

Funu:
The politics of East Timorese resistance,
1974-1979

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Independence for East Timor as a new nation-state has been achieved at a high and tragic cost. Sanctioned, guided and funded by the United Nations and leading capitalist nations to a nominal independence, East Timor, despite its oil and natural gas reserves, is on the road to dependent economic underdevelopment.

In witnessing East Timor's present we should recall its past – the last years as a Portuguese colony and the first years of the Indonesian invasion. It was in this brief period that East Timorese independence was borne and resistance to Indonesian subjugation waged. Too often these years of the Maubere people are left to those with only a historical interest in the evolution of East Timor as a nation. While the battle for statehood has been won the long journey of resistance has become a fading memory.

This paper attempts to retrieve the East Timorese liberation struggle in those vital years from the increasing condescension of contemporary history. It is written as a way of questioning the kind of independence East Timor has eventually achieved.

'Liberation' is a word rarely seen or spoken in politics now. It is a fading or forgotten archaism of the 1960s and the early 1970s when the Third World was seen as a revolutionary force in the global class struggle. 'Liberation' is a word never used to describe the struggle for East Timor by those who have written about this early 'historical' period. Why? At this time, Fretilin and its mass of activists and supporters were attempting to turn Portuguese Timor upside down beyond the existing Marxist models of Third World liberation struggles.¹ For most Marxists the beginnings of a possible East Timorese revolution was either passed over or regarded as apparently not revolutionary enough. What Fretilin hoped to achieve was effectively destroyed by Indonesian state terror. Fretilin's 'Funu' (the Tetum word for 'war or resistance'), unlike earlier indigenous risings against Portuguese colonialism,² was an attempt to defend an embryonic socialist East Timor. That Fretilin's armed resistance to Indonesian militarism failed should not be seen simply as a phase in East Timor's long agonised independence struggle. Instead, this largely forgotten earlier period promised in its Funu an independent East Timor vastly

different to the one orchestrated by a United States dominated United Nations two decades later.

The politics of Fretilin's Funu must be examined in the context of the prevailing colonial political economy in East Timor. What Fretilin attempted to create through the mobilisation of social forces and the eventual failure of its guerilla war against the Indonesian state. The colonial setting of the East Timorese resistance provided both the contradiction for its popular advance and its military defeat. Scant attention is given to East Timor's material conditions and its profound effects on the Funu of Fretilin. John G. Taylor, Peter Carey, Jill Jolliffe, Grant Evans, Geoffrey Gunn and other offer some examination of East Timor colonial context before the consolidation of Indonesian hegemony.³

The political hopes of Fretilin and its Maubere supporters have tended to be cast as a form of nationalism, but what kind of nationalism?⁴ In part, this paper argues that Fretilin's program of collective self-reliance and its support by the Maubere people speak of a socialist vision from below, a radical yearning for material and cultural equality. Moreover, of these authors only Gunn theorises the political economy of Portuguese Timor in the final days of its four hundred and fifty-year existence. In the mid-1970s, East Timor was 'a paradigm of underdevelopment, an exemplar of a backward dependent colonial periphery where pre-colonial and even tributary modes of production co-existed with an embryonic plantation economy and where non-economic motives of imperialism appear primordial.'⁵ Portugal's sixteenth century attempt to dominate the Malay spice trade in maritime Southeast Asia through Christianity and the gun proved illusory. Over time, like its successive colonial rivals, Portugal in East Timor accommodated itself to local forms of tribal power. Indeed, the pre-capitalist Portuguese state form by the twentieth century held colonies of marginal economic value in Asia, Goa, Macau and Timor.

Until the Indonesian conquest most East Timorese lived in the mountainous interior. Their mode of existence was subsistence swidden agriculture, which remained largely untouched by the Portuguese state. The cash crops of coffee and sandalwood were owned and controlled by Chinese traders or the minuscule urbanised *mestizo* elite. Unlike Portugal's former slave colonies in Africa, East Timor was economically unimportant to the metropolitan power. It was barely self-sustaining and produced no surplus value through the super-exploitation of a colonial peasantry. Instead, it held little commercial value with most Maubere 'living outside a monetarist economy.'

During the Caetano and Salazar dictatorships colonial East Timor became a distant dumping ground for intractable political prisoners. It survived as a colonial expression of

fading Portuguese power through government grants. Class formation in East Timor was as undeveloped as the colonial economy. Most Maubere remained as tribal subsistence agriculturalists. The Chinese comprised the petty merchant class while the urbanised Portuguese and mestizo families were either plantation owners, government officials or members of religious orders. The liberation struggles which had brought national independence to much of Asia during the Cold War period left Portuguese Timor untouched. It stood as a political anachronism in an increasingly post-colonial Third World. Political change seemed an impossibility. Like Francoist Spain until its fall, Portugal and its colonial possessions appeared guaranteed of their continued existence by US imperialism which required Lajes airfield in the Portuguese Azores for its 'mid-Atlantic nuclear strategy.'⁶

By the early 1970s Portugal's colonial empire finally unravelled. Liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde overwhelmed the conscript army of the Portuguese coloniser. Numerous mutinies occurred. The soldiers of colonialism formed an armed forces movement, which ended the war in Portuguese Africa and precipitated revolutionary change in the metropole power.⁷ The long night of proto-fascist dictatorship was swept away by the popular pressure from below and the denial of imperial plunder by the risen African people of its former colonies. Lisbon in 1974 and 1975 experienced its 'Revolution of the Carnations' when flowers filled gun barrels and new socialist ways of thinking and acting were possible.⁸

It is in this context of a shattering Portuguese colonialism and its repercussions in far off East Timor that the politics of East Timorese independence and resistance must be set and considered. A revolutionary empire ended the colonial old order in Lisbon and inspired Maubere liberation. Benign Portuguese neglect left Timor with thirty kilometres of paved road, few administrative buildings, fewer bridges, and 60,000 of the 600,000, indigenous people nominally Roman Catholic in 1974 and 1975. Nevertheless, it did allow small numbers of the colonial petty bourgeoisie, usually the sons of tribal chiefs (*luirais*) and governmental officials to study in seminaries, agricultural and teaching colleges or, more rarely, the university at Lisbon.⁹

These young, mainly male, intellectuals who would be priests, teachers, agronomists, or other government employees were caught up in the revolutionary fervour of a Portugal seeking a socialist advance. They read Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che, Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, and Paulo Freire, as guides to a revolutionary future for East Timor. As Ball and McDonald noted, those amongst these intellectuals who became Fretilin leaders 'adopted the socialist liberation ideology then in vogue throughout the Third World.'¹⁰ If their understanding of the material conditions for revolutionary change was slight,

romanticised or misplaced, their desire for change was ardent. Helen Hill's study of the sources of East Timorese nationalism explores these stirrings in Lisbon and Dili amongst that stratum of Timorese intellectuals who sought a revolutionary path for East Timor.¹¹ Yet Hill doesn't examine the enthusiasm and the self-activity of the Maubere people for revolutionary change. If indeed, 'a Maoist influenced' returning students from Lisbon and their confreres in Dili were the instigators of this political awakening, their ideas of national independence, self-reliance, popular medicine and health, popular education, the expropriation of large landholdings, gripped the masses. The formation of Fretilin gave shape and drive to these pressing mass questions. Too often those who have explored the complex and fraught political situation in East Timor during 1974 and 1975 have concentrated on the formation of political organisations, Portuguese indecision, the machinations of Indonesian militarism, Australian duplicity and the civil war which led a victorious Fretilin to declare unilateral independence.¹²

Without the widespread and growing support amongst the Maubere people for Fretilin's program of rural socialism, its declaration of national independence would have been no more than words. The people of East Timor were attempting to construct a new East Timor, self-reliant and free of Portuguese or Indonesian neo-colonialism. Those with significant property or capital had wanted the continuation of dependency via either Lisbon or Jakarta. Their comprador outlook saw no future in an East Timor, free socialist and independent. In the brief civil war the forces of continuing colonial dependency were routed. Some deepened their collaboration with the Indonesian state in its clandestine efforts to destroy the Fretilin project.

Apart from the embryonic efforts of the Maubere people to overcome colonial oppression through land distribution, popular health and literacy programs, the defection of over 3000 Timorese conscripts serving in the Portuguese army to Fretilin, became the nucleus of the East Timorese people's defence. This mass desertion on the 6th August 1975 occurred when the uneasy coalition between the UDT (*Uniao Democratica Timorense*) and Fretilin ruptured. In Dili, the UDT and the chief of police launched a coup to halt the growing popular authority of Fretilin. Within a week the 3000 Timorese deserters had rallied to Fretilin's cause and had restored popular order. These soldiers along with 17,000 men who had received military training under the Portuguese eventually formed Falintil, Fretilin's guerilla army.¹³

Even at this stage tensions between the military and political wings of Fretilin had emerged and remained. According to Carey, the influx of soldiers created a fundamental and continuing clash within Fretilin's leadership. There were those who believed that politics should be in command as opposed to those with military experience who argued

that the army must be kept out of politics as military decisions should be taken without regard to politics. Despite these apparent tensions it would seem that political and military decisions became one as the Indonesian invasion proceeded. Under the conditions of an Indonesia invasion and its campaign of terror, the Maubere people's war represented their needs and hopes – they could not be divorced from military strategy. Indeed, Falintil depended entirely upon the East Timorese people for the guerilla war campaign, as the infamous 1981 'fence of legs' campaign testified.¹⁴

The civil war may be seen as the continuation of an emerging embryonic class war which grew more visible with the end of Portuguese colonialism. Fretilin, although a united front organisation, represented in varying ways, differing class interests which favoured either a continued Portuguese presence, national independence, the preservation of existing class relations (especially over the question of land), the break up of the big estates, or peasant cooperatives and popular forms of education and health. During and after the civil war the more radical and socialist tendency held sway within Fretilin whose program found increasing support amongst the majority of the poor Maubere. Such continuing mass support became the basis of the popular war of resistance against the Indonesian invasion.¹⁵

Criticisms of Fretilin's petty bourgeois leadership and program have been made. Fretilin's contradictory attitude to Portugal, self-reliance, and socialist objectives are seen as failings, as is their apparent rejection of attempting 'to join in the common struggle of the West Timorese and Indonesian working class and oppressed masses against the Suharto military dictatorship.'¹⁶ Nevertheless, in January 1977 interview, Rogerio Lobato, East Timorese Minister for National Defence stated:

...we will help all movements against Suharto, and we will help the liberation movement in West Timor too. ... In West Timor, we know through refugees and from other sources, that there are over 1000 West Timorese guerillas fighting there, helped by Fretilin.¹⁷

Such criticisms of Fretilin's shortcomings overlooks the immediate problems confronting East Timor and the clear lack of the political experience and judgement of the Fretilin leadership and its mass of East Timorese activists and supporters before Indonesia invaded. Innumerable mistakes, often fatal ones, were made and later acknowledged. Such a bold effort to create a form of Maubere popular democracy at a time of heightened danger is too easily forgotten by Fretilin's Marxist critics and other political commentators.

Nevertheless, given the dependent colonial economy and its possible revolutionary transformation, Fretilin's economic program was, from the outset, uncompromising and

profoundly problematic. Portuguese Timor's existing capitalist sector was at this stage dominated by the Chinese. All but two of the twenty-five largest enterprises were Chinese-owned. Of the 300 shops in the colony only two were owned by Timorese. This class divide had generated antagonisms and sometimes manifested itself as ethnic conflict.¹⁸ Fretilin was committed to ending all contracts with foreign capital made by the Portuguese government. It sought complete economic independence achieved through negotiations for aid (the World Bank, for example). No such method of acquiring aid ever existed. If Fretilin had begun negotiations with the World Bank, it would have found itself encumbered with a World Bank development program that contradicted its own political platform of expropriating the large coffee estates and the rejection of foreign capital investment. The Chinese business community had panicked about Fretilin's economic program of socialist self-reliance, despite Fretilin's reassurances that their presence would be welcomed. Many of the Chinese businesses closed, while a Chinese black market flourished in Australian dollars.¹⁹ Fretilin's political strength was also Timor's economic weakness²⁰

During the civil war and the destabilising 'border incursions' undertaken by Indonesian special forces the experience, daring and determination of the Timorese fighters proved to be an able defence of East Timorese independence. When the token Portuguese military force evacuated Dili during the civil war Fretilin's guerillas liberated the colonial arsenal at Taibesse of automatic rifles, bazookas, light artillery pieces and trucks.²¹ The mass desertion of Timorese soldiers from the Portuguese army and the securing of weapons and equipment gave Fretilin the 'military capacity to mount a highly effective resistance' to the invading Indonesia armed forces.²² But guns alone did not represent the essence of the Maubere Funu. Timorese resistance to previous invasions by the Portuguese and Dutch had never fundamentally changed the traditional social order. Fretilin's program promised a new East Timor in the making, as Indonesia prepared for its invasion.

With much of the politicised Timorese student population, the Fretilin leadership had escaped capture and possible death in the August coup, as they were in mountain villages. They had formed Revolutionary Brigades to help villagers hoe fields, grow crops and to teach literacy and numeracy. An armed guerilla fighter explained:

We organised schools to teach reading and writing. We introduced some Portuguese words we don't have in Tetun and tried to explain these by drawing pictures. We had books – people from the villages sold fruit to get money to buy school books from the Chinese shops at the market. It was important for our people to read and write a language. We taught the young people also about the guns of course ... also physical training and combat, tactics for fighting. Some would study traditional medicine.²³

Drawn from the ideas of Frelimo's Amilcar Cabral these Timorese Revolutionary Brigades sought to break from their petty bourgeois privileges and origins by working collectively with the poor villagers to develop a solid mass base with a radical collectivist outlook.²⁴ The efforts of the Revolutionary Brigades were, according to Denis Freney, the spearhead of Timorese revolutionary independence whose base was the subsistence villagers.

In the haste of change brought about by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism through the force of the African liberation struggles, Fretilin arose in East Timor as an ill-prepared, inexperienced, idealistic national liberation movement. To avoid elitism, bureaucratism and stagnation after independence, Fretilin aimed to live and to work in the villages. They were determined to rapidly improve the living standards of the poorest people by bringing new fertile land under collective cultivation, improve the farming methods and to educate and to mobilise the Maubere people to achieve these goals through self-reliance and cooperativism. On this basis, Fretilin 'naively believed' East Timor could be 'economically viable and avoid the dependence and domination of neo-colonialism by outside powers.'²⁵

While Falintil would act to defend the Maubere people, Fretilin's program won the overwhelming support of the Maubere people to its cause. These social forces proved to be both the strength and ultimate weakness of the Maubere people to Indonesian invasion. In the early days of its invasion the Indonesian military leaders believed that East Timorese resistance would be easily defeated, despite Falintil's ability to counter the clandestine operations of Indonesia's special forces before November 1975. As the Indonesian military secured Dili and other coastal towns a majority of East Timorese fled inland to the mountains.²⁶

While East Timorese national liberation was stalled and was finally lost because of the Indonesian invasion, Fretilin resistance in the period 1975 to 1977 was strong and effective but regionally contained by the stalemated Indonesian invasion. Fretilin held 80 per cent of the country and 40,000 Indonesian troops were confined the major towns and coastal areas and heavily guarded roads between them.²⁷ Accompanying the Indonesian landing craft were Javanese cargo vessels to carry away the plunder of war. All objects of value were removed from homes and Portuguese offices in Dili.

... door frames, windows, refrigerators, radios, roofing material, furniture, operating theatres, Marconi radio transmitters, mirrors, copper pipes, bathroom fittings, vehicles and motorcycles – in brief anything portable. ... (even bodies were later exhumed by collectors of gold teeth and Timorese labour gangs conscripted to dig up the bodies of Timorese liurai, many of whom had precious objects buried with them).²⁸

This war booty was later seen in the hotel suites and villas in Jakarta and Bali owned by Indonesian generals. The ferocity and carnage of the advancing Indonesian forces drove the East Timorese further into Fretilin controlled territory.

How was Fretilin able to survive this occupation? On the military level, the people were brought into the armed struggle. Fretilin's military forces were divided into four sections; the regular army of Falintil, regional troops, guerilla units, and people's self defence forces. Falintil concentrated large-scale attacks on Indonesian positions and then dispersed to conserve their forces. Regional soldiers coordinated with Falintil in localised attacks. Guerillas operated in small areas and were spread throughout East Timor. The people's self-defence was composed of villagers who fought the invaders with bows and arrows, blowpipes, traps and sometimes combined with the other military sections against the Indonesian forces.²⁹ A Maubere women recalled

Some ordinary people were fighters; we call them *arma branca*, they defend us but are not Falintil. They use traditional weapons, knives, bow and arrow, spears, one we call *deman*, a long stick with a knife at the end, used to kill buffalo. Women and men all used those.³⁰

Turner states that the 'extensive network of resistance to what the Timorese [saw] as a foreign occupation ... permeate[d] all levels of life.'³¹ In this strategy of people's war all Timorese engaged in the struggle with different military tasks and on different fronts.

The ingenuity of the people's resistance to the Indonesian occupiers was further illustrated by an East Timorese soldier who had served in the Portuguese army.

Another tactic was to make them waste their weapons. We'd tie a light on a horse and let it go, and the Indonesians would send mortar bombs to the place where the light was. Every night we'd do something like this.³²

Another strategy was 'fake surrendering.' Resistance fighters would voluntarily surrender because the Indonesians would put them to work carrying and guarding their weapons. From this position they carried out sabotage and obtained weapons, supplies and food for Fretilin and Maubere families. The efforts of East Timorese 'conscripts' in the Indonesian army's renowned Battalion 744, demonstrated another face of Maubere resistance and Fretilin support. One such soldier who later joined Fretilin, recounted that 'the Indonesian's couldn't trust the Timorese they made join their army; often they'd turn and fire on the Indonesians or bring their weapons and join us in the bush.'³³ The East Timorese cooperated to subvert the Indonesian presence at every opportunity.

Apart from Fretilin's military strategy, a people's war political economy was created and sustained. All fighters were gardeners. Beyond Indonesian controlled areas the various military sections usually tended to their own material needs. They planted foods - sweet potatoes, marrow, rice, sago, corn, and beans. They hunted pigs, buffalo and cassowaries in the mountain forests. Their traditional form of swidden agriculture took on a renewed and vital political and economic significance. These food crops and supplies sustained the people's Funu and their sense of independence. This resistance economy also involved the increased sharing of traditional, local and regional agricultural and medicinal knowledge.³⁴

Inevitably the US equipped and advised Indonesian army of the early 1980s sought to destroy the Timorese ecology of collective resistance. A Maubere woman sheltering in the mountains remembered:

The Javanese circled us every year, a big attack in the dry season, just when the things you've grown are ripe, your corn or coffee. Then before you can collect it the enemy come and surround a food garden to wait for you ... they start shooting, drive you away and destroy or steal the food. ... At the end of three years when the enemy was surrounding us we ate rats and grasshoppers and sometimes snakes.³⁵

In the years of starvation following Fretilin's Funu, many Maubere people elected to survive in the mountains rather than risk an existence in the Indonesian controlled concentration camps. Their meagre resources, often gathered on the run, would always be shared equally,

...no discrimination, no difference. We have a women's organisation and when we go to the farm to work we not only do the job but we support each other - no fighting and the results of that job divided equally. In each group we elect one person in turn to be responsible. Not control us like children, just organise that we cooperate.³⁶

The environmental warfare waged on the Timorese people's means of subsistence failed to undermine their collectivist way of life.

In the successful years of the Funu and nascent rural socialism, a vastly different picture emerged in the coastal towns under Indonesian control of both the captive East Timorese population and the Indonesian army conscripts. Effectively cut off from the food of the forest under Fretilin control, these areas were ransacked and pillaged by the invading military. The East Timorese were held in these concentrated areas facing starvation, torture, rape, arbitrary brutality and other privations. Many sought to escape to the mountains with or without the aid of Fretilin.³⁷

Through its unprecedented experience of invasion, the Indonesian military faced an armed and united people's resistance. Apart from its pacification efforts, the officer caste of the Indonesian army devoted much of its time in organising bars, restaurants and other businesses, whilst the commanding generals established themselves as the owners of coffee plantations. The Indonesian soldiers were encouraged to spend their money in the officer's bars and restaurants instead of remitting it to their families. In these early years they sought to avoid being killed in their six-month tours of duty. They were forced to stay and to protect the towns they held because of the effectiveness of Fretilin's *Funu*.³⁸ Others in the Indonesian army, 'the people in command, high-up majors, had run away' in the face of Timorese resistance.³⁹

In September 1977, Indonesia frustrated by its lack of military success in East Timor, launched a major offensive against the Maubere resistance. The World Bank and other US dominated institutions funded this new Indonesian war of terror. To end its stalled conquest Jakarta 'bought sophisticated weapons systems, particularly counter-insurgency aircraft.' Moreover, the willingness of Western governments to sell Indonesia the required weaponry and equipment was fundamental to its military campaign. Indonesia's premier supplier of weapons and military training was the United States. An East Timorese woman witnessed

A lot of Americans ... in Dili ... Some are building things, but others we don't know why they came. They stay with Javanese. America helps Indonesia with weapons. The Indonesians take coffee from Timor and with the money from that they pay back the Americans. So we Timorese pay for the bullets that kill us!⁴⁰

The East Timorese viewed the more cunning military strategies of the Indonesian Army as United States orchestrations 'who were often in Dili talking to the Indonesians.'⁴¹ President Carter's concern for human rights seemingly did not extend to a people facing the onslaught of an army equipped and trained by the United States. Indonesian aircraft piloted by US mercenaries, carried out daily saturation bombing using 'napalm and other chemical and biological weapons.' Before launching its offensive the Indonesian army in East Timor was reinforced by fifteen new battalions (12,000 soldiers) to carry out the search and destroy operations which caused the systematic destruction of Timorese people suspected of Fretilin sympathies.

A Dili based priest spoke of "hundreds" of deaths every day with people being left where they fell on the bare mountain sides to become food for carnivorous birds. The use of chemical and biological weapons (Agent Orange defoliant, for example) and napalm was widely confirmed; survivors spoke of children dying of violent attacks, of vomiting and dysentery after drinking water in bombed areas, of crop destroying maggots (*ular kecil*)

emerging within a few days of bombing raids and of whole communities incinerated alive when timber-dry “palm thatch” houses went up in flames.⁴²

Simultaneously, the Indonesian ground forces staged massive assaults on Maubere held territory, and carried out a scorched earth policy destroying Fretilin’s gardens culminating in mass starvation in most areas. Ultimately Fretilin’s project of rural socialism and national self-reliance and its military resolve to defend these goals was eventually distinguished. It is from this time that the East Timorese became captives within their own country and the dreams and hopes of liberation by their own efforts were destroyed. The Funu died in the mountains.

What if Fretilin’s East Timor had been allowed to exist as an independent country? What if Indonesia had been prevented from invading? In 1975 Grant Evan’s saw East Timor’s economy being eventually forced into a neo-colonial mould.⁴³ If Fretilin had advanced a clear socialist program ‘it would place severe strains on its party unity,’ as it appeared to offer too few advantages. Evans believed that aid from the People’s Republic of China which had become a Cold War ally of the United States from 1973 was remote. Moreover, such a socialist endeavour would only antagonise the ‘fanatically anti-Communist Indonesia.’ Implementation of such a program would ensure that the development of agricultural productivity would become East Timor’s ‘main source of primitive socialist accumulation.’ Such a form of economic self-reliance would engender a ‘very slow economic development’ only perhaps possible on ‘a broad and deep campaign of political education amongst the Timorese people.’ Timor’s economic development would rely almost solely on politics and political education, the difficulties of which could prove immense and fundamentally damaging to the East Timorese people. The popularity and success of Fretilin’s people’s war political economy in the years following the Indonesian invasion suggests that Evans’ measured criticism was perhaps dismissive and premature. Even if this was achieved under circumstances of invasion and resistance to it, such criticisms under-estimated the determination and creativity of the Maubere people to decide their own fate, however it may be seen by outside commentators.

Sympathetic commentators of the East Timorese independence struggle give little consideration for class in understanding what kind of nationalism the East Timorese were fighting for.⁴⁴ Though the class composition of East Timorese political parties is often noted, Fretilin is portrayed simply as a radical nationalist party, stripped of class moorings or dimensions. However, as Denis Freney stated in 1975, East Timor’s

‘modest revolution’, ... is a revolution without great ambitions, without a desire to strike postures on the world stage. It is a revolution whose achievements, past and future, do and will modestly speak for themselves. If it is worthy of emulation, then it is perhaps above all

in its modesty, in its anti-elitism and in its complete devotion to the oppressed people who are making it.⁴⁵

Too often, their program of self-reliance appears to be understood solely as a necessity of war rather than an alternative form of material existence that was embraced and fought for by the Maubere people.

From the period following Indonesia's 'encirclement and annihilation' of Fretilin people's war, the Maubere resistance was reduced to sporadic and symbolic protest, witnessed by the West as a lost cause of blameless victims, until Indonesia itself became convulsed by internal economic and political crisis.⁴⁶ In the postmodern present of corporate globalisation, the East Timorese and their pursuit of a form of national independence are now seen as worthy of acceptance into the 'community of nations,' despite the worrying question of their nation's economic viability. In the celebratory moment of East Timorese nationhood following the calamity of the 1999 referendum, sponsored and chaperoned by a United States dominated United Nations, the vision and sacrificed Maubere generations are too easily forgotten and ignored as the bearers and fighters for an authentic, self-reliant, socialist East Timor.

Endnotes

- ¹ Freney, Denis. 'East Timor: The Modest Revolution.' *Australian Left Review*, September 1975, pp. 3-10
- ² See Gunn, G. C. 'The Five Hundred Year Timorese Funu.' In Tanter, R, Selden, M. and Shalom, S. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community*. Pluto, Sydney, 2001, pp. 3-14.
- ³ Dunn, James. *Timor: A People Betrayed*. Jacaranda, Milton, Qld, 1983; Jolliffe, Jill. *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1978; Taylor, John G. *The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor 1974-89: A Chronology*. Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1990; Taylor, John G. *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The History of East Timor*. Zed Books, London, 1999; Budiardjo, Carmel and Soeiliong, Liem. *The War Against East Timor*. Zed Books, London, 1984; Ramos-Horta, Jose. *Funu: the Unfinished Saga of East Timor*. Red Sea Press, Trenton, NJ., 1987; Turner, Michelle. *Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies*. New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992; Niner, Sarah. 'A Long Journey of Resistance: the Origins and Struggle of the CNRT.' *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 32, 1-2, 2000, pp. 11-18; Rabbitt Roff, Sue. *Timor's Anschluss: Indonesian and Australian Policy in East Timor, 1974-1976*. Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, 1992; Nicol, Bill. *Timor: The Stillborn Nation*, Visa, Melbourne, 1978. Ball, Desmond and McDonald, Hamish. *Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra*. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 2000.
- ⁴ For example, Taylor, John G. 'The Emergence of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor.' In Carey, P. and Carter Bentley, G. (eds.) *East Timor at the Crossroads.: The Forging of a Nation*. Cassell, London, 1995, pp. 21-41.
- ⁵ Gunn, op. cit., p. 11.
- ⁶ Ibid. p. 9.
- ⁷ Porch, Douglas. *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. Croom Helm, London, 1977.
- ⁸ Ashenden, D. "Where is the Portuguese Revolution Heading?" *Australian Left Review*, 49, pp. 12-19; Robertson, Mavis. 'Wilfred Burchett on Portugal.' *Australian Left Review*, March/April, 1975, pp. 3-10; Ball and McDonald, op. cit, pp. 1-30.
- ⁹ Ibid; Carey, Peter. 'Historical Background.' In Carey, P. and Cox S. *Generations of Resistance: East Timor*. London, Cassell, 1995.
- ¹⁰ Ball and McDonald, op. cit, p. 4.
- ¹¹ Hill, Helen. *Fretilin: the Origins, Ideologies and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor*. MA Thesis, Monash University, 1978.
- ¹² Gunn, Geoffrey C. 'A Critical Review of Western Scholarship on East Timor.' *Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies*, 1994, Ch 4.
- ¹³ Carey, op. cit.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 35-37.
- ¹⁵ Ibid; Taylor, 1995, op. cit.
- ¹⁶ Head, Mike. 'East Timor, the History and Politics of the CNRT.' *World Socialist Web Site*, 17th November, 1999. (www.wsws.org).
- ¹⁷ Anon. 'Rogerio Lobato: How East Timor Fights On.' *Australian Left Review*, 57, pp. 6-15, esp. 15.
- ¹⁸ It is noteworthy that where Fretilin tried to resolve its difficulties with the Chinese, the Indonesian army shot hundreds of Chinese in the first days of the invasion (Carey, op. cit, p. 22.)
- ¹⁹ Evans, Grant. 'ortuguese Timor' *New Left Review*, 91, May-June 1975, p. 67-79, esp. 76-77. Not all Chinese were wealthy. One Chinese primary school teacher stated: 'We were friends of the Timorese Portuguese soldiers and we fought with them but we got not pay, it was just helping for justice, to keep order.' (Turner, op. cit, p. 96).
- ²⁰ Evans, *ibid*.
- ²¹ Carey, op. cit, p. 18.
- ²² *Ibid*.
- ²³ Turner, op. cit, p. 119.
- ²⁴ Freney, op. cit.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁷ Anon. 'Bloody History of the US in Indonesia and East Timor.' *Revolutionary Worker*, 1022, 19th September, 1999. (www.rwor.org)

²⁸ Carey, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

²⁹ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 134.

³¹ Ibid, p. 83-84

³² Ibid, p. 88-89.

³³ Ibid, p. 113.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 116.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 110.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 133.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 81-203.

³⁸ Carey, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 111.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 116.

⁴² Carey, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴³ Evans, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ For example, Taylor, 1995, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Freney, *op. cit.* p. 10.

⁴⁶ Carey, *op. cit.*, p. 28.