

Whatever happened to the rural revolt:
Thwarted by symbols,
science and substance?

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Abstract

In the period prior to the 2001 federal election there had been much speculation that voters in rural and regional Australia would punish the coalition. It appeared that there was considerable disenchantment amongst such voters with both the National Party and the Liberal Party over a range of policies which were seen as having an adverse impact on them. These policies which were subsumed under the labels of 'economic rationalism' or 'competition policy', were seen to have reduced services in non-metropolitan areas, to have reduced supports and subsidies and to have threatened the livelihoods of rural dwellers. This disenchantment was reflected in the support for the One Nation Party in the 1998 federal election and in state elections in Queensland and New South Wales, and in election victories for the ALP at the state level. The formation of Country Labor was expected to capitalise on this disenchantment. Yet, the ALP was not swept to victory in 2001 on the wave of a rural revolt. This paper seeks to explain why the 'rural revolt' failed to materialise. It will be argued that the explanation lies in more than simply the exploitation of fears of terrorism and a swamping by refugees. This is not to say that these issues were not important. Indeed the skilful linking of them as 'border protection' with quarantine threats struck a responsive chord and the anti-refugee stance undercut key support for One Nation. Strategically targeted spending initiatives, however, should not be overlooked in mollifying rural disquiet. It will be argued that the coalition reacted to the threatened rural revolt with measures (both substantive and symbolic) which enabled it to meet the challenge when coupled to broader 'security' issues.

Introduction

Prior to the arrival of the Tampa and events of September 11th 2001, there had been ongoing and regular media speculation on the role the 'bush' vote would play in the outcome of the 2001 federal election.¹ The speculation began largely as a result of the 1998 federal election when Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party received over 15 per cent of the vote in some rural electorates; rural voters proved twice as likely as others to support One Nation. No longer could the coalition parties assume that their country voters were loyal and stable.

This rural and regional discontent was not limited to the federal level, nor was it only vented in terms of support for One Nation. In the 1999 Victorian state election, there was a swing to the ALP in both regional cities and in the country, and Independents polled strongly in a number of rural/regional seats, culminating in the election of three independents.² In 2001, the West Australian election result provided Labor with the largest number of seats since 1911, and in the Queensland state election which followed a week later, the National and Liberal parties each received only 14% of the vote, compared to Labor's 49%.³ In both elections, the non-major party vote was significant (29% and 22% respectively) with One Nation doing particularly well, winning 3 seats in Queensland and 3 seats in Western Australia's Legislative Council.⁴

In 2001, at the federal level, the Coalition's four most marginal seats (held by margins of less than 0.5%) were in rural and regional Australia. Of the 30 Coalition seats held by margins of less than 5%, 19 (almost two thirds) were rural or provincial seats. Yet, the election results indicate that the Coalition was able to hold its own in country Australia, at least in terms of vote. The National Party vote increased slightly from 5.3% to 5.6%, although this has translated into fewer seats (13 compared to 16 in 1998). Pauline Hanson's One Nation vote was almost halved, dropping from 8.4 to 4.3% and Labor were largely unsuccessful in harnessing the regional discontent.

In this paper we ask what happened to the rural revolt that appeared to be imminent? Certainly part of the answer lies with the Tampa and global issues, but it is clear this is not the whole story. Attention also needs to be paid to the Coalition's range of policy alterations undertaken from late 2000, which were significant to the 'bush'; the symbolic attention given to regional Australia since the 1998 election; the less obvious but

nevertheless tangible use of 'science' to enhance a regime of technical barriers to trade for a range of agricultural and horticultural products; and the rhetorical methods used to link quarantine and border protection issues, ensuring that Tampa and its policy implications would have a special significance for those in rural and regional Australia. The combination of these strategies largely shut down any opportunity the Opposition had in winning critical regional seats.

The pseudo-campaign: Symbolic and substantive

Rural and regional Australia punished the Coalition in the 1998 election. The National Party vote dropped by 9% in rural electorates, while there was a 10% swing against the Liberal Party in provincial electorates. One Nation was the primary beneficiary of this electoral discontent, receiving 10% and 12% of the vote respectively in provincial and rural electorates. In an effort to regain their status in country Australia, the Coalition began to target more specifically those outside of the capital cities, both symbolically and financially. This targeting increased in intensity towards the end of 2000 and into 2001, so that in a sense, much of what was the Coalition's regional Australia policy was launched prior to the start of the official election campaign.

At the symbolic level, in October 1999, the Regional Australia Summit was held at which 282 delegates from a range of community, government and business organisations met to discuss problems and challenges facing regional Australia. Partnerships, local empowerment, equity of services and economic and business development were key issues defined as warranting government attention by the Summit. An \$83 million fund was set up following the Summit, with the aim of 'kickstarting' local community projects in struggling electorates.⁵

John Howard then undertook a 'listening tour' early in 2000, and the relay of the Olympic Torch and the Queen's visit in August 2000 included a number of rural and regional stops. While this may seem trivial, some communities felt these visits were an illustration that the government remembered they existed, and there appeared to be a local morale boost that accompanied these visits.⁶ In addition, the Alice-Darwin railway was launched (and relaunched it seems), while the Natural Heritage Trust funded by the proceeds of the partial sale of Telstra provided significant monies to projects in regional Australia, particularly in the area of land care. Two parliamentary committees looked specifically at employment and infrastructure issues in regional Australia.⁷ The Human Rights and

Equal Opportunity Commission conducted an investigation into educational services for children in rural and remote Australia, while the Inquiry into Telecommunications in Regional Australia by Besley was commissioned and reported in late 2000. Part of the Government response was a commitment that the remaining sale of Telstra would not go ahead until the Besley recommendations were met. These inquiries, while not all government-sponsored, and not all resulting in any significant government response, did provide an opportunity for rural dwellers to have their say through oral and written presentations on a whole range of issues directly affecting their immediate material well-being.

In terms of expenditure in the regions, the Government responded with increased funding for some ongoing regional expenditure programs and a large number of new spending initiatives targeted at improving the welfare of those living in rural and regional areas.⁸ In launching the National Party's campaign at Tweed Heads, John Anderson urged voters to remember his party's record in government, which he claimed included the investment of more than \$28.5 billion in over 300 separate regional programs.⁹

However, despite this investment of almost \$30 billion prior to the election campaign of 2001, the government continued to flounder in the polls.¹⁰ The fall out over the implementation of the GST was having an impact in the regions, as were increasing fuel prices. In response the Government preempted the Budget and began to spend up big in the bush. In early 2001, the Government chose to suspend the February indexation of the fuel excise, and additional money was given to local governments in regional Australia for roads (\$850 million). The May budget continued these expenditure patterns. Self-funded retirees, many of whom live in marginal coastal electorates were targeted and a commitment of \$163.1 million over four years was given to the area of telecommunications.

Quarantine, science and trade: A strategy of stealth?

While many of the substantive and symbolic initiatives listed above targeted the broader communities of rural and regional Australia, the traditional Coalition interests of rural industries were not ignored, but instead were addressed in more 'muted' terms.

The Liberal Party, with the support of the Nationals had, during their time in government from 1996, pursued a range of policies that were subsumed under the labels of 'economic

rationalism' or 'competition policy', which had resulted in a reduction in support and subsidies for farmers and growers, the deregulation of the domestic dairy and pig industries, and the loosening of government controls in the marketing of wool, wheat and other commodities.

However, such policies did not mean a complete removal of 'state' support for rural industries. Government involvement in maintaining and promoting international market access remained a key function within the bureaucracy. And what emerges, we suggest, is a different means by which domestic farmers and growers were provided with a shield from international economic competition.

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 'SPS Agreement') came into force with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation on 1 January 1995. The Agreement deals with food safety and animal and plant health regulations and allows countries to adopt measures that protect local products from disease, pesticide residues, particular additives and so on.

Under the Agreement countries are able to set their own standards but these must be based on the analysis and assessment of objective and accurate scientific data as far as possible. It is expected that countries will not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail. However, the WTO openly acknowledges that the adoption of particular measures may well result in trade restrictions, to the extent that protection of domestic markets results.

The Coalition Government, since its arrival into office in 1996 has paid some considerable attention to issues of quarantine. In August 1997 the Federal Government announced a \$50 million shake-up of Australia's quarantine services including a review of contentious quarantine risk assessment procedures for high-risk imports in line with the WTO SPA Agreement.¹¹

One of the first areas targeted for immediate consideration under the new process announced in 1997 was New Zealand's application to export apples to Australia. The ban on the importation of New Zealand apples has been in place since 1921 due to the possibility of fire blight disease affecting Australia's \$350 million apple and pear industry.

After a scientific review and an extensive consultation process by AQIS with growers and others, the local industry considered it had won the battle to keep out New Zealand apples after a draft decision to keep the ban in place was announced in April 1997.¹² New Zealand then warned that it would challenge both apple and salmon imports. It declared

that Australia was using 'specious' quarantine arguments to block the import of these New Zealand products.¹³ Not surprisingly perhaps, New Zealand lodged a second application with AQIS to drop its ban in early 1999. The Import Risk Analysis process which ensued was to last for almost two years.

In October 2000 Biosecurity Australia¹⁴ finally released a draft report recommending the lifting of the ban. The Director of AFFA stressed that the draft risk report did not represent 'approval for imports of apples from New Zealand',¹⁵ but growers saw it as a substantial threat. Within weeks, growers had sought an adjournment of the Import Risk Analysis. While this request was refused, a Senate inquiry into the issue was announced and Biosecurity Australia then extended the deadline for submissions from December 11 2000 to 28 February 2001. Not long after the close of submissions, the report by Biosecurity Australia recommending the ban be lifted, was dumped.

The case of New Zealand apples is perhaps the most explicit example of the scientifically-based Import Risk Assessment process becoming heavily politicized during the consultation process. There have been similar incidents with respect to both salmon and cheese. For example in the case of salmon, an Australian risk analysis concluded that no scientific basis for banning raw salmon existed. However, the federal Government did require that assurances be given that any imported raw fish did not show any overt signs of disease and the Tasmanian Government declared that the island was a 'protected area' under its Animal Health Act 1995. In 2000 the declaration was replaced by a 'general authority' under the Act, which outlines specific requirements for importing fish products into the State which ultimately allow for considerable restrictions.¹⁶

While being a firm advocate of free trade, the food imports regime now used in Australia has come under severe criticism by other nations: the United States citrus, table grape, stone-fruit and grain growers regarding constraints to access; Thai and US chicken farmers regarding conditions applied to cooked chicken meat imports, and; the Philippines Government over Australia's use of quarantine rules to limit access for its mangoes, bananas and other tropical fruits.¹⁷ The European Agriculture Commissioner noted in mid-2000 that it 'would be easier to pass through the eye of a needle than for global food exporters to get agricultural products past Australia's tough quarantine laws'.¹⁸

It is not possible to say categorically that the strengthened emphasis on quarantine necessarily swung the election in favour of the government, at least amongst those working in rural industries. The public generally, and even those in rural and regional communities may have been completely unaware of the way in which scientific quarantine measures were ensuring certain domestic products were not challenged by

international competition. However, the various sectors concerned would have been quite clear of the opportunities and problems such measures offered them.

Furthermore, the Coalition's provisions for enhanced quarantine service laid the groundwork upon which the later commitments to border protection could then be linked. Indeed, the skilful linking of asylum-seekers and terrorism alongside issues of quarantine threats, under the banner of 'border protection', struck a responsive chord amongst those in rural Australia and it would seem helped the Coalition to substantially undercut key support for One Nation.

The actual campaign: Securing traditional constituencies

Campaigns in regional and rural Australia are generally synonymous with 'pork barrelling', yet the 2001 federal election campaign had a slightly different complexion. The Coalition had already loosened the purse strings on regional and rural expenditure and further campaign promises were constrained by the desire to maintain an overall budget surplus. This particularly presented the ALP with a major problem, limiting its options to announce grandiose projects.

The Coalition campaign focused primarily on leadership and security both domestic and international, and foregrounded the issue of national security/border protection linking the firm stand on dealing with asylum seekers with the threat of terrorism. While these issues no doubt had an impact on those in regional Australia, it seemed little was being said to those in the country. 'For a campaign that was to be fought on rural and regional issues, we are still waiting to be put in the picture'.¹⁹

Howard was able to address the asylum seeker issue in his pitch to regional Australia by linking border protection to quarantine:

(our policy) involves support for new industries, big boost to quarantine and border protection, and restoring our environment with a particular emphasis on improving water quality... The coalition will defend our agricultural industries from overseas pests and diseases with significantly enhanced border protection.²⁰

In the main however, rural and regional interests were largely addressed by John Anderson and the National Party campaign, with Howard spending little time outside of the cities. This was in some ways necessary given that several of the Independents were

arguing that the Nationals had lost touch with those in non-metropolitan Australia, and had become too much like the Liberals. 'Regional' rather than rural Australia was the key term used by the Coalition in its campaign, thereby encompassing a constituency broader than the traditional farming vote.

Because the Government had already invested in a range of regional and rural programs, including packages to ameliorate dairy deregulation, the announcement by John Anderson of a further \$316 million expenditure on regional Australia paled in comparison. This money was promised for additional capital funding (over four years) for aged-care homes (including city fringes), for roads in regional Australia, and for extension of SBS television coverage and upgraded radio services for the regions.²¹

The Coalition also made a number of other commitments that targeted their regional constituency. It was promised that the diesel fuel rebate would be extended to cover small retail and hospitality firms, which used diesel for generators and that \$50 million would be spent on promoting ethanol production. More (\$306 million) was promised to increase the numbers of rural general practitioners, to provide more after-hours medical care, to boost cancer treatment in the country and to help arthritis sufferers and palliative care. Money from the Natural Heritage Trust of over \$350 million was earmarked for improving water quality and an extra \$21.5 million was to be devoted to TradeStart and Export Access programs.²² Other commitments tended to involve such small amounts of expenditure that they virtually fall into the symbolic or tokenistic class.

This is not to say that farmers' interests were insignificant. Assurances were forthcoming that tax legislation which impacted on family trusts would not be introduced and a number of concessions from both major parties were made to farmers during the campaign. These included commitments to protect rural property rights, to review of the Trade Practices Act, to give more power to farmers in their dealings with big retailers and processors, and to increase the number of rural vets.²³ The National Farmers Federation (NFF) welcomed both parties' plans on water rights and a review of competition policy but expressed concern with Labor's position on industrial relations and with becoming a signatory to the Kyoto protocol.

The NFF also put themselves at odds with the National Party early into the campaign. Mr Anderson had said that the Coalition would relook at Telstra's sale in 12 months. The NFF publicly noted that 12 months was too soon to consider selling the remainder of Telstra. Regional concerns were then inflamed by Mr Costello's announcement that the Government would sell its share in three equal tranches from 2003-2004 and that all the proceeds would be used to retire debt, with no social bonus forthcoming.²⁴ Howard,

fearful of an electoral backlash, countered this immediately by saying the sale would be at least four years away, (beyond his next term). The Government also countered a regional backlash to the Ansett collapse by providing emergency funding to Kendell, Ansett's regional airline²⁵ and granting regional passengers an exemption from the \$10 Ansett ticket levy.²⁶

Kim Beazley launched Labor's regional policy at Ballarat with a scheme for developing 'enterprise zones' which would revive rural Australia. A most impressive 'headline' figure of \$700 million in funding disguised the actual paucity of expenditure that was being promised. The need to keep actual new outlays to a minimum to maintain a budget surplus was also reflected in the fact that a considerable amount of the promised money was in the form of loans rather than outright grants. At its heart, the proposal entailed \$150 million (over four years) to be spent on depressed regions with economic and social problems which would be supplemented with \$350 million in infrastructure loans. Also promised was the creation of a new office for the regions and the development of a national regional development strategy, at a combined cost of \$17 million.²⁷

Labor gave an assurance that Australia Post would remain in government hands. Similarly, it was emphasised that other institutions, such as Telstra, the ABC, public schools and public hospitals would be protected under a Labor government, and the public interest test as applied to National Competition Policy would be expanded.²⁸

While the main thrust of Labor's election promises were directed primarily at urban voters, some of them had aspects which were designed to have a broader appeal. For example, Labor hoped to win support in certain regional electorates with its promise to 'roll back' the GST from long term caravan park residents.²⁹ Similarly, Labor's GST plan was promoted as reducing red tape for small business people with benefits particularly for those in the wine and meat processing industries³⁰

This was always going to be a difficult election for Labor in the regions for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, much of the budget surplus had already been spent. Second, the campaign election had to be fought on both global and local issues. While Howard was able to leave much of the regional campaigning to John Anderson and Ron Boswell, Beazley had no such alternative. This meant that while Beazley undertook some campaigning in targeted seats in regional Australia, he also needed to be in the city, on-hand to counter Howard on radio and television.

While some media commentators saw little difference between the two major parties' policies on regional Australia, Howard and Anderson sought a distinction by emphasizing

their close relationship with regional Australia and the community-focused nature of their 'initiatives'.

Our focus is on working with farmers and local communities on these important issues in contrast to Labor's plan to impose far greater intrusion from the bureaucracy in Canberra.³¹

It was as if the Coalition were trying to remind farmers and others of the way in which the Whitlam government in particular had sought to 'impose' regional solutions on non-urban Australia, and the Labor party's tendency more generally to apply centralised and prescriptive policies on rural dwellers.

The results

The discontent expressed by those in rural and regional Australia was never uniform. Over the last decade, some regional centres have experienced growth, while micro-economic reforms have ensured that other medium-sized towns have become small towns. There has been population growth in coastal areas, particularly in Queensland, New South Wales and south west of Western Australia, much of which has come from the cities, particularly as a result of those seeking lifestyle change or retirement. These demographic changes have meant electorates like Richmond, Fisher and Lyne are becoming less rural and more regionally-urban, therefore less traditionally National Party heartland. It appears that, at least in terms of how it pitched its campaign, the Coalition was able to successfully adapt its message to this new demographic.

However, there were some negative results for the Nationals in particular, as manifest in the support for independents, and the loss of Fischer's old seat of Farrer to the Liberals. In New South Wales, where post-election analysis has suggested the election was won and lost, there were some interesting developments in rural and regional electorates. While only two seats changed from the ALP to the Coalition (out of 19), in the seat of Calare, Independent Peter Andren increased his primary vote by 15% to 51.5%, despite the boundaries of his electorate being redrawn in 2000. Also significant was the election of Independent Tony Windsor, whose primary vote was 45%, in the electorate of New England. The election of these two independents received considerable attention, but it is worth noting that there were other Independent candidates in the electorates of Eden Monaro, Gwydir and Page who challenged the major parties by gaining over 8% of the

vote. Although National Party Leader John Anderson seldom acknowledged Pauline Hanson's One Nation by name during the campaign, he did directly address the challenge to the Nationals being made by independents, on a number of occasions stating the political repercussions of electing an independent candidate who would never be in government.

An Independent streak was also present in Queensland. Apart from Bob Katter winning back his seat of Kennedy as an Independent, other rural and regional electorates of Fairfax, Fisher, Herbert, Hinkler had an independent stand, and each attracted approximately 8% of the vote, (almost 10% in the case of Hinkler and Fairfax), while in Wide Bay, three independents between them drew over 10% of the vote. Prior to, and throughout the campaign, Bob Katter talked of the possibility of forming an alliance of independents to develop a loose charter for parliamentary action. The independent vote sits alongside a reduced, but still significant vote for Pauline Hanson's One Nation, which averaged 9% in Queensland rural and provincial electorates.

In Victoria, the electorates of Indi and Mallee saw independent candidates receive significant voter support, but it was Gippsland that provided a most diverse and localised campaign. There, six independent candidates stood against National MP Peter McGauran (as well as five other candidates), with independents capturing 13% of the vote (although this was a similar situation to the one McGauran had faced in the 1998 election). The presence of so many independents ensured a broad range of local issues gained a profile during the campaign: Basslink, river flows, coastal subsidence, logging, gas and local roads alongside the national issues of privatisation of Telstra, GST red tape and competition policy.

Victoria was the only state where the ALP was able to win a regional seat from the Coalition, that of Ballarat. And in this instance the endorsed Liberal candidate withdrew and had to be replaced just prior to the election campaign. Overall, the ALP did not do particularly well in rural and regional Australia. In almost all of its provincial seats in NSW, Labor's primary vote fell (the exception being Hunter), while in Victoria, the results were mixed. The only country seat in Queensland held by the ALP is that of Capricornia, where the primary vote increased by 2%.

The Independent phenomenon was less significant in the other states, Solomon in the Northern Territory being the exception. In Western Australia, the One Nation vote did not decline by as much as in other states (around 2%), suggesting some lingering discontent with the major parties, initially demonstrated by the strong vote for One Nation in the 2001 WA state election.³²

It is apparent the Coalition was able to lure a considerable number of voters away from Pauline Hanson's One Nation in this election. In at least two thirds of the rural and provincial seats won by Coalition candidates, the decline in One Nation vote was matched by an increase in coalition primary vote (except in Victoria).

Table One

House of Representatives: Regional summary

Rural electorates

	Seats Won 2001	% vote 2001	Seats won 1998	% vote 1998
ALP	6	30.7	7	32.2
Liberal	24	30.1	22	27.9
National	13	17.4	16	16.1
Democrats	0	3.8	0	4.1
Greens	0	4.0	0	2.1
PHON	0	7.1	0	12.6
Independents	3	6.2	1	
Others	0	0.7	0	
Total	46		46	

Source: Australian Electoral Commission

Provincial Electorates

	Seats Won 2001	% vote 2001	Seats won 1998	% vote 1998
ALP	11	40.8	11	43.6
Liberal	8	38.7	7	32.6
National		2.0		3.1
Democrats		3.5		4.1
Greens		4.5		2.9
PHON		5.0		10
Independents		2.2		
Others		3.2		
Total	19*		18	

*increase of one represents Solomon, new electorate in NT

Source: Australian Electoral Commission

Table One shows the results in the 65 rural and provincial electorates across Australia (representing approximately 42 per cent of enrolled voters). It is apparent that the Nationals increased their vote by 1% across rural electorates, yet they lost three seats, all of which were previously safe National seats. The Liberals gained 2% in rural Australia and 6% in provincial Australia. Pauline Hanson's One Nation vote dropped by just over 5%.

So while the Coalition parties might well be concerned with the rise of independents in its heartland, it seems that incumbency and the campaign focus on immigrants and global security ultimately overrode the local issues being championed by the many independents that stood. While the One Nation vote was comparable with that of the Nationals in many states, it appears that those voters who have moved away from One Nation have, in the main, returned to the Coalition.³³

Conclusion

Both parties pitched their campaign beyond the interests of farmers: the focus was on education, health, aged care, telecommunications and equity of service of these to those outside of metropolitan Australia. This suggests that arguments about the city-country

divide have permeated the consciousness of political spin-doctors, with an explicit recognition that rural and regional interests are about more than farmers' interests.

Post-election, the National Party has reduced its number of seats from 16 to 13, and consequently has had to forfeit a seat in the cabinet. Ron Boswell won back his place in the Senate, denying Pauline Hanson, but in Western Australia, Hendy Cowan was unsuccessful in his bid for a Senate place. While the National Party vote remained steady in this election, they lost Farrer to the Liberals, and were never a serious threat to the Liberals in Indi. Younger Liberal women were up against older National men. In the election post-mortem, John Anderson suggested a review would be needed of the National's preselection process. The election of three Independents will also allow for three-cornered contests in subsequent elections, meaning the nationals may not regain Calare, New England or Kennedy.

In conclusion, it seems that the rural revolt failed to materialise for a number of reasons. Exploitation of fears of terrorism and a swamping by refugees were maximised in the bush through the Coalition's explicit linking of these issues with quarantine threats. This was done at a rhetorical level; substantively by appropriating the position previously taken by One Nation; and by stealth through the significant pre-election rebuilding of quarantine services and the use of import risk assessments.

In addition, considerable symbolic and financial attention was given to the 'bush' after the 1998 election, and the National Party's (rather than the Prime Minister's) local presence in the regions during the campaign itself appears to have sufficiently appeased traditional rural constituents.

Elaborate theories seem hardly necessary to explain the lack of a 'rural revolt' in the 2001 election. Much of the rural disquiet seems to have been overcome by massive spending programs long before the election itself. Incumbency was clearly once again important. The only Labor gain in regional Australia took place where the sitting member had retired. An incumbent independent held Calare. Katter won his seat as an independent but he was the sitting member. The other two seats, which the Nationals lost were both ones where the sitting member had retired. The Labor Party's lack of rural infrastructure told against it. Lastly, overlaying these factors was the appeal to stability in the face of terrorist/refugee threats which, when coupled with quarantine issues as part of 'border protection' issue, proved a winner for the Coalition.

Endnotes

- ¹ See for example Grattan, M. 'Where to now for the Pauline protest vote?' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 October 2000 and Green, A. 'One million votes up for grabs, but nobody's crowing', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 November, 2000.
- ² Woodward Dennis and Brian Costar, 2000, 'The Victorian Election of 18 September 1999: Another Case of Electoral Volatility?', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol 35, no 1, pp 125-133.
- ³ Bennett, S and Newman, G 2001, *Queensland Election 2001*, Current Issues Brief 15 2000-01, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra; Newman, G 2001, *Western Australian Election*, Current Issues Brief 18, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2000-01
- ⁴ Ibid
- ⁵ Interestingly it was recently revealed that John Anderson and Wilson Tuckey approved more than \$1.6 million in regional assistance funding against the advice of their own committee, and that these two Ministers had received more funding for their own electorates than any other parliamentarians (*The Australian*, 23 July 2002).
- ⁶ See Curtin, Jennifer, forthcoming 2002, *Voicing the Vote of the Bush: Representing Rural and Regional Australians in the Federal Parliament*, APF Monograph, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra.
- ⁷ Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee, *Jobs for the Regions: A report on the inquiry into regional employment and unemployment*, September 1999, and House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, *Time running out: Shaping Regional Australia's Future*, March 2000.
- ⁸ An extensive listing of the governments rural and regional programs is provided in the report *The Foundations for Future Growth. Commonwealth Programmes and Services in Regional Australia 1996-2001*. Some aggregate expenditure figures are listed, but the cost of individual programs is not specified.
- ⁹ *Australian Financial Review*, 23 October 2001.
- ¹⁰ Morgan Poll, *Federal Opposition Increases Lead Over Coalition*, Finding No. 3377, February 27, 2001.
- ¹¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 August 1997.
- ¹² *The Australian*, 12 January 1998.
- ¹³ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 August 1997
- ¹⁴ Biosecurity Australia is part of AFFA's Market Access and Biosecurity Group.
- ¹⁵ *Courier Mail* 12 October, 2000.
- ¹⁶ *Business Review Weekly* 25 August 2000
- ¹⁷ *Australian Financial Review* 27 May 2000
- ¹⁸ Ibid
- ¹⁹ *Weekly Times*, 'Time we were put in the picture', 17 October 2001, p. 22.
- ²⁰ Howard cited in *Weekly Times*, 7 November 2001: 15.
- ²¹ *Australian Financial Review*, 23 October 2001.
- ²² *Weekly Times*, 7 November 2001
- ²³ *Australian Financial Review*, 23 October 2001
- ²⁴ *Courier Mail*, 'Year too soon for Telstra inquiry: NFF', 30 October 2001.
- ²⁵ *Courier Mail*, 2 October 2001

²⁶ *The Farmshed*, 'Regional passengers excused from \$10 air levy', 9 October, 2001 (www.thefarmshed.com.au/news).

²⁷ *Sunday Age*, 21 October 2001

²⁸ *Ibid*

²⁹ *Weekly Times*, 7 November 2001.

³⁰ A simpler tax system and cost of telecommunications were ranked first and second on a list of main concerns for rural businesses surveyed by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (www.acci.asn.au).

³¹ Howard cited in *Weekly Times*, 'Plan to move forward', 7 November 2001; Anderson, *Insiders Program*, ABC, 21 October 2001.

³² Newman, *op. cit*, 2001.

³³ Interestingly both Ron Boswell and Hendy Cowan in their fight for National Party Senate Seats, in Queensland and Western Australia respectively, campaigned to mobilise the ethnic vote. In doing so, they were separating themselves out clearly from One Nation, somewhat of a paradox given the national campaign seemed to explicitly co-opt some of One Nation's policies on asylum seekers arriving by boat.