Political theory

Stream convenors(s):Jeremy Shearmur (Australian National University)
Complete list of papers

Other streams:       Australia's contribution to political studies    The disciplinary history of political science    Australasian politics    Political sociology    The politics of resistance and class    Health, politics and policy    Women and politics    International politics    Environmental policy and politics

Presenters: Megan Alessandrini  Mark Bahnisch  Bruce Buchan  Craig Browne  Hal Colebatch  Chris Geller  Martin Leet  Glen Lehman  Damian O'Leary  Gonzalo Villalta Puig   Stephen Reglar  Nic Southwood John W Tate  Nick Turnbull  Robert van Krieken  Mary Walsh (Arendt)  Mary Walsh (Individualization)  Jennifer Wilkinson 

PANELS

Megan Alessandrini, School of Government, University of Tamania
A fourth sector: The impact of neo-liberalism on non-profit organisations
Modern society has traditionally been viewed as comprising of three sectors; government, market and civil society. The theoretical base of three pillars of government (or polity), commerce (or market) and civil society has historically been assumed to be a comprehensive structure of society. Many theorists have proposed different characteristics for the sectors but until recently none have proposed fundamental change to the structure. Debate over civil society has been a central element of political analysis for hundreds of years. Civil society has been variously theorised as subversive and detrimental to society at large, as the site of social action and as a category into which all human activity that is not market or government can be placed. In the late twentieth century civil society has been viewed as the site of social and community activity and more recently the activities of formal community organisations that have become increasingly involved in the delivery of human services. It has become evident that the traditional third sector has changed dramatically and is now polarised: some organizations remain highly altruistic and amateur in their structure and functions, but others have developed sophisticated and complex modes of operation in response to the shrinking welfare dollar. A 'fourth pillar' to the traditional tripartite separation has emerged. This fourth pillar is that of the 'entrepreneurial civic service sector'. Organisations engaged in one or a number of formal legally based arrangements with government and other funding sources are now indistinguishable in many respects from market-based organisations. They cannot however be categorised as market organisations because they are not focussed on profit or capital accumulation. These organisations' underlying goals are survival, growth and compliance with appropriate values. In pursuit of these goals, organisations are achieving greater independence through funding diversity and the implementation of managerial strategic plans and processes. It is apparent that an additional 'pillar' provides a theoretical base to contemporary societal structure, and more accurately reflects society and the relationship between government and human service organisations.
Email: M.Alessandrini@utas.edu.au

Mark Bahnisch, Sociology, School of Social Science, University of Queensland
Derrida, Schmitt and the essence of the political
As the 21st century begins, the air is alive with proclamations and whispers of the end of everything. For from being the apocalyptic pronunciations which one might expect would mark the turn of a millennium, what is being enunciated is a set of discourses more utopian in nature. It appears to be of the nature of utopian dreaming to erase conflict - to announce the end of history, the end of ideology, the end of passion, the end of philosophy, and pre-eminently - the end of politics. While this gesture is not new, understanding contemporary discourses of the end of the political requires a broader theoretical frame than offered by the narrow debates Strong (1996) argues characterise a discipline largely concentrated within liberal problematics. This paper seeks to suggest that while many theorists over the past decade or so have turned to Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, its utility for analysing the contemporary postmodern (anti)political field requires supplementation by an engagement with the critique of Jacques Derrida [1994] (1997) in The Politics of Friendship. The paper reads Schmitt and Derrida together and argues that in some senses, Derrida's deconstructive reading of the Concept of the Political is already prefigured within Schmitt's text. The paper concludes by proposing a theoretical analytic based on the Schmittian Derrida which also engages with the work of theorists of the agonistic political such as Chantal Mouffe. This contributes to an exploration of the utility of a post-structuralist political analytic that comes to grip with the multiplicity of political antagonisms constructed agonistically through rhetoric.
Email: m.bahnisch@uq.edu.au

Manuhuia Barcham, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
The idea of corruption in late Medieval and early Renaissance European political thought
What I am interested at exploring in this paper are the ways in which the idea of corruption was approached as a problem of government. The attempted synthesis of the Classical and Christian traditions during this period make this an extremely interesting time to study the idea of corruption - a key motif in both these traditions. Taking the work of Augustine as the initial point of departure this paper will explore how various authors in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Europe attempted to synthesise these two very different traditions into a coherent whole.
Email: barcham@coombs.anu.edu.au

Craig Browne, Department of Social Work, Social Policy and Sociology, University of Sydney
Deliberative democracy and late-modernity
My paper compares Habermas' and Giddens' respective attempts to delineate the potential for democratization immanent in recent social changes. At the outset, Habermas' and Giddens' conceptions of deliberative democracy were conditioned by the basic categories of their social theories and corresponding models of modernity. Describing the contemporary developments promoting deliberative democracy as part of a later reflexive stage of modernization, they also found that the discontinuity of this new phase placed in question the expectations of progress and improvement that have defined social democratic understandings of the welfare state. Subsequently, Habermas and Giddens presented contrasting and overlapping responses to this situation. But in each case their arguments that far-reaching processes of democratization can offset the detrimental consequences of globalization are paradoxical. Namely, they overlook some of the implications of their earlier interpretations of modernity and Habermas' procedural paradigm of deliberative democracy acquires greater relevance precisely due to the very changes his social theory cannot adequately explain. While Habermas' version of deliberative democracy clearly satisfies most of the requirements of a normative political theory, it largely dispenses with the historical perspective of critical theory. Alternatively, Giddens attempts to outline a way of reconciling the dynamics of expanding capitalism and social solidarity, yet the result is less a genuine synthesis than an oscillating between policy alternatives. Nevertheless, I suggest that their respective arguments for expanding democracy and raising the levels of political participation are important. Due to the foundation of deliberative democracy in the principle of dialogue, it constitutes a counterweight to the conflicts of late-modernity. Indeed, deliberative democracy could even make increasing autonomy conditional on social justice. This potential is, however, diluted in Giddens' 'third way' politics and Habermas' discourse theory curtails the prospects for change through assimilating radical democracy to the legal principles of the constitutional state.
Email: craig.browne@social.usyd.edu.au

Bruce Buchan, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
The empire of political thought: Perceptions of Indigenous government in Australia
This paper examines the relationship between perceptions of Indigenous government and the development of early-modern European, and especially British political thought. It will be argued that a range of British political thinkers provided a rationale for the 'subjection' of Indigenous peoples by articulating the view that such peoples were in want of effective government and regular conduct due to the absence of property relations among them. The deficiencies of Indigenous people were thus framed by understandings of concepts of 'civility', 'government', and 'society' in European and British political thought. In opposition to the reason and freedom of European civility, government and society, Indigenous peoples in Australia and elsewhere were perceived to live in associations bound by unalterable custom and tradition. The paper will thus identify conceptual connections made between property, polity, civility, and sovereignty in European and British political thought. Understandings of these conceptual relationships will then be traced in colonial literature on the subjection of Indigenous people to British law and sovereignty, and on the existence or non-existence of Indigenous government and nation-hood in Australia. The paper will conclude with some observations on the 1998 Federal Court of Australia decision in the Yorta Yorta case. Discussion of this finding will be used to highlight the continuity of some salient assumptions about the nature of Indigenous social and political life prior to and after European colonisation.

Paul J Carnegie, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland
Assessing regime change: The processes of democratic transitions and consolidations
This paper offers an analysis and critical overview of the conceptual, methodological and theoretical issues that have helped shape and develop this sub-discipline namely, the transitions and consolidations of nascent democracies. Picking through the maze of approaches, normative statements and hypotheses makes it very difficult to assess the evolving conceptual, theoretical and methodological nature of the literature. It is important to know whether the relevant conceptual adjustments are being made when cross-regional analysis is undertaken. It is only through the study of varying regimes that it is possible to identify key explanatory factors and in some way explain or understand the processes of change taking place. Solving the problems of how to understand, what to analyse, the emphasis to apply to varying links and how factors interact with each other is a task of complex comparative sophistication. The aim in evolving better more sophisticated conceptual, theoretical and methodological frameworks is that it can help reveal factors missing from previous paradigmatic accounts and thus enriches the understanding of the diversity of ways nascent democracies have come into being and evolved. However the relevance of one approach over another should not descend into a valence issue. The aim is to draw on the best contributions of varying approaches bringing them together in contextualised and interactive way. This is in order to highlight linkages and help bring into analysis factors missing from previous approaches, (the interaction between economic and political transformation, the importance of media in a democratisation process, the influence of international factors and the role of mass publics in transitions as well as consolidations), that will allow an improved understanding of the processes of change.

Chris Geller, School of Economics, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University
Single Transferable Vote with Borda Elimination: A new vote counting system
Dummett (1997) notes particular difficulties with single transferable vote (STV) and proposes an alternative vote counting system called "Quota/Borda system" (QBS) to remedy specific difficulties. I propose an alternative system, structurally related to QBS, which accomplishes similar solutions but has some significant differences. This alternative system is identical to STV in all aspects except one. It eliminates candidates in reverse order of their Borda scores rather than by their current ranking of first-place votes. I designate this system STV with Borda elimination (STV-B). STV-B and QBS share general features. They retain proportional representation from STV. However, they differ from STV is two critical manners. First, both permit some influence on candidate selection to occur between voting blocks. Second, they are much more stable than STV when subjected to small changes in voter preferences. Outcomes from STV-B differ from QBS outcomes in two ways. Under STV-B, a minority that shares some preferences may elect a candidate even if the minority is not a solid coalition, as is required for minorities under QBS. Further, QBS always selects Borda winners, either for a minority or overall. STV-B may reject a Borda winner through emphasis on each voter's most preferred candidates.
Email: cgeller@deakin.edu.au

Carolyn Hendriks, Social and Political Theory Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
Exploring the murky waters of civil society in deliberative democracy
Civil society is one of those murky terms that floats around with multiple meanings, all with different political connotations. The field of deliberative democracy is as guilty as any of using the term with limited critical discussion of what it includes, and what its normative role encompasses. This paper takes on this exploration and in doing so reveals a number of tensions within the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Amongst the growing literature on deliberative democracy there are two emerging streams of thought and both have something different to say on the role of civil society. There are those micro-theorists who concentrate on defining the actual conditions of deliberation with some limited discussion on who should be involved (Elster 1986; Gutmann and Thomson 1996). This perspective suggests that citizens can engage in deliberative practice provided they are communicative, reflective and open to the ideas of others. Macro-theorists in contrast are more concerned with defining how deliberative politics might come about (Dryzek 1990; 2000; Habermas 1996). Their focus is on discussing the interrelationships between state and legal institutions and civil society. Macro theories of deliberative democracy call on civil society to engage in the contestation of discourses including oppositional public spheres. These two ideas on the role civil society should play in a deliberative democracy seem to be in conflict - one requires participants to engage in collaborative practices with the state and the other advocates for political activity outside and against the state. Apart from this being a theoretical inconsistency, this phenomena also has practical ramifications. The recent experiences of how some interest organisations choose to react strategically to innovative public participation processes such as citizen juries and deliberative polls demonstrate that the ideals of structured deliberative forums are often in conflict with the unstructured nature of deliberation in civil society and the public sphere.
Email: Carolyn.hendriks@anu.edu.au

Martin Leet, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland
Relations between science, morality and aesthetics
Theorists such as Weber and Habermas argue that the disintegration of religious and metaphysical worldviews negates the possibility of an intrinsic harmony between different spheres of cultural value. In particular, they suggest that a process of disenchantment has taken place in which the claims of science, morality and aesthetics can no longer be reconciled. A holistic type of meaning has disappeared since that which is called true cannot also be identified as good and beautiful. Habermas argues disenchantment is a progressive development as long as none of these three values is dominated by the others. He has set himself the task of (re)validating the aesthetic and especially the moral spheres of value which tend to be suppressed in an instrumentalist culture. Weber and Habermas proceed on the assumption that only metaphysical and religious ideas of an absolutist kind can ground the unity of science, morality and aesthetics. This paper disputes that assumption by drawing upon recent developments in political theory connected to the notion of 'weak ontology'. These developments, it is claimed, point to harmonious relations between science, morality and aesthetics by focusing more upon the affective level of sensibilities, attitudes and dispositions than upon the plane of rational ideas. This approach, it will be argued, provides a better way of responding to the one-sided development of culture in western modernity.
Email: m.leet@mailbox.uq.edu.au

Damian O'Leary, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
Post-national belonging: Unpacking Habermas' constitutional patriotism
This paper focuses on the ethical underpinnings of Habermas' claim that 'regardless of the diversity of different cultural forms of life, [constitutional patriotism] require[s] that every citizen be socialized into a common political culture.' (Habermas, 1996:500) Constitutional patriotism is Habermas' answer to the problematic relationship of national identity to citizenship. In contrast to republican arguments stressing the importance of shared ends and affective attachments to one's political community, Habermas argues for a post-national form of political belonging, secured via one's identification with, and patriotic duty to, specific political, rather than cultural, ends. There are two features to Habermas' approach that I focus on, each of which exhibits ethical defects in Habermas' theoretical schema. The first relates to the forms of socialization that the demands of constitutional patriotism issue. Here, I examine Habermas' distinction between politics and culture and suggest that he fails to recognize the crucial ways in which they are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. My second focus is on the relationship between belonging and the normative character of the state as the proper vehicle for determining issues of belonging. Habermas' perspective on belonging remains focused on the nation-state, even though his approach to a post-national form of belonging emerged out of considerations of the mass-movement of people across state boundaries, a movement heightened in intensity and importance as a result of the second world war. So although Habermas signals an affection for a notion of world citizenship, he continues to undermine the possible realization of such a goal by reinforcing the normative character of state apparatus used to denote legitimate belonging. (The paper concludes by suggesting that the conventional normative paradigms of citizenship fail to recognize the changes in empirical conditions that render these paradigms increasingly anachronistic.)
Email: doleary@coombs.anu.edu.au

Aleksandar Pavkovic
Secession from a liberal state: Is it justified?
Unilateral secession breaches the majority principle and the principle of equal rights to which a liberal democratic state should adhere. How can one justify such a breach in a case in which the seceding state also aspires to be a liberal democratic state? I argue that a breach of the majority rule can be justified in a case in which the parent state refuses to negotiate over the secession with a secessionist political leadership which had already won a referendum for a secession. Through the referendum the secessionist group had petitioned the parent state to change its constitutional order so as to enable the group to pursue a politically satisfying life in a separate state 'of their own'. If the parent state refuses to negotiate over secession, it thereby denies the secessionist group the liberty of a pursuing a politically satisfying life. Secession in such a case becomes the only effective instrument the secessionist have for the defence of that liberty.
Email: apavkovi@laurel.ocs.mq.edu.au

John Parkinson, Social & Political Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
Plus ça change: The use of deliberation in the UK's National Health Service
Britain's National Health Service is apparently in the midst of a dramatic transformation from centralised bureaucracy to "patient-centred" network. The rationale is partly a familiar one given the New Public Management reforms of the last two decades: efficiency, control of bureaucracy, and accountability. But, given the "Third Way" imperatives of the Blair government, it is also claimed to be radically democratic, transferring power from central and regional bureaucracies to local communities. This is happening in many ways, such as transferring decision making power to primary care practices and putting lay members on their boards; creating Health Action Zones controlled by elected community representatives; and giving local government more scrutiny powers over health authorities. Just as important has been the use of apparently deliberative democratic means of engaging with citizens. Health policy actors at various levels inside and outside government have been using citizens' juries, consensus conferences, citizens' panels and so on, not just as consultative exercises but also for real decision making. However, the results of the encounter between deliberative democracy, "Third Wayism", and a new public management focused bureaucracy, embedded in a liberal state, are unlikely to be straightforward. In this paper, I concentrate on the use of deliberative techniques as a starting point to examine that encounter. Drawing on interviews with 30 health policy actors, I look at how deliberative techniques have been used and why they have become popular in certain sections of the NHS. The analysis reveals issues to do with state legitimation and the roles of citizens and experts, and will question whether the reforms are truly as dramatic a revolution as they are claimed to be, or whether it is a matter of the more things change, the more they stay the same.
Email: parkinson@coombs.anu.edu.au

Gonzalo Villalta Puig, Australasian Political Studies Association
Michael Oakeshott's critique of rationalism in politics: A counter-critique
Ideological politics reduces political activity and discussion to a few simple rules thought to be formulated independently of the activity itself. These rules are assumed to constitute an objective criterion appropriate both for understanding or evaluating the polity and for guiding political conduct. Starting from the proposition that Rationalism is a misconception of knowledge and its acquisition, Michael Oakeshott criticises this kind of politics because of its Rationalist character. That is, he criticises the Rationalist belief in the sovereignty of technique or ideology in politics. Denying its alleged certainty, self-completeness, and independence, Oakeshott argues that a technique or an ideology depends on, implies, or presupposes another kind of knowledge, practical knowledge, of which it is only an abridgement. In short, he concludes that a technique or an ideology does not reveal a concrete manner of activity. Oakeshott's critique of Rationalism in politics also has its critics. This paper argues that while, on the whole, Oakeshott has been unfairly treated by his commentators (much of the critique addressed at Oakeshott is invalid because it wilfully ignores what he has written), his argument does give rise to at least four issues that he either ignores or does not effectively discuss. Firstly, if what Oakeshott argues holds true, that is, if ultimately all politics are traditionalist and so Rationalist (that is, ideological) politics are impossible, then, there would seem to be no reason for preferring one style of politics to another. Rationalist politics, though theoretically naïve, would seem to pose no great threat and, therefore, not to be worth criticising. Two other criticisms can be addressed at Oakeshott's use of tradition. The first is that Oakeshott's notion of tradition does not offer a criterion against which to distinguish a good tradition from a bad one; it does not provide a standard by which an entire tradition might be assessed. Not all traditions, it is argued, are good. The second criticism is that no tradition is univocal, that no tradition intimates a single thing. Rather, a tradition always intimates many (and often contradictory) things. By itself, tradition cannot indicate to us which intimation amongst this multiplicity to pursue. Finally, Oakeshott's particular understanding of political activity implies an inherent denial or devaluation of political philosophy. By understanding political activity in terms of practice, Oakeshott denies the possibility of a theoretical or, as he would call it, technical understanding of politics.
Email: gvillaltapuig@claytonutz.com

Stephen Reglar, School of Politics, Australian Studies and History, University of Wollongong
Why politics is by nature a-historical
It is often argued that being a-historic is a major defect. This paper argues that the main concepts in politics are by their very nature a-historical. Not only is contemporary political theory overwhelmingly a-historical but that situation is very much how it has always been. Moreover, "good politics" should be a-historical. Politics is universal, a-temporal and involves the exercise of free will and the formation of government by consent and obligation as an act of free will. Politics is based on consensus. At times consensus coexists with conflict, but for politics to exist there has to be a basic consensus as to the rules of the game. Politics is necessary because of the uncertainty of the outcomes of political practice and the inherent uncertainty of the informational inputs to its practice. We cannot accurately foretell the future nor is the level of information on which politics is founded ever certain because of the nature of human behaviour and motivations. For good politics to occur, however, the rules, roles and norms of the game need to be certain, to the extent that they are consensual. Consequently, politics needs to be anti historicist in both of that confused and confusing doctrine's two opposite meanings. Furthermore, not only are the main methodologies of political science a-historic, but history can only ever play a secondary role in the study and practice of political science. History is not irrelevant to political scientific inquiry but it is secondary. Nor does it have a privileged place in political inquiry. In political scientific inquiry historical research fills out the subsidiary questions raised by the particular matrix or paradigm of political scientific inquiry used. Before any use of history in political inquiry comes a set of concepts and questions which are derived ultimately from ideas of human nature and of the "good life." In many cases the questions and concepts are derived a priori. Such questions and concepts ultimately set the limits and conditions for inquiry. Overall political analysis requires not only empirical information, which might include historical and sociological information, and examination of such data but also further critical inquiry. And it requires analysis based on an understanding of the main concepts involved in political thought -which include: rights, justice, freedom, obligation, equality, virtue, sovereignty, authority, power, state and civil society. None of these concepts are purely products of the past or of history. From its origins as a disciplined form of inquiry in ancient India, China, Mesopotamia and Greece political inquiry has spurned any conception of a philosophy of history. Each of these cultures regarded history a collection of facts about the past, subordinate to speculations about the cosmological order. Its basic concepts are products of speculation about the universal aspects of the human condition. They are concerned more with the future than the present or the past. Politics developed alongside political economy and is critically bound to it. Instead of the contemporary view of political economy, which talks of the interaction of state and economy, in its classic sense political economy involves two related fields of study. The first is the study of the realms of freedom and necessity, which are explicitly examined by Plato. Political economy has always concerned itself with the question of how to expand the sphere of freedom and limit the sphere of necessity for all people. The second field involves the realisation that the destruction of localised and familial autarky by a modern widespread division of labour meant that the old division between public (polis, politike koinonia or res publica) and private or the household (oikos) was no longer apposite. Political economy in common with politics is necessarily based on a-historic concepts.
Email: sreglar@uow.edu.au

Maurice Rickard, Australian Parliamentary Fellow
Party discipline, conscience voting and conscientious dissent
Individual parliamentary members of Australian political parties are usually expected to adhere to the party position on policy in parliament. Unauthorised non-adherence often attracts penalties from the party machine. Conformity is therefore coercively enforced under threat of party discipline. At times there are claims that disciplined party conformity is too extensive, and that there should be more opportunity within the party system for free voting. In Australian politics over the last three or so years, the issue of free voting has arisen on occasion in connection with conscience voting - particularly whether certain issues should count as issues of conscience or not, and also in connection with parliamentarians indicating an intention to cross the floor on conscientious grounds on certain policy issues. No doubt, the decision as to whether an issue will actually be granted a conscience vote, or whether dissent on the floor will be tolerated, will be strongly influenced by strategic party political considerations. However, of more fundamental philosophical interest is the question of what issues, if any, count as genuine issues of conscience in and of themselves, and in virtue of what do they so count. Similarly, there is the question of when, if ever, it is justifiable from an ethical or philosophical point of view, for individual party members to express dissent on the floor, without the subsequent imposition of party-based discipline or penalties. This paper critically explores the major arguments surrounding the identification of genuine issues of conscience, and also those advanced in favour of justified dissent.

Nic Southwood, Social and Political Theory, RSSS, ANU
Resolving deliberative democracy's proceduralist ambiguities
In this paper, I show that, whilst necessarily proceduralist, the ideal of deliberative democracy may be interpreted in four different ways, depending upon what answers one gives to two logically independent questions that are inescapable for any version of proceduralism. After mounting a general argument for only one of these interpretations of proceduralism being remotely desirable, and then detailing two sets of challenges to which any version of this interpretation must provide answers, I show that a kind of deliberative democracy that I call 'deliberative republicanism' looks relatively promising with respect to answering these two sets of challenges.
Email: nfs@coombs.anu.edu.au

John W Tate, School of Policy, University of Newcastle
Liberalism and its limits
Liberalism is a contested term. While many liberals will agree on its more central values, its boundaries and limits are open to continual dispute and negotiation. For instance, the liberal tradition's historic commitment to plurality and diversity has necessarily entailed limits - that point where certain types of differences are no longer tolerated. This paper argues that liberalism has been defined by intrinsic and extrinsic limits - those which it has imposed on itself and those which have been imposed upon it, not least by liberalism's institutional context within the wider sphere of state systems and democratic politics. In the wake of September 11, it is the latter type of limit which has become more salient within contemporary political practice. This paper looks at the historical experience of liberalism within Australia and the United States, and focuses on those periods where liberalism has been under the most intense pressure to concede extrinsic limits, in favour of state and democratic concerns about national security. To what extent is liberalism able to defend its intrinsic limits against such extrinsic demands in these circumstances?
Email: ecjwt@cc.newcastle.edu.au

Nick Turnbull, Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales
A theoretical analysis of the argumentative turn in policy theory, in light of the philosophical separation of logic and rhetoric
Argumentation and rhetoric have been identified as important in the theoretical policy literature. Authors such as Majone, Fischer and Dryzek have critiqued the rationalist model of policy making, pointing out the necessity for policy makers to utilise argumentation in formulating policy problems and articulating their solutions. Policy decisions are not made via a scientific determination of necessary truth, but through a contestable process in which the participants argue in favour of different positions. This also raises the importance of political rhetoric in the policy process. However, difficulties persist in understanding how argumentation and political rhetoric can be incorporated into political science. This stems from the Aristotelian division between logic and rhetoric which presents rhetoric as a weakness of reason. Consequently, rhetoric is viewed as being a justification after a decision has already been made, or as manipulative discourse designed to obscure the truth. Rhetoric remains secondary to logical demonstration, and so the study of policy argumentation and political rhetoric is incommensurable with the scientific analysis of politics. The study of policy arguments is thus cast as inferior to the rationalist model of policy analysis on more than sociological grounds, as it is founded on a fundamental philosophical construction. The theoretical literature on policy argumentation is discussed in light of this philosophical understanding. This division is played out in various ways in the policy theory literature, having consequences for the theoretical conceptualisation of policy and the implied separation of policy and politics. Michel Meyer's philosophy is the basis for this critique. Meyer's alternative approach is not articulated, but his argument that the degradation of rhetoric stems from the suppression of questioning in favour of propositional reasoning is applied to policy theory.
Email: nickturnbull_au@yahoo.com.au

Robert van Krieken, University of Sydney
What has civilization got to do with liberalism? Political theory, settler-colonialism, and the Stolen Generations
The history of the stolen generations, and its current re-assessment, provides an important stimulus towards critical reflections on the nature of liberal politics and practices in a settler-colonial context. This paper will sketch out some of the challenges that the stolen generations history poses for the understanding of liberal political rationalities. It will focus in particular on the linkages between the historical development of liberalism and changes in what is understood and experienced as 'civilization', beginning with the contrast between the reliance on the concept of 'civilization' both to remove Aboriginal children families up until the 1970s, and to provide support for the subsequent critique of removal policies and practices. This contrast will be used to reflect on the heterogeneity of liberal political thought, especially the exclusions which operate alongside its claimed inclusiveness, with particular constructions of 'civilization' operating as a crucial 'filter' for liberal citizenship. Liberal political regimes thus appears more as a terrains across which the liberal concern for individual welfare and freedom is articulated with the exercise of power within more specific, and ever-changing, framings of civilization.
Email: robertvk@mail.usyd.edu.au

Mary Walsh, University of Canberra
Arendt and the political: From freedom to power
The concept of "the political" and its relation to "the social" and "the philosophical" are absolutely central to the oeuvre of Arendt's political theory. Arendt's elaboration of the dignity of the political in The Human Condition (1958), Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (1961) and On Revolution (1963) provides a landmark contribution unsurpassed by many contemporary political theories. This paper argues that the Arendtian theorisation of the concept of the political and (its relation to the social and philosophical) significantly reinvigorates contemporary discussions of the significance of political theory, emphasising the distinctiveness of political traditions as opposed to political history. It argues against Villa's recent assertion that Arendt's conceptual distinction between the political and social and public and private "was too rigid for her own good" (2000:19). Arendt outlines the 'unconscious substitution of the social for the political' in the modern age with a breath taking clarity that is as spectacularly original as it is (apparently) shocking. In Kristeva's words, Arendt "envisages the very transfiguration of the political" (2000:9). Her more widely cited critics on this theme (Pitkin, 1981; Bernstein, 1986 and Villa, 1999, 2000) vary in their degree of response to her central conceptual positions. While engaging with Arendt's important contributions on the relation of the political and the social, they tend to read exclusively from Arendt's discussion of 'The Social Question' in On Revolution (focusing upon her reading of the political implications of the French and American Revolutions and controversial interpretation of Marx as anti-political). Their readings insufficiently engage with insights from The Human Condition (1958:22-78) and Between Past and Future (1961:106-120). Overall, this paper seeks to elaborate upon the distinctiveness of the political that emerges in the work of Arendt, as well as engaging in recent critiques of Arendt's work. Arendt demonstrates the strengths of new political theorising, one that makes possible a reintegration of thinking and action for restoring the dignity of political theory into the new millennium.
Email: MaryW@management.canberra.edu.au

Mary Walsh, University of Canberra
Individualization, sociology and sub-politics: Implications for political theory
It has become increasingly imperative for contemporary international political theorists to demonstrate the distinctiveness of political theory contributions to theorisations of the political and public realm (Walsh, 2003). This is particularly so in the face of the emerging phenomenon of prominent international sociologists theorising on politics and the public realm in the shadow of widely held misconceptions that the discipline of political theory has been unwilling to conceptualise the public realm outside the state. Bauman's recent work In Search of Politics (1999), Liquid Modernity (2000) and The Individualized Society (2001) cover a range of themes held together by his observation that society can no longer guarantee a collective remedy for individual concerns. Bauman recognises that the problem in contemporary society is that "the most common troubles of the individuals-by-fate are not additive. They simply do not sum up into a 'common cause'" (2001:48). According to Bauman, the demise of citizenship means that the public arena is filled with the concerns and preoccupations of individuals as individuals leaving little room for other considerations. "The 'public' is colonized by the 'private'; 'public interest' is reduced to curiosity about the private lives of public figures, tapering the art of public life down to a public display of private affairs and public confessions of private sentiments" (2001:49). Similarly Beck in The Reinvention of Politics (1997), Democracy Without Enemies (1998) and Individualization (2002) distinguishes between politics and sub-politics claiming the latter category as a sociological reinventing of politics and public life. The paper explores what is at stake for the discipline of political theory and political theorizatons of the public realm in the face of blatant appropriations of these central political concerns by some international sociologists. The paper argues that the discipline of political theory offers key insights into the nature of the political and the public realm that are obscured by an analysis of politics by sociologists.
Email: MaryW@management.canberra.edu.au

Jennifer Wilkinson, Cumberland College of Health Sciences, University of Sydney
Putting privacy before the public: Why liberalism inverts accountability in journalism ethics
Journalists place great emphasis on the importance of the public and the validity of democratic principles in explaining the moral value of their profession. Journalists claim they have a special duty to represent the public. This duty and the principle of public accountability to which it is attached is seen to derive from the liberal theories of democracy. Accountability is often explained by invoking powerful democratic legitimations about the rights of the public, but in actual journalistic practice, the scope of democracy is principally confined to considerations about the rights of the individual . Communitarian theories show us that liberalism is far better at protecting the rights of the individual, than it is at securing civic obligation in the sense of a civic community or expanding the terms of public participation. It is because of the narrow liberal underpinnings of journalism that discussions of media ethics have traditionally been focussed on the democratic significance of privacy rather than the democratic importance of public accountability. This paper will explore these propositions. I take up the issue of public accountability by moving outside the liberal paradigm to evaluate the notions of public within the civic traditions of democracy.

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