in turn rests on "threats" identified via appeals to citizens' state "chauvinism" (Walter and Dickie 1985). In confronting such threats, populist leadership must boast a degree of 'strength' or "charisma" (Stokes 2000, 24) and must possess an "egalitarian impulse" that encapsulates a "close tie between leader and follower" (Canovan 1999, 5-6). In employing a "tabloid" rhetorical style of communication that bears "simplicity and directness", populism seeks to 'step over' formal political institutions to become, ultimately, "of the people but not of the system" (Canovan 1999, 3-5).

While commonly assumed today to be an instrument of the political 'right', populism's roots can be traced to the mid nineteenth century United States in which disgruntled farmers initially expressed a 'leftist' agenda of grievances (Canovan 1999, 4). Australian populism similarly can be traced to the 1840s when sections of the colonial working and agrarian classes first articulated demands for independence from Britain. Australian populism re-emerged during the economic calamities of the 1890s and 1930s and strains of populist discourse can be found even in later years, including in Menzies' pitch in the 1940s to the 'Forgotten People', in Howard's invocation to the 'battlers' and in the appeals of the Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party (PHON) to the nebulously 'disgruntled' of the 1990s and beyond (Stokes 2000; Williams 1998).

Queensland Populism

It is credible to suggest that "the most obvious feature of the Queensland version of populism lies in its style and rhetoric" (Reynolds 1986, 51). The distinctiveness of this interpretation, and Queensland's particular social and economic characteristics, have given rise to the oft-cited 'Queensland is different' thesis (Charleton 1983; Walter and Dickie 1985; Bulbeck 1987). It has been argued, for example, that less secondary industry and a concomitant absence of a large middle class, lower than average levels of education, fewer migrants, a lack of media diversity, a unicameral legislature, and a decentralized economy and population from which rural and regional political emphases emerge, collectively have forged unique political conditions predisposing Queensland voters toward strong leadership (Smith 1985, 19-21; Wear 2000,57). On this evidence, given that Queensland has nurtured a host of far-right populist movements, including the League of Rights, the Citizens' Electoral Council and the Conservative Action Party (Wear 2000, 58), it has been argued that the rise of PHON in 1997 is "simply one of the recent, but more extreme examples of populism" (Stokes 2000, 26). Moreover, it seems reasonable that "any claim that populism in Queensland passed away with the ending of the Bjelke-Petersen era…rests on shaky ground" (Reynolds 2000, 164).

It is a truism that, historically, Queensland electors have "look[ed] to [Premiers] of practical ability" who are "aware of the bread and butter issues at the political heart of the State, sensitive to regional needs yet capable of ensuring progress of both rural and urban interests in a total Queensland development ethos" (Smith 1985, 26). Indeed, a review of key Queensland Premiers reveals recurring themes, including strong, even authoritarian, leadership, a commitment to state development and a demonstrative state parochialism. William Forgan Smith (1932 - 1942), for example, was "receptive" to development and cultivated both business and working class support (Carroll 1990, 412). 'Ned' Hanlon (1946 - 1952) was a parochial state 'nationalist', a supporter of rural interests and a champion of law and order (Knight 1990). Vince Gair (1952 - 1957), in turn, directed his populism through an unabashed anti-intellectualism and a "confrontationist" leadership approach (Costar 1990). Despite the ALP's loss to the Coalition in 1957 - a watershed that has led some to distinguish a traditionally 'left' populism from a subsequent 'right' variant (Stokes 2000, 26) - it is clear many of the core elements of traditional Queensland populism were maintained, indeed enhanced, during the conservatives' long tenure. Frank Nicklin (1957 - 1968), for example, expounded law and order issues and, while publicly portraying a "deceptively open personality", reportedly wielded "the iron fist in private" (Stevenson 1990, 486-88). Yet it is undoubtedly the Premiership of Johannes Bjelke-Petersen (1968 - 1987) which has become most closely associated with traditional populism in Australia. As an "heir to a particular history", Bjelke-Petersen not only continued, but scrupulously refined, populist rhetoric to appeal to rural, regional and urban Queensland voters (Walter and Dickie 1985, 33). With assistance from an agile press secretary, Allan Callaghan, Bjelke-Petersen successfully engaged the Queensland media and, in turn, much of the electorate with an aggressive campaign in which Bjelke-Petersen was marketed as a valiant defender of Queensland's interests (Lunn 1984). Specifically, Bjelke-Petersen's populist discourse capitalized upon: remaining "in touch" with Queenslanders via his extensive travels; drawing upon under-development as justification for further state enterprises; identifying the 'socialist' / 'centralist' government in Canberra as a threat to Queensland sovereignty; propounding anti-intellectualism and moral conservatism as the guardian of 'the people's' interests; and, ultimately, by "orchestrating the grievances of 'the people'…and insisting on a direct relationship between people and government" (Smith 1985; Patience 1985). In short, Bjelke-Petersen became the 'Father', or indeed 'Grandfather', of the Queensland 'folk' (Patience 1985, 43; Walter 1990, 507).

Populist discourse, like any strategy, cannot survive without adapting to a changing political environment. Increases in education levels, changes to media configurations and advances in communication technology have each contributed to an electorate growing, albeit gradually, in its political and media consciousness. Even by 1985, Patience (1985, 13-14) had written that "time [was] running out" for the Bjelke-Petersen model of populism. Certainly, Queensland political figures in the post-Fitzgerald era knew the changing Queensland electorate would demand more from its leaders and that traditional populist strategies were no longer entirely suited to increasingly skeptical voters. Bjelke-Petersen's immediate successor, Mike Ahern, for example, deliberately eschewed a 'strong' authoritarian approach to distinguish his Premiership from a tainted past. Following a brief and perfunctory attempt by Ahern's successor, Russell Cooper, to revive the Bjelke-Petersen formula, traditional Queensland populism fell into relative disuse during the Premierships of Wayne Goss (1989 - 1996) and Rob Borbidge (1996 - 1998). Although Goss remained partially consistent by exercising a degree of 'strong' leadership, he cannot be considered a genuine populist as his administration was based on 'technocratic managerialism' and he failed to employ the rhetoric of state 'chauvinism' (Wear 1993, 24; Preston, forthcoming).

Beattie's populism

Beattie's populist leadership style inevitably has led him to be likened to Bjelke-Petersen (Preston, forthcoming) and casual observation of the public addresses of each reveals discernible similarities, including a predilection for verbal repetition and the use of earnest hand gestures to underline points. Moreover, Beattie concedes his admiration for the former National Party Premier, a deference Bjelke-Petersen seemingly reciprocated when he congratulated Beattie on his 2001 election victory for doing "a masterly job" (Courier-Mail 19 February 2001, 5). The purpose of this section is to identify the origins and constitution of Beattie's own model of populist discourse, described above as metapopulism. The roots of Beattie's interpretation of populism appear to extend further than to his election as Premier in 1998 and beyond his accession to the Labor leadership in 1996. Preston (forthcoming), for example, traces Beattie's sensitivity to the peculiar needs of the Queensland electorate to his earlier experiences in the 1980s as ALP State Secretary, a time when Beattie honed his media skills and learned to manage crises by negotiating with competing factional interests. Indeed, a core argument of this paper is that Beattie's adroit media engagement, from which he happily accepted Liberal leader Dr David Watson's 'media tart' sobriquet, underpins Beattie's self-deprecating persona, an image which, in turn, constitutes the kernel of his own metapopulist approach. This thesis is further validated by Beattie's daily routine as Premier in which he meets first with press advisers and only then with his policy advisers and senior bureaucrats (Syvret 2000, 61). The following sections argue that Beattie has developed his metapopulism by combining four core elements of traditional populism - 'Strong' leadership; Queensland 'nationalism'; Regionalism-Ruralism; and State development - with three of his own applications, namely: a commitment to make Queensland the 'Smart State'; a commitment to pluralism and conciliation as method of conflict resolution; and, most critically, the evolution of his 'Everyman' image in which Beattie's self-deprecation and widely promulgated traits of honesty, integrity and fiscal prudence have produced a profile with which a majority of 'ordinary' voters can identify.

Strong Leadership

Evidence of Beattie's 'Strong' leadership over his Cabinet in the mold of traditionally populist Queensland Premiers can be found in his predilection for assuming the 'face' of government in Queensland. Preston (forthcoming), for example, claims Beattie often "crowds out his Ministers" while the Courier-Mail (28 August 2000, 8) similarly alleges Beattie to be a "modern day minister for everything". Ministerial 'staffers', too, have accused Beattie of "grabbing the 'good news' from their portfolios and making the subsequent public announcements" (Courier-Mail 2 September 2000, 23). Other evidence, however, contradicts such claims. A random sample of press releases issued by the Queensland Ministry in August 1999, for example, reveals that, while Beattie's office was clearly the most prolific generator of press material, his sum remained a minority. Where Beattie's office produced 42 of that month's 195 press releases, or around 20 per cent of the total, two other Ministers each released a comparable 10 per cent, with several releasing around a dozen statements (Williams 1999, 5). Superficially, then, Beattie does not appear to be a 'one man band' (Williams 1999, 5). Other evidence, though, supports Preston's claim. It appears Beattie likes to "keeps a close eye" on critical or sensitive portfolios where he considers it "too hard or too politically risky" for vulnerable Ministers to execute decision-making, including Education, Environment and, especially, the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio in which Beattie personally conducted sensitive negotiations with both mining and Indigenous groups (Courier-Mail 28 August 2000, 8). This last example is particularly representative of the Beattie's approach in that his Native Title model, under which Aborigines maintained the right to negotiation over mining, but not exploration, was vehemently at odds with that of the Federal ALP (Courier-Mail 1 September 2000, 2). Similarly, Beattie's 'strong' leadership over environmental matters is evidenced in his intervention to abandon the Gold Coast 'Naturelink' cableway project (Courier-Mail 9 November 2000, 4).

'Law and order' is another time-honoured theme among populist leaders eager to establish 'strong' leadership credentials. Hanlon, for example, combined strong 'rule of law' rhetoric with anti-union practices in his suppression of radical unionism in the late 1940s, just as Nicklin had done in the mid 1960s with his anti-picket legislation during the Mount Isa strikes (Knight 1990; Stevenson 1990). Once again, however, it is undoubtedly Bjelk-Petersen who is most closely associated with 'law and order' campaigns, ranging from the Springbok tour of 1971, to the anti-street march legislation of the late 1970s, through to the SEQEB strikes of the mid 1980s (Walter 1990). Beattie's own commitment to 'law and order' issues is found on several fronts. First, Beattie committed, in successive Budgets, significant allocations to increased police numbers and, in 2001, mobile "flying squads" for police to intervene in known crime 'hotspots' (Courier-Mail 19 July 2000, 17; 20 June 2001, 17). Beattie's public order credentials were strengthened further by his support, despite opposition from within his own Party, to retain police 'move-on' powers and by his proposal to extend DNA testing to all prisoners (Courier-Mail 26 January 2001, 5; Sunday Mail, 15 April 2001, 1).

Traditional Queensland populism also invokes the Premier's role as moral guardian of 'the people'. Evidence of Beattie's moral leadership is found, for example, in his immovable opposition to a proposal by Brisbane Lord Mayor, Jim Soorley, to trial heroin injecting rooms; in his opposition to surrogate pregnancy arrangements; in his pledge that, since "children are more important than dingoes", to continue their cull on Fraser Island; and in his unilateral selection and announcement, during the Shepherdson Inquiry and before the Party's Administrative Committee had met, of five "clean" candidates for the 2001 poll (Courier-Mail 24 June 2000, 22; 6 August 2001, 23; 13 December 2000, 2; 5 May 2001, 4-5; 7 May 2001, 1). It is this last element that allowed Beattie to expound his honesty and integrity most vocally, and in a fashion that appears to have met voters' greatest approval. Even before the Commissioner had completed his inquiry, Beattie pledged to 'clean up' his Party and opined that rorters "should feel the full force of the law" (Preston, forthcoming).

Queensland State 'Chauvinism'

A second theme common to all successful Queensland Premiers is their appeal to voters' parochial state 'chauvinism' and a concomitant attack on 'southerners', particularly the 'centralist' Federal government in Canberra. As outline above, this is consistent with the populist strategy of identifying 'outside' threats in order to unite a support base at home. Again, while Bjelke-Petersen is remembered as the master of State parochialism in his condemnation of both Labor and Coalition governments in Canberra for his own political kudos (Walter 1990, 505), there is ample evidence of Beattie's emulation to achieve the same end. Quite apart from his pride in announcing numerous investment projects in Queensland - a theme discussed below - Beattie's own form of Queensland 'nationalism' can be found on numerous fronts. First, like Bjelke-Petersen, Beattie has extracted political mileage from the perennially tense fiscal arrangements between the State and Federal governments. Such entreaties have included demands for the Commonwealth to introduce tax concessions to economically depressed Queensland regions and to further assist ailing rural enterprises, particularly the dairy industry (Courier-Mail 20 February 2001, 6; 3 March 2001, 2). These constituencies are, of course, most vulnerable to a PHON voter backlash. Similarly, when New South Wales Treasurer, Michael Egan, took out full-page advertisements in the Sydney Morning Herald in which he labeled Queenslanders 'cane toads' for receiving what Egan perceived as an overly generous share of Commonwealth funding, Beattie retaliated in kind and described those south of the Tweed as 'cockroaches' (Courier-Mail 29 March 2001, 6). In a similar vein, Beattie has capitalized upon Queensland State 'chauvinism' through his opposition to the Prime Minister's plan to tax the earnings of the State Governor, a move, Beattie insisted, that would force Queenslanders to pay annually an additional $100,000 in tax (Courier-Mail 7 June 2001, 10).

Beattie's appeal is further evident in his response to Canberra's proposal to construct a detention centre for illegal immigrants in Queensland. Beattie replied that he would oppose "all the way" any attempt to build a "riot plagued" detention centre that was tantamount to "dumping illegal immigrants onto Queensland taxpayers" (Courier-Mail 4 June 2001, 4). Beattie's State 'chauvinism' is also found in his assertion that northern New South Wales should fall within Queensland borders, in his hanging of the Queensland flag on the Sydney Harbour Bridge following Queensland's victory in the 1999 State of Origin Rugby League match, and, in responding to a Virgin Airlines website denigrating local tourism, his declaration that Queensland was "the most desirable state to visit in the world" (Courier-Mail 9 June 2000, 2; 10 May 2000, 18; 6 August 2000, 32).

Ruralism - Regionalism

Placing strong emphasis, both rhetorical and practical, on rural and regional affairs constitutes a third populist element successfully employed by a succession of Queensland Premiers. Indeed, a strong regional awareness meant not only a statewide suspicion of Canberra, but also rural mistrust of Brisbane (Smith 1985, 23). Perhaps the strongest evidence of Beattie's homage to rural and regional needs is his 'Community Cabinet' programme in which the State's Ministry travels to outlying centres to hear first hand residents' grievances (Preston, forthcoming). Indeed, in maximizing his media exposure during such trips, Beattie often has traveled to distant centres by train and, on one occasion, visited Labor's 'Tree of Knowledge' at Barcaldine (Johnston 1999, 39). This is further evidence of Beattie's maintenance of links with traditional 'left' populism.

As discussed below, a recurring theme in Queensland politics is one of the "parish-pump" (Syvret 2000, 61). Politically astute governments must deliver largesse, particularly to regional Queensland, to ensure continuing electoral success. Where the Goss Government, arguably to its detriment, dutifully complied with the burgeoning economically rationalist agenda and closed cost-ineffective regional infrastructure, such as rail lines and courthouses, Beattie, in identifying regional grievances and the risk of a PHON resurgence, has openly questioned the National Competition Policy (NCP). Beattie has concurred with conservative renegade MHR Bob Katter Jnr (Kennedy, Q) and claimed that "[c]ompetition is all very well in theory and it may work well in some states like Victoria which are the size of a postage stamp" but that it was entirely unsuitable to a vast and decentralized Queensland (in Johnston 1999, 40). Beattie, himself, has declared that NCP should only prevail if economically rationalists proposals pass the "public benefit" test, a tenet Beattie describes as "social rationalism" (Preston, forthcoming). Beattie's defence of regional Queensland has further included a proposal for any future Daylight Saving scheme to be limited to the southeast, and in his encouragement of anti-bank protests in such small communities as Laidley, Kilcoy and Sarina (Courier-Mail 1 September 2000, 4; 23 October 2000, 4). Consonant with this commitment, Beattie has committed funding to regional health projects, to the restoration of regional courthouses and to the construction of additional dams and ports (Courier-Mail 19 July 2000, 17; 25 January 2001, 7; 20 June 2001, 17). Indeed, 58 per cent of the 2001-02 Budget's entire capital works allocation was destined for projects outside Brisbane (Courier-Mail 20 June 2001, 1). Quantitative evidence supports the thesis that Beattie's emphasis on rural and regional affairs has met favourably with voters' expectations. First, pre-election opinion polling found 40 per cent support for the ALP outside Brisbane - 10 percentage points higher than the Coalition and 25 points higher than PHON (Weekend Australian 17-18 February 2001, 4). These data were validated on polling day when the ALP won 20 provincial and 11 rural-based seats (ECQ 2001).

State development

Traditionally, governments in Queensland have accepted their role as the principal providers of the State's infrastructure; development, both public and private, remains a hallmark of Queensland populism (Smith 1985, 26). Bjelke-Petersen's Premiership, especially, became synonymous with the economic development of the state and his self-description as a 'crane economist' is frequently cited (Smith 1985; Syvret 2000). Beattie remains consistent with his predecessors in placing State development at the very heart of his populist discourse. Beattie's commitment to a five per cent unemployment level and his mantra of "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs" during both the 1998 and 2001 election campaigns, Preston (forthcoming) suggests, paints the Premier as "obsessive" about job creation. Consequently, a key component Beattie's programme is to announce regularly job creation projects underpinned by a mix of public and private investment. Such large scale projects, in regional and metropolitan Queensland, have included the location of Virgin Blue headquarters in Brisbane, the development of the Roma Street Parklands, new power stations at Millmerran, Tarong and Callide, a gas pipeline from Papua New Guinea to Queensland, a Gold Coast convention centre, the Brisbane Airport rail line, a Brisbane River pedestrian bridge and redevelopment of the Woolloongabba and Lang Park sporting grounds (Preston, forthcoming). In addition, Beattie has made frequent reference to the job creation potential generated by such international forums as CHOGM and the 'Masters' and 'Goodwill Games'. The emphasis Beattie places on State economic development is further underscored by the Premier's frequent overseas visits and by the fact he is his own Trade Minister. Indeed, Beattie has stated his desire to make Queensland the "California of the Pacific" (Syvret 2000: 61).

The 'Media Tart'

The transition of Australian political parties from ones of grass-roots interaction to those of mass political communication via the electronic media has been underway since at least 1972 when the ALP's It's Time campaign saturated television screens in order to elicit an emotive, rather than rational, voter response (Ward 1995, 197). Indeed, so adept have leaders and parties become at tailoring their policies and images to meet the needs of increasingly media-savvy audiences that political scientists now describe modern parties as 'responsive', 'catch-all' and 'electoral-professional' (Jaensch 1989; Stewart and Ward 1996). Beattie, of course, is no exception; he has employed media exposure artfully to disseminate widely an 'Everyman' image. Beattie, in constructing and maintaining this persona, enjoys the support of his Corporate Communications and Information Office, a body of 17 staff whose brief is to publicize favourably the Queensland Government's activities (Sunday Mail 12 March 2000, 31). Indeed, Beattie, between 1997 and 2000, appeared in 32 non-party political government publications, more than any other Minister (Courier-Mail 28 October 2000, 12).

Where the previous sections explored Beattie's employment of traditional populist tenets, the following examines how Beattie has adapted traditional Queensland populism to the needs of a modern, cognizant electorate by shifting populist discourse to a new, self-aware and self-effacing level. It is argued that Beattie, in happily accepting, indeed boasting of, his status of 'media tart' (Courier-Mail 24 May 2000, 20) has effectively negated any criticism to his style from the Opposition. Beattie remains, of course, a "public face [that is] a manufactured image for the evening news" (Syvret 2000, 61). Yet, by allowing himself to be filmed swimming with sharks, playing with dogs or cuddling piglets - and, most critically, acknowledging publicly that such photo-opportunities are intended distractions from weightier affairs, such as the Shepherdson Inquiry - Beattie has circumvented censure and assumes an amiable profile appealing to uncommitted voters. Undoubtedly, Beattie's adroit press secretary, Steve Bishop, must assume a degree of credit for this strategy.

'Everyman' image

Concurrent with Beattie's self-aware and self-effacing media strategies is his ability to cast himself, despite his high office, as 'one of the people'. Beattie's 'Everyman' image is predicated upon three elements. The first is his insistence to paint himself as an 'ordinary' person with whom voters, metropolitan and regional, can easily identify. Photo-opportunities, for example, have featured Beattie donning "funny hats" and football jerseys, while print media stories have referred to his status as husband, father and owner of 'Rusty' the family dog (Courier-Mail 10 August 2000, 18; 19 February 2001, 5). Indeed, Beattie happily described himself during the 2001 campaign as "an amiable boofhead" and as "just a boy from Atherton" with "a willingness to laugh at himself" (Courier-Mail 19 February 2001, 5). Beattie combined humility with political acumen in announcing his state-wide "listening tour" on which he asked voters whether he should call an early election (Sunday Mail 14 January 2001, 9). Beattie's self-deprecation, a trait voters clearly appreciate in their elected officials, continued on election night when he pledged he would be "humble in victory" and that "there is no room for complacency…the celebrations are over" (Courier-Mail 19 February 2001, 12; 20 February 2001, 6). Such affirmations are integral to Beattie's intentional campaign to cast himself as an 'anti-politician', a trait that, again, resonates with potential PHON voters (Preston, forthcoming).

A second element is Beattie's reputation as a financially prudent Premier who can empathize with 'ordinary' families overseeing tight household budgets. In addition to launching in 2000 a $304 million family support package entitled "Putting Families First", Beattie harnessed widespread animosity towards financial institutions and oil companies by encouraging a "break the banks" protest and by proposing petrol price freezes (Courier-Mail 19 July 2000, 15; 23 October 2000, 4; 20 February 2001, 1). In addition, Beattie warned voters of the 'perils' of the Coalition's policies and the 'danger' of "living beyond your means" (Courier-Mail 27 January 2001, 28). Beattie consolidated this image by warning Ministers not to accept free Olympic Games tickets and insisted he would attend London's 2000 Federation celebrations "only if there are trade benefits" (Courier-Mail 20 April 2000, 5; 9 August 2000, 4).

Beattie's insistence on promulgating an image of honesty and integrity is a third element critical to Beattie's 'Everyman' image. As outlined above, the potentially embarrassing revelations stemming from the Shepherdson Inquiry provided Beattie with a unique opportunity to parade his integrity colours. Indeed, the fact that Beattie was, ultimately, able to transform the liabilities of the Inquiry into marketable electoral assets for Labor is a measure of his leadership command and rapport with voters. In so doing, Beattie employed plain language and boasted that he had "trod on a few people's toes and [that he'll] tread on a few more before [he's] finished" (Sunday Mail 14 January 2001, 9). Beattie further asserted, in a no-nonsense manner, that "Labor rorters should go to jail, the National Party rorters should go to jail, the Liberal Party rorters should go to jail" (The Australian 10 January 2001, 4). In a similar appeal to coarser interests, Beattie announced Jim Elder's replacement as Deputy Premier, Terry Mackenroth, as the "need [for] a strong son-of-a-bitch who will stand next to me and kick and kick and kick those who have rorted the system" (Courier-Mail 28 November 2000, 2). Once again, such an approach no doubt struck a chord with a cynical, weary electorate.

Pluralist and Conciliator

Beattie deviates markedly from Bjelke-Petersen's populism in his regard for minority groups and in his methods of resolving their competing interests. Where Bjelke-Petersen pitted rival sectional interests against one another, for example, employers against unions, Beattie remains "responsive to all points of view" and consolidates his support base by weaving together coalitions of interest across a wide variety of pressure groups (Preston, forthcoming). Moreover, Beattie's pluralist, consultative approach, what Preston (forthcoming) labels "Inclusive Populism", earns Beattie kudos as a genuine conciliator. Beattie's sensitivity to reconciliation is seen, for example, in his navigation of the Queensland Parliament's apology to Aborigines for the Stolen Generation and in his negotiations with Aboriginal leader, Noel Pearson, over the Cape York Partnership plan (Courier-Mail 20 May 2000, 22; 12 June 2000, 13). In environment policy, Beattie brokered an agreement between ecological interest groups and the forestry industry that, while protecting hardwood forests, made generous concessions to farmers’ rights to tree-clearing (Courier-Mail 10 August 2000; Preston, forthcoming). Beattie's pluralism has also extended to increased funding for the disabled and for the Arts where a ‘Gallery of Modern Art’ is planned (Courier-Mail 27 May 2000, 31; 12 June 2000, 4). Social issues, too, have been addressed and reforms to prostitution laws and gay rights have been enacted. Beattie's coalitions of support have even bridged the party political divide when he successfully negotiated former Liberal Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Sallyanne Aitkinson, to accompany him to Indonesia (Sunday Mail 2 April 2000, 41). It is, however, advances in the representation of women that offers perhaps the most tangible evidence of a sea-change in Queensland governance. In addition to the 33 women now sitting on the Government benches - a record for an Australian Parliament - the ALP's 2000 Conference endorsed a range of gender issues that, Beattie claimed, "sends a clear indication to the community" (Courier-Mail 12 June 2000, 4). Critically, Beattie has found support not just from his espousal of a wide range of interests, but also through the conciliatory manner of such advocacy. Indeed, it has been argued that Beattie possesses a "political style that recognizes the limits of power [and he comprehends] that a leader cannot get too far ahead of his [sic] constituency" (Preston, forthcoming). In short, it seems Beattie's "most potent political gift [is his] art of compromise" (Courier-Mail 2 September 2000, 23).

The 'Smart State'

A third element of Beattie's metapopulism is his commitment to build Queensland's profile as the 'Smart State'. As noted above, a succession of Queensland Governments has devalued the importance of higher education with some Premiers adopting a rabid anti-intellectualism (Smith 1985, 24; Costar 1990, 446). Beattie, by contrast, has championed the value of education and technology and, in promoting the utilitarian benefits of the public's investment, has appealed simultaneously to traditional populist sentiments, particularly State 'chauvinism'. Beattie's commitment is seen in such developments as the creation of the Innovation and Information Technology portfolio, in his quest for venture capital for biotechnology research, and in substantial education budget allocations to IT training for teachers and school internet access (Courier-Mail 22 February 2001, 2; 20 June 2001, 16-17). Even Parliamentary proceedings are planned for Web broadcast (Courier-Mail 22 January 2001, 2). While Beattie's emphasis on technology clearly overlaps with some established populist tenets, including the need for State development, the 'Smart State' programme remains distinctive: Beattie is the first Queensland Premier to place education and technology at the centre of his political vision.

Conclusion

The 2001 Queensland election will no doubt stand for decades as a watershed poll. In capturing almost three-quarters of the Legislative Assembly's seats, the ALP, in the wake of potentially damaging revelations arising from the Shepherdson Inquiry, withstood what many saw as inevitable defeat. In addressing the logical question of how Beattie and the ALP won the overwhelming endorsement of the Queensland electorate despite the prevailing ignominy, this paper has argued that Beattie's leadership, while undoubtedly only one of a number of influences, nonetheless constituted a factor of major significance to the ALP's success. Specifically, this paper has argued that Beattie ingratiated himself with Queensland voters by combining traditional populist elements with his own interpretations, including his cultivation of an 'Everyman' image, his reputation as a pluralist and conciliator, and in his commitment to build Queensland into the 'Smart State'. This paper has found that the Premier's, and the ALP's, continuing high levels of support can, in large part, be attributed to Beattie's employment of metapopulism: a higher plane of traditional populist discourse on which a self-aware Beattie has acknowledged his 'media tart' status and, accordingly, has neutralized opposition criticism. Beattie's concomitant self-deprecation completes the metapopulist strategy and has allowed the electorate to perceive him as an 'ordinary' Queenslander with whom voters can easily identify. This paper has also found that, paradoxically, it was the discomfiture of the Shephersdon Inquiry that provided Beattie with a unique opportunity to parade his much touted qualities of integrity and honesty, traits that, apparently, a majority of electors endorsed.

As this paper has found Beattie's leadership to be a major constituent in the electorate's continuing endorsement of Labor, it is intuitive that any souring of his relationship with the electorate holds an equal potential to scuttle the ALP's future. The immediate challenge for the Beattie administration, then, is to weather the hazards inherent to all governments enjoying mammoth parliamentary majorities, particularly the temptation to become overconfident and to act contemptuously in the public arena. While it remains implicit that, in the zero-sum game of Australian politics, the continuing success of any government also hinges significantly upon the roles of the Opposition and the media, the personal challenge for Beattie is to continue to adapt his metapopulist strategies to the needs of an increasingly capricious electorate. Within these parameters, Preston's conjecture that Beattie potentially may become Queensland's most eminent Labor Premier appears entirely credible.

References

Bulbeck, C. 1987. 'The Hegemony of Queensland's Difference' in Journal of Australian Studies. Vol. 21, November: 19-28.

Campbell, M. 1996. Queensland's Electoral History. ECQ: Brisbane.

Canovan, M. 1999. 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy' in Political Studies, XLVII: 2-16.

Carroll, B. 1990. 'William Forgan Smith: Dictator of Democrat?’ in The Premiers of Queensland. 2^nd Ed., D. Murphy, R. Joyce and M. Cribb, Eds, UQP: St Lucia.

Charleton, P. 1983. State of Mind: Why Queensland is Different. Methuen Haynes: North Ryde, NSW.

Costar, B. 1990. 'Vincent Clair Gair: Labor’s Loser' in The Premiers of Queensland. 2^nd Ed., D. Murphy, R. Joyce and M. Cribb, Eds, UQP: St Lucia.

Electoral Commission of Queensland. 2001. Queensland Election 2001: Statistical Returns. ECQ: Brisbane.

Jaensch, D. 1989. Power Politics: Australia’s party system. 2^nd Ed., Allen and Unwin: Sydney.

Johnston, L. 'Broken Heartland' in The Bulletin, 16 March 2000: 38-40.

Knight, K. 1990. "Edward Michael Hanlon: A City Bushman’ in The Premiers of Queensland. 2^nd Ed., D. Murphy, R. Joyce and M. Cribb, Eds, UQP: St Lucia.

Lunn, H. 1984. Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: A Political Biography 2^nd Ed., UQP: St Lucia.

Patience, A. 1985. 'State Politics in Australia: Queensland and the Emerging Crisis in Australian Federalism' in The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership 1968 - 1983. Ed., A. Patience. Longman Cheshire: Melbourne.

Preston, N. Forthcoming. 'Peter Douglas Beattie: The Inclusive Populist'. The Premiers of Queensland 3^rd Ed.

Reynolds, P. 1986. 'Queensland politics: the rise and rise of populism' in Social Alternatives, 5 (3), September: 50-53.

Reynolds, P. 2000. 'One Nations's electoral support in Queensland: The 1998 State and Federal elections compared' in The Rise and Fall of One Nation. Eds, M. Leach, G. Stokes and I. Ward. UQP: St Lucia.

Smith, P. 1985. 'Queensland's Political Culture' in The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership 1968 - 1983. Ed. A. Patience. Longman Cheshire: Melbourne.

Stevenson, B. 1990. 'George Francis Reuben Nicklin: "Honest Frank"' in The Premiers of Queensland. 2^nd Ed., D. Murphy, R. Joyce and M. Cribb, Eds, UQP: St Lucia.

Stewart, R. and I. Ward. 1996. Politics One. 2^nd Ed., Macmillan: South Melbourne.

Stokes, G. 2000. 'One Nation and Australian Populism' in The Rise and Fall of One Nation. Eds, M. Leach, G. Stokes and I. Ward. UQP: St Lucia.

Syvret, P. 'State of mind' in The Bulletin, 12 September 2001: 61-65.

Walter, J. 1990. ‘Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: The Populist Autocrat’ in The Premiers of Queensland. 2^nd Ed., D. Murphy, R. Joyce and M. Cribb, Eds, UQP: St Lucia.

Walter, J. and K. Dickie. 1985. ‘Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: A Political Profile’ in The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership, Ed. A. Patience. Longman Cheshire: Melbourne.

Ward. I. 1995. The Politics of the Media. Macmillan: South Melbourne.

Wear, R. 2000. 'One Nation and the Queensland Right' in The Rise and Fall of One Nation. Eds, M. Leach, G. Stokes and I. Ward. UQP: St Lucia.

Williams, P. 1998. 'A Race Election: Context and Implications for Australia' in Social Alternatives, 17 (1): 46-48.

Williams, P. 1999. 'Beattie's one-man-band more apparent than real' in The Queensland Independent, September: 5.

Williams, P. 2001. 'The Queensland State Election of 17 February 2001: Reforging the Electoral Landscape?’ in Australian Journal of Political Science. 36 (2): 363-71.

Conference Background | Streams and Panels | Conference Program | Abstracts | Conference Proceedings | Home

webhumans | text version | privacy | © 2003 griffith university | disclaimer