

Security, sovereignty and identity

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Abstract

This paper is part of a broader research project that seeks to map the construction of security. Central to this project is understanding how particular conceptions or discourses of security come to have prominence and resonance with political communities concerned, and how these discourses might be located in a range of representational practices. This paper holds that security is not an ontological given, but a fluid political construction whose meaning changes across time and space. The meanings attached to security in any given context, and the extent of the resonance of these meanings, are crucially determined by representational practices that create certain understandings and expectations in political communities as to who 'we' are, and of the extent of our obligation to those outside the borders of that political community. Central to this, then, is the role of invocations of identity and sovereignty, particularly by political leaders, in representing the self and providing ideas about where the boundaries of our moral duties to others lie. The central argument of this paper is that the invocation of particular understandings of sovereignty and identity may be viewed as being indicative of an evocation of a particular discourse or narrative of security: of a conception of security at work. In making this argument, this paper will first attempt to outline the means through which security is constructed and operates in world politics. It will then discuss the ways in which sovereignty and identity are central to the construction of security, using the examples of Realist and Critical Security discourses of security. Finally, it will be argued that an acknowledgment of the relevance of the invocation of sovereignty and identity to security discourses and practices may provide us with an understanding of how discourses of security come to be evoked in different contexts and at different times, and therefore how meanings associated with security may come to be changed in a manner more consistent with progressive normative ends.

The construction of security

This paper argues that security, while possessing ontological content, is not ontologically given or fixed.¹ This point requires some elaboration. A range of theorists and practitioners would accept that security means the absence of danger, thus pointing to security's ontological content. However, the necessary subsequent movement towards defining what constitutes danger, for whom, and how that danger is to be addressed has yielded discourses of security as disparate as Realism and Critical Security.² Thus, security is not ontologically given, and what constitutes security changes dramatically depending on the actor concerned as well as specific cultural and political contexts.³ The definition of security is a political act in terms of defining an issue's importance, elaborating a group's core values and privileging certain means of responding to particular problems.⁴ Taking this argument a step further, the Copenhagen School has put forward the idea, based on a combination of Realism and post-structuralism,⁵ that 'security' is what state leaders say it is.⁶ The idea of security as being a speech-act on the part of state leaders, while problematic in terms of its statism,⁷ introduces the idea of the importance of power and representation in defining security, relating to Foucault's conception of the relationship between power (in this case, that of state policy makers) and knowledge (what constitutes security).⁸

The way in which security is represented, linked profoundly to questions of power, becomes even more important given the idea of the provision of security as providing, as Michael Dillon has argued, the 'mandate for the political'.⁹ Because states, and other actors,¹⁰ derive legitimacy through their claim to be able to provide security, the way in which security is represented must have resonance with the group concerned,¹¹ or else their legitimacy and even reason for being may be called into question.¹² This point is important in terms of recognising the role of structural factors, rather than simply agency, in the process of defining security. Constructivist insights concerning the role of culture and identity in constituting the realm of the possible within societies¹³ are important in recognizing that policy-makers are constrained in terms of the nature of their invocation or evocation of security. Discourses of security, therefore, are not simply chosen by policy-makers or leaders. In some cases, these discourses may choose and constrain actors' range of possibilities,¹⁴ with the important post-structural caveat that the actors most able to define security are also those with the greatest capacity to create a resonance for their

policy, and represent issues in such a way as to create contexts conducive to a particular security discourse through the creation of 'common sense'.¹⁵

Thus, 'security' is not ontologically given, but changes depending on context. That contexts in which security is evoked or invoked are constantly changing means that what constitutes security will also be constantly changing: over time, and across different groups or societies. The political nature of security is also an important point to note when addressing how or why particular understandings of security come to dominate in different contexts. The argument presented here is that the centrality of security to a range of actors' reason for being, and the foundation of their legitimacy, means that the invocation or evocation of security in particular ways must have resonance with the group that it is 'representing'. This resonance is mediated through representational practices of the powerful, however there still exists the possibility for alternative understandings of security to emerge and become important over time. Security, therefore, is fluid, constructed, and fundamentally political.

This argument, that security is politically constructed and fluid, leads to a crucial point for this paper concerning the importance of addressing discourses of security, rather than simply 'security'. This is that the particular discourse (or understanding) of security employed is more important than whether or not a particular issue, problem or threat is described or represented as a security issue. The example of the possibility of including environmental threats within the security rubric serves to illustrate this point. Proponents of this inclusion argue that environmental issues threaten state interests in such a way as to warrant their inclusion in the 'high politics' of security.¹⁶ There is a normative goal implicit in such an approach, based upon the assumption that the increased attention, resources and importance associated with security issues will benefit environment problems. Some critics of movements in this direction have argued that environmental problems will be detrimentally affected by their inclusion in an expanded security rubric: that they may risk being militarized, for example.¹⁷ Both approaches to the relationship between the environment and security noted here make a fundamental assumption that this paper rejects: they assume that security is ontologically given, or has properties independent of the *discourse* of security associated with it.¹⁸ The definition of an environmental problem, for example, as a security problem is neither good nor bad. Rather, the particular discourse of security evoked in addressing that problem will determine the extent to which the problem will benefit from being defined as a security problem. The Brazilian government, for example, defined the existence of an intact Amazon rainforest prior to 1988 as a threat to national security, as a breeding ground for political dissidence and potentially as allowing the formation of an independent state in the north of the country.¹⁹ In doing so, the government employed a Realist discourse of

security in which environmental concerns were deemed inimical to the preservation of the nation-state. However, deforestation may be defined as a threat to, rather than a tool for, security, if security is understood as involving the emancipation of individuals, particularly given the role of marginal actors such as indigenous groups in seeking to preserve forests and their way of life. Crucially, then, the discourse of security employed is more important than whether or not an issue is defined as a security issue, making an elaboration on alternative discourses of security all the more important.

Sovereignty and identity politics

The previous section has attempted to demonstrate the need to address discourses of security, rather than security *per se*. This section is concerned with elaborating a means of locating discourses of security at work. It is argued here that the conception of sovereignty invoked by an actor (particularly with reference to competing norms), and the role of identity politics (in terms of attempts to address the relationship between the self and the other), are crucial indicators of security discourses at work. Of course, the direct invocation of security is also indicative of a security discourse, but it is important to note the ways in which security is evoked through a range of practices and representations, particularly given that the goal of providing security is central to a number of actors' legitimacy, and therefore never far from the thoughts of political leaders.

Central to the idea of representations of sovereignty and identity politics being indicative of security discourses at work is that discourses of security are fundamentally embedded in broader discourses of international relations. As the following sections seek to illustrate, all discourses of international politics have, even if implicit, conceptions of identity and sovereignty through the elaboration of the boundaries of moral responsibility, the role of the state as an actor in international politics and the value of relative norms in international politics.²⁰ It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate discourses of security elaborated by Realism or Critical Security, for example, from the conception they also hold about the state, the other, and the boundaries of moral obligation that are central to understandings or narratives of sovereignty and identity. At this level, it is important to recognize the foundation of discourses of security in these broader assumptions of international politics, and to broaden our conception of when security is evoked and how representational practices affect the resonance of security discourses.

Sovereignty

Despite the centrality of both sovereignty and security to international politics, there have been few attempts to explicitly link these concepts. However, most attempts to engage with security, at both the theoretical and practical level, involve an engagement with sovereignty. As RBJ Walker has argued, it is difficult to escape sovereignty when discussing issues such as security: it permeates the way we talk about and think about international politics.²¹ Crucially, even discourses of security critical of the statism of traditional approaches to international politics continue to set out and evoke a range of understandings concerning the state and the norm of sovereignty, even while critical of the dominance of the state in traditional security discourses.

The understanding of sovereignty invoked by actors can be seen to be indicative of discourses of security in two ways. First, linked to the idea that discourses of security are embedded in broader discourses of international politics, the understanding of sovereignty held in Realism or Critical Theory, for example, may be taken to be indicative of the understanding of sovereignty held by their corresponding security discourses.²² Second, discourses of security operate on the basis of certain understandings of sovereignty. Questions such as who is to be secured and from what threats necessarily entail an engagement with sovereignty. Further, discourses of security involve a judgment (whether explicit or implicit) on which norms are to be valued in the international system, and the potential for norms concerning human rights or environmental preservation, for example, to constrain the actions of states and compete with the norm of sovereignty.²³ A brief analysis of the understanding of sovereignty, and the extent to which this norm is to be valued over others, in Realism and Critical Security will be provided so as to illustrate how the evocation of sovereignty through language and practice may be seen to be indicative of an evocation of a security discourse.

For Realists, sovereignty is generally understood in negative, external, Westphalian terms. Sovereignty, for Realists, involves the territorial inviolability of the state from external interference, in a manner consistent with the depiction of sovereignty in the Treaty of Westphalia and the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by the state.²⁴ This conception of sovereignty is clearly related to broader Realist claims of the centrality of the state in international relations, and the reliance on self-help as a means of preserving this sovereignty.²⁵ While the reasons for this need to preserve sovereignty defined in such terms differ in classical and structural Realism, with the former emphasizing the social contract between citizens and the state,²⁶ the emphasis is ultimately on the centrality of the state and preservation of state sovereignty as central to the security project. Importantly, John Mearsheimer explicitly related state survival (read security) with the

maintenance of sovereignty to the point of conflating survival and sovereignty,²⁷ a conflation which Jack Donnelly describes as common among Realist scholars.²⁸ Realists further argue that sovereignty will always 'win out' over competing norms, because the preservation of sovereignty is in the interests of states, and because there is no international society to impinge upon state action.

A useful starting point for understanding what Critical Security theorists think about sovereignty is that, for these theorists, sovereignty constitutes an obstacle to the realization of security. This stands in direct opposition to Realist claims that the best means through which security may be achieved, for the state and for its citizens, is through the sovereign power of the state. As Ken Booth argues, 'Critical Security Studies rejects...the belief that the state is and should be the key guardians of peoples' security'.²⁹ Richard Wyn Jones goes further, arguing that 'the overwhelming majority of states create insecurity rather than foster an atmosphere within which stability can be attained, and prosperity created'.³⁰ For Critical Security theorists, the maintenance of internal and external sovereignty obfuscates the possibility for the victims of insecurity to be empowered, and for non-state actors concerned with emancipation to affect security practices.³¹ Interestingly, Critical Security shares with Realism a perception that sovereignty will win out over competing norms. The power of the state, for both approaches, means that states will continue to privilege sovereignty over competing norms. While ultimately suspicious of sovereignty as a norm, Critical Security theorists are hopeful that the essence of sovereignty is moving away from a negative, external sovereignty and towards an empirical or popular conception of sovereignty that links the rights of the state to their treatment of citizens. Their focus on immanent possibilities for emancipation, and the fluid nature of political concepts and practices such as sovereignty,³² provides a basis for optimism concerning the future of sovereignty and the dominance of statist conceptions of security. Critical Security theorists are acutely aware of the strong relationship between security and sovereignty, even in attempting to de-link the state from security.³³

Conceptions of sovereignty are not just coincidental with the broad themes of discourses of security: understandings of sovereignty are central to these discourses, with issues such as who constitutes the referent object and agent of security ultimately being reliant on particular understandings of sovereignty and its value relative to other international norms. Further, the necessity to engage with the primary actors in world politics (states) has carried with it a necessity to engage with the ways in which they have defined or legitimized their existence, through both sovereignty and security.³⁴ It is thus argued here that the manner which actors³⁵ evoke or conceptualise sovereignty is crucial to locating a security discourse at work: through understanding the relative importance attached to sovereignty; the particular conception of sovereignty employed; and the expectations of

whether the norm of sovereignty will 'win out' over competing norms, we can move towards locating a security discourse at work.

Identity³⁶

As a number of theorists have argued, the question of identity is central to security.³⁷ Security, it is argued, tells us much about who a particular group (or at least dominant voices within that group) thinks it is, particular with regard other groups. As Gillian Youngs has argued, 'notions of security are strongly associated with identity and...the inside/outside, state/international, order/anarchy sets of oppositions reflect the political processes through which states secure an identity'.³⁸ Discourses of security, therefore, have inherent implications for the elaboration of the political subject (the self) and the nature of the relationship between the self and the other. This is somewhat different to the example of sovereignty as indicative of the evocation of a security discourse. In the case of identity politics, the manifestation of security entails particular implications for the group in question, but also for other groups whose very existence may be conceptualized as a security threat due to their not belonging within that group. In short, security discourses have different limitations in terms of their capacity to be 'other regarding': defined by Roy Smith as the 'ability to define one's own identity within the context of a greater community'.³⁹ The extent to which actors seek to engage with the 'other' or to attempt to construct or reify a dichotomy between the self and the other is crucial to locating different discourses of security at work. A brief outline of the approach of Realism and Critical Security to the issue of identity politics demonstrates the extent to which these discourses are founded, and reliant, upon different conceptions of the relationship between the self and the other, even if such conceptions are not made explicit.

The Copenhagen School has directly addressed the relationship between security and identity in arguing that a useful way of conceptualizing security is through recognizing the importance of societal rather than state security.⁴⁰ In this schema, security is tied to a set of shared values within society linked to that society's identity, rather than to abstract notions of the security of the state. Bill McSweeney is critical of such a conception of identity, arguing that viewing identity in such terms treats it as a thing rather than a process, thus obscuring the political means through which dominant conceptions of identity are constructed.⁴¹ It is important to recognize that identity is not fixed, and that like the intimately related concepts of sovereignty and security, particular identities are constantly being reproduced and reified through a range of representational practices. Broadly post-structural and post-modern theorists have also engaged with the relationship

between of identity and security, in arguing that security in contemporary world politics (as inevitably national-based) necessarily involves the construction and vilification of the other, usually outside the state, from whom the security of the self is purchased.⁴² RN Berki goes further, arguing that 'seeking security after oneself and being a cause of insecurity for others are not just closely related; they are the same thing, with no chance of either logical or existential separation'.⁴³ These theorists, however, ultimately conflate 'security' with a particular discourse of security, namely Realism. The attempt to redefine security in Critical Security, for example, is explicitly concerned with moving away from the idea that the security of the self must be purchased at the expense of the other.

Realism, whether engaging explicitly with security or not, has paid little attention to the issue of identity. This is not to say that a particular conception of identity is not present in the discourse. Rather, Realism is built upon a series of choices concerning the nature of the relationship to the other and the limitations of possibilities for being, both within and outside the state.⁴⁴ As Richard Ashley has noted, 'Realist power politics is...an art of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalisation of dangers, all in the name of a social totality that is never really present, that always contains traces of the outside within, and that is never more than an effect of the work of art by which differences between inside and outside are marked and total dangers inscribed'.⁴⁵ Simon Dalby and David Campbell focus on the ways in which US security policy (read foreign policy) during the Cold War, predicated on Realist conceptions of security, can be viewed as an attempt to define and reify a dichotomy between the self and the other, both within and outside the United States.⁴⁶ This process is central to the discourse itself, particularly in its operation and implications. The attempt to construct and reify a dichotomy between the self and the other is indicative of the evocation of a Realist discourse of security, in which the outside is defined as a realm of chaos and disorder, while the inside is defined as the realm of peace and security.⁴⁷ The relationship here between security, sovereignty and identity is particularly apparent in the Realist security discourse: the preservation of the state is the central goal in a Hobbesian state of nature, and the moral boundaries of obligation begin and end at the state's borders.

The distinction between Realist and Critical Security accounts of identity is evident in Ken Booth's argument that 'one of the aims of critical security studies must be to reconsider the distinctions between "us" and "them" in a political sense'.⁴⁸ In other words, Critical Security attempts to explicitly move away from the idea that security should be, or indeed can be, purchased at the expense of an other⁴⁹ whose very existence constitutes a threat to the identity and security of the self. This attempt is itself embedded in a moral obligation to those outside the borders of the state, even to a loose form of global community.⁵⁰ As Andrew Linklater has argued, 'a critical theory of international relations must regard the

practical project of extending community beyond the nation-state as its most important problem'.⁵¹ The idea of membership in a form of *global* society, in which the limits of moral concern are expanded beyond the state, significantly informs the Critical Security approach. Further, its rejection of states as the primary focus of security allows for a movement away from a form of identity (nationalism) that has undermined an engagement with the other. The focus on individuals as the 'ultimate referent' object of security⁵² moves towards a situation, for Critical Security theorists, in which there is no fundamental dichotomy between the self and the other in terms of how security is to be conceptualized and attained.⁵³ The attempt to break down dichotomies between self and other, and to move away from identity politics and towards an acknowledgement of the importance of community, is central to the Critical Security project.

As was the case with the norm of sovereignty addressed earlier, identity politics is central to discourses of security and to the security project. The extent to which discourses seek to be (or are) 'other-regarding'⁵⁴ is central to acknowledging how security discourses are constructed and what implications these discourses might have if employed. In short, the extent to which the 'self' is reified in opposition to an 'other', or the extent to which the 'other' might be identified and vilified, is central to understanding the nature of security discourses being evoked. Further, engagement with questions of identity and the manifestation of identity politics in terms of these self-other relations, is indicative of a particular security discourse at work.

Security, sovereignty and identity: Mutual constitution

The closeness of the relationship between security, sovereignty and identity is such that security discourses can be located in, and are indeed partially constructed by, actors' conceptions of sovereignty and through their attempts to either engage with, or vilify, the other. Richard Wyn Jones points to this symbiotic relationship in noting an important theoretical starting point for non-traditional approaches to security: 'those who reject state centrism as a foundation for thinking about security, also, as a corollary, embrace some notion of common security', which conceptualises security as being with rather than against the other.⁵⁵ J. Ann Tickner also points to the relationship between security, sovereignty and identity by arguing that 'when national security is defined negatively, as protection against outside military threats, the sense of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a secure community inside and a dangerous external environment'.⁵⁶ In other words, Realist conceptions of security, to which Tickner is primarily referring, involve a simultaneous move for states of

promising security, asserting sovereignty and reifying the dichotomy between inside and outside, self and other. By contrast, Critical Security discourses contest the idea of states as necessary agents of security, and define the provision of security in such a way as to problematise and critique sovereignty and the dichotomy between the self and the other. The sovereignty and identity politics elements of these approaches are central to the overall discourses of security, and a strong relationship also exists in terms of security discourses between sovereignty and identity politics. The assertion of sovereignty in negative, Westphalian terms leads towards, or reinforces, a context in which the self is privileged over the other to the extent that the other's existence constitutes a security threat, and towards an understanding of security as the territorial preservation of the state. The context in which security is evoked or invoked by actors, which is central to understanding how different discourses come to be evoked and have resonance with the group concerned, is significantly affected by understandings and representations of sovereignty and the relationship between the self and the other. Taking this argument one step further, it is possible to locate discourses of security at work through particular manifestations or conceptualizations of sovereignty and identity.

Conclusion

Critical Security and Realism, despite a shared conception of the importance of power in shaping international outcomes, exist at opposite ends of the political spectrum. While Realism accepts the current order of the international system as 'the way things are', Critical Security problematises the very emergence of this system and explicitly links global problems to the dominance of Realist understandings of international or global politics.⁵⁷ As such, it is not surprising that discourses of security linked to these approaches would have different conceptions of issues and concepts such as sovereignty and the nature of the relationship between the self and the other. The central goal of this paper has been to demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between security, sovereignty and identity. Through acknowledging the nature of this relationship, we can better understand how and when discourses of security are evoked or invoked by actors, and we can move towards understanding how it is that certain issues and certain actors come to be privileged over others.

Those interested in the concept and practice of security should move away from semantic issues related to defining security, and move towards locating security discourses at work and analyzing how particular understandings or narratives of security come to

prominence in different contexts.⁵⁸ Part of this project might involve addressing representational practices associated with sovereignty and identity, for example, in creating a context in which particular discourses of security come to have resonance or are accepted as 'common sense'. This research direction would also involve a move away from treating security as a thing to treating security as a process, and from focusing on what *security* does or does not do to focusing on the manifestation and operation of *discourses* of security. Through understanding the means through which security is constructed and operates we can locate possibilities for normative progression in terms of which actors might be empowered, which issues might be prioritized over others, and ultimately, how a context could emerge in which discourses of security concerned with issues of individual welfare might gain priority over the short-term interests of political leaders. This paper shares with Critical Security theorists a concern with the current operation of security in the international system, largely wedded to Realist conceptions of security, and it is hoped that through understanding the processes through which different discourses of security come to gain prominence, we can move towards a redrawing of the parameters of moral obligation and towards a praxis of security that serves to further the security of the most vulnerable.

Endnotes

- ¹ Joseph Camilleri, 'The security dilemma revisited: Implications for the Asia-Pacific', in W.Tow, R.Thakur and I.Hyun (eds.), *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2000), p.308; Simon Dalby, *Environmental Security: The Geopolitics of Colonising Nature* (forthcoming in 2002), chapter 9; Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997), p.332, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40 (1996), pp.242-3.
- ² Matt McDonald, 'Human Security and the Construction of Security', *Global Society*, 16:3, July (2002).
- ³ Camilleri, op. cit., p.308.
- ⁴ Michael Clarke, 'Politics as Government and Politics as Security', in M. Clarke (ed.), *New Perspectives on Security* (London: Brassey's, 1993), p.42; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'On Security', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Krause and Williams, op. cit., p.234.
- ⁵ Lloyd Pettiford, 'When Is a Realist Not a Realist? Stories Knudsen Doesn't Tell', *Security Dialogue*, 32:3 (2001), p.370.
- ⁶ Ole Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in *On Security*, op. cit., p.56.
- ⁷ Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school', *Review of International Studies*, 22 (1996), pp.81-93.
- ⁸ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Wheatsheaf Press, 1980); Michael J. Shapiro (ed.), *Language and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). Gramsci's conception of hegemony, linked to the control exercised by political leaders through cultural and social production of knowledge and 'common sense', is also useful here. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971). Further, Edward Said's ground-breaking text, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books 1979) deals with the issue of who has the power to represent, and what the implications are of particular forms of representation.
- ⁹ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.16.
- ¹⁰ Non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations may be variously seen to have defined their role in terms of the provision of security. The United Nations, for example, defines security in terms of the existence of international order, to which end the organization views itself as contributing through the provision of a venue for dialogue between states and through the establishment and elaboration of international rules. As Samuel Makinda notes, 'the primary responsibility of the United Nations is to foster and maintain international peace and stability (Samuel M. Makinda, 'The United Nations and state sovereignty: mechanism for managing international security', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 33:1, March (1998): 101-116). Amnesty International, meanwhile, has linked its central goal, namely the provision of human rights, to a broad conception of security encompassing these goals. For example, a publication on Turkey's human rights record in 1996 titled *No security without human rights*, argued that Turkey's justification for human rights violations against Kurds (namely the provision of security), ignored the fact that security necessarily entailed the provision of human rights, to which Amnesty was committed. For both the UN and Amnesty International, their existence is in part justified through the claim to provide security broadly defined, and both organizations have explicitly engaged with issues concerning the definition and implications of security.
- ¹¹ Ole Waever et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), p.188.
- ¹² McDonald, op.cit.
- ¹³ Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- ¹⁴ McDonald, op. cit.

¹⁵ Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp.4-16; Michael J. Shapiro, 'Representing world politics: the sport war intertext', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of Global Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989). Shapiro refers to this process as 'the production of acquiescence' (1989:75).

¹⁶ Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, 8:1, Summer (1983), pp. 129-153; Norman Myers, 'Environment and Security', *Foreign Policy*, 74, Spring (1989), pp. 23-41; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, 68:2, Spring (1989), pp. 162-177.

¹⁷ Daniel Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security', *Millennium*, 19:3 (1990), pp. 461-476; Marc Levy, 'Is the Environment a National Security Issue?', *International Security*, 20:2, Fall (1995), pp. 35-62; Waever, 1995, op. cit.; Sean Lynn-Jones, 'The Future of International Security Studies', in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds.), *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Strategic Studies and Defence Centre, ANU, 1992), pp.78-9. On this point, see also Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp.104-112.

¹⁸ Wyn Jones, *ibid.*, pp.108-110.

¹⁹ Joao Pacheco de Oliveira Filho, 'Frontier Security and the New Indigenism: Nature and Origins of the Calha Norte Project', in David Goodman and Anthony Hall (eds.), *The Future of Amazonia: Destruction or Sustainable Development?* (London: Macmillan, 1990); David Treece, 'Indigenous Peoples in Brazilian Amazon and the Expansion of the Economic Frontier', in *The Future of Amazonia*; Jose Goldemberg and Eunice Ribeiro Durham, 'Amazonia and National Sovereignty', *International Environmental Affairs*, 2:1 (1990), pp.22-39.

²⁰ On this point, see Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, 'Securing International Society: Towards an English School Discourse of Security' (forthcoming, 2003).

²¹ RBJ Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

²² I am indebted to Tim Dunne on this point.

²³ Of course, it should be noted that norms of sovereignty and human rights, for example, need not necessarily be in opposition. On this point, see Christian Rues-Smit, 'Human rights and the social construction of state sovereignty', *Review of International Studies* 27:4, October (2001), pp.519-538.

²⁴ See Makinda, op.cit.

²⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear* (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983). Of course, positive sovereignty is also important for Realists as the basis for allowing an escape from the Hobbesian state of nature. The important point to note here is that negative sovereignty is particularly important in terms of the prioritization of the state over individuals within it regarding debates concerning human rights and intervention.

²⁶ Max Weber, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', in Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers (eds.), *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

²⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19:3, Winter (1994/5), pp.5-49.

²⁸ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.54.

²⁹ Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit., p.106.

³⁰ Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies', *Contemporary Security Policy* 16:3, December (1995), p.310.

³¹ Krause and Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit.

³² Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991), p.313.

³³ Krause and Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda', op. cit., p.232.

³⁴ RBJ Walker, 'The Subject of Security', in *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit.

³⁵ Of course, it could be argued here that the linkage of security to sovereignty might lead towards a statist conception of security. However, it is argued in this paper that non-state actors can evoke discourses of

security, and frequently do, through attempting to undermine the sovereign claims of a state or through supporting those claims with reference to competing norms. Further, although not possessing sovereignty in a traditional sense, non-state actors can still evoke sovereignty in a manner consistent with a Realist discourse of security. Kurds in Turkey, for example, conceptualized water development projects on the Euphrates river in the south-east of the country as a 'theft of Kurdish water' (in Daniel Hillel, *Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.104). This invocation of sovereignty in terms of territorial ownership may be viewed as broadly consistent with the evocation of Realist principles of security.

³⁶ For an excellent overview of identity as it applies in international relations, see Iver Neumann, 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 2:2 (1996), p.142). Identity politics, also used in this paper, refers to the extent to which actors attempt to establish, through a range of representational practices, a dichotomy between self and other.

³⁷ Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*, op. cit.; Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War*, op. cit.; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Gillian Youngs, 'Beyond the 'Inside/Outside' Divide', in Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (eds.), *Identities in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2002).

³⁸ Youngs, *ibid.*, p.27.

³⁹ Roy Smith, 'Citizenship: Identification and the Global' in *Identities in International Relations*, op. cit., p.197.

⁴⁰ Waeber, 'Securitization', op. cit., Waeber et al., op. cit.

⁴¹ McSweeney, op. cit.

⁴² RN Berki, *Security and Society: Reflections on Order and Politics* (London: JM Dent and Sons, 1986); Shapiro, *Politics of Representation*, op. cit.; Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War*, op. cit.; Campbell, *Writing Security*, op. cit.; Burke, *In Fear of Security*, op. cit..

⁴³ Berki, *ibid.*, pp.32-3.

⁴⁴ Krause and Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda', op. cit.; Walker, 'The Subject of Security', op. cit.

⁴⁵ Richard Ashley in Youngs, 'Beyond the 'Inside/ Outside' Divide', op. cit., p.29.

⁴⁶ Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War*, op. cit.; Campbell, op. cit. Similar arguments have been put forward concerning the motivations for US involvement in the Gulf War (Jef Huysmans, 'Security! What Do you Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:2, p.239) and the Australian government's refusal to allow boatloads of asylum-seekers to be processed in Australia in August-September 2001 (Burke, op. cit., pp.322-331; Matt McDonald, 'Fear, Security and the Politics of Representing Asylum Seekers', *M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture*, 5:1 (2002) < <http://www.media-culture.org.au/0202/security.html> >).

⁴⁷ Walker, 'The Subject of Security', op. cit.

⁴⁸ Booth, 'Security and Self', op. cit., p.109.

⁴⁹ Paul Williams, 'Contesting the logic of 'securitization': a Critical Security Studies perspective'. Paper presented to the South African Political Science Association conference. Saldanha, South Africa, 29 June- 2 July, 1999.

⁵⁰ A forthcoming edited collection on Critical Security (Ken Booth (ed.), *Security, Community and Emancipation: An Introduction to Critical Security Studies* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 2002)) explicitly advocates a move away from focusing on identity to focusing on community regarding security.

⁵¹ Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.171.

⁵² Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', op. cit., p.317.

⁵³ The Critical Security discourse is not without its critics concerning its treatment of identity, however. Critical theorists, broadly, have been accused of essentialising rather than problematising identity (Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory: History and the Challenge of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p.26), while

others are concerned that emancipation of groups based on their collective identity might mean in practice little more than support for self-determination, with its associated problems (Mohammed Ayoob, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective', in *Critical Security Studies*, op. cit.).

⁵⁴ Smith, op. cit., p.197.

⁵⁵ Richard Wyn Jones, 'Travel Without Maps: Thinking About Security After the Cold War'. In *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. M. Jane Davis. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), p. 208.

⁵⁶ J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.189.

⁵⁷ Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10:2 (1980), pp.126-153.

⁵⁸ Karin M. Fierke, 'Changing Worlds of Security', in Krause and Williams (eds.), op. cit.