

Marshall, Mannheim and modern citizenship

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Refereed paper presented to the
Jubilee conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association
Australian National University, Canberra, October 2002

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Abstract

In this paper we address a little-studied tension in Marshall's account of the *successive* emergence of civil, political and social rights in citizenship as 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community.' Although Marshall noted that conflicting principles in citizenship arose 'from the very roots of our social order,' he did not elaborate the point in this first tripartite model. When he returned to it by emphasising strains between democratic, welfare and capitalist moments that were *co-present* in the 'hyphenated society' rather than successive, he did so in a pessimistic tone at odds with the progressive modernism of his first schema. To blend the two models we read Marshall through Karl Mannheim's early studies of political knowledge. Here Mannheim had anticipated the shift from stages to co-presence, and had prefigured a resolution of Marshall's sense of impasse. In his account of liberal, socialist and conservative 'thought-styles' - the ways of seeing and knowing that are characteristic of particular ways of life - he saw political change as an interactive effect of individually calculating, dialectically collective and culturally symbolic forms of rationality. Since this approach has a classical heritage in keeping with Marshall's neo-Aristotelian sense of citizenship it can be usefully applied to the tensions in his work. In effect, that is, we invent a collegial interaction between Marshall and Mannheim that does not seem to have occurred when the two writers actually were colleagues at the LSE in the 1930s and 1940s. This invention has dual benefits. Mannheim's work can restore the interrupted dynamism of Marshall's, while Marshall's Fabian pragmatism can limit Mannheim's later and hubristic claims for politically engaged intellectuals.

T. H. Marshall's (1950) account of the evolutionary emergence of civil, political and social rights seems to be an obligatory point of passage in the disputes over the meaning and extent of 'citizenship' that have been such a feature of recent social scientific and governmental approaches to reconfigurations of political life (e.g. Davidson 1997; Goldlust 1996; Hogan 1997). This does not signify agreement. Marshall (1972, 1981) himself later amended the model, and writers in the field invoke it for disparate critical purposes. Marshall serves as a 'modern' foil for a range of theories of a transition to post-, late- or high-modernity. The routine use of this move then becomes as interesting as the developments that he included in his model. It displays the essential contestability that is characteristic of concepts in sociopolitical analysis (Gallie 1964), and since later writers have continued to scratch, it seems that Marshall set a provocative itch in his version of 'citizenship.'

In this paper we identify one source of the itch in the conventional sense of 'modernity' that Marshall first assumed and later implicitly disrupted, and that later writers have left under-examined. We do so by reading his model through Scheler's and Mannheim's sociologies of knowledge. This means that in a sense we invent a collegial interaction. Although Marshall and Mannheim were colleagues at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the 1930s and 1940s, when Marshall developed his approach to citizenship and when Mannheim shifted his focus from the sociology of knowledge to the place of planning in democracy, neither writer has left more than traces of the other in his work. To (re)unite them, we first outline how we work with 'essential contestability', and then read Marshall as a theorist of the modern. We note, however, that he implicitly disrupted the modern 'progress' of his first triadic model when he developed his later and less discussed account of tripartite tensions between the democratic, welfare and capitalist moments of the 'hyphenated society.' This gives a link to the sociology of knowledge, for Scheler and Mannheim all but defined this field by the shift from stages to co-presence that Marshall adopted here. Since Mannheim most elaborated what a focus on co-presence entails, we next outline the emphasis on incompatible 'thought-styles' that was typical of his knowledge-politics. Noting that he had preempted the complexity of this early work by the time of his actual colleagueship with Marshall, we then invent the

interaction between them. We use Mannheim's work to treat the dynamics of Marshall's evolutionism as a triple helix of thought-styles, and we use Marshall's modesty to limit Mannheim's hubristic claims for social scientists.

Citizenship as essentially contestable

Embodying the 'civic ideal' (Heater 1990), 'citizenship' has served as a key marker of membership in polities that range from pre-modern city-states and empires through nation-states to still uncertainly delineated forms of transnational federalism. The history of debate over its meaning is just as long. 'Citizenship' is an essentially contested concept, with its meanings having always emerged in disputed and recursive use (Gallie 1964). Aristotle set this pattern early in his pragmatic solution to the problem of defining it: "What effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office" (*Politics* 1275a22). Since this simply shifts the issue to what 'participation' means, and since any account of 'participation' necessarily implies politico-moral disputes, the fuzziness remains. Marshall left the question just as open when he defined citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" (1950: 28), for while 'membership' may be formally or procedurally specified, 'community' has all the vagueness of both its popular and social scientific usage. It too is recursive, being a "birth-to-presence of a form of being which pre-exists" the conditions of its re-inventions (Rose 1999: 177).

Many writers have noted this fuzziness in definition. Whether it is a *problem*, however, is another matter. It certainly need not require the surrender that Lister (1997: 14) implied, when she held that writers in the field typically "fall back" on Marshall's version in the face of the difficulty of doing better. We hold instead that Marshall's theory has been successful *because* of Marshall's inclusion of unrecognised tangles in his account, not *despite* them, and that writers on citizenship exploit the uncertainty rather than yield to it. 'Interesting' social scientific theories, and even more so those which remain sufficiently interesting to become 'classic,' are those in which key issues are posed sharply but with their ambiguities left in play (Davis 1971, 1986). Contestable concepts are boundary objects that cannot be widely used unless they overflow their framing in any one context (e.g. Callon 1998). The history of disputes in any social science shows that this entails agreement over what is arguable and argument over how agreement should be reached. So while essentially contestable concepts, like citizenship, and classic theories, like

Marshall's, do yield relatively fixed points in what would otherwise be simply the blooming, buzzing confusion of socio-political life, these are always points of departure.

The dependence of 'citizenship' on myriad forms of 'participation' and 'community' means that *what* it is must remain uncertain. A trans-situational analysis is still possible, however, through attention to the *how* of disputes over it. Although conceptual *order* may be a mirage, conceptual *ordering* is empirically accessible (cf. Law 1994: 107). Patterns emerge in what analysts include and what they omit as they make situational sense. Furthermore, this sense must be inflected by the rhetorical devices they use in presenting their arguments as plausible, and these devices are also open to examination. On that approach, we now read Marshall's approach to citizenship as specifically 'modern.'

Marshall as modern

Marshall's model of the evolution of civic, political and social 'rights' has been so extensively canvassed that we do not need to repeat its details here. Instead, we move directly to one set of ordering moves in accounts of 'citizenship.' Marshall's own ordering strategy shows him as a theorist of the modern, and enrolments of him repeat this effect.

Despite the Aristotelian echo in Marshall's definition, to say 'citizenship' in political sociology is to say 'modernity.' As Turner (1993a) noted, the classical theorists all at least implicitly treated modernisation through the extension of citizenship, Marshall drew on them, and their themes recur in all the commentaries on and departures from him. These themes arise in the familiar and conflicting axioms on 'the state of nature' in theorisations of the order of modernity: that since human life is by nature solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, social life is possible only if individuality is suppressed in the collectivity represented by the Leviathan; or that humans are by nature born free and yet are everywhere in the chains of that suppression. Drawing more on Rousseau than on Hobbes, evoking Comte's three stages and Spencer's evolutionism, and filtering Marx's eschatology through a blend of Tocquevillean scepticism and Fabian *realpolitik*, Marshall part tacitly and part openly drew on any number of theories of the modern to suggest the progressive development of a basic human equality and freedom.

Those themes and writers, and any number of others, recur in post-Marshallian accounts of citizenship. Adam Ferguson and 'civil society' reappear in diagnoses of neo-liberalism (Dean and Hindess 1998; Rose 1999). Wollstonecraft is a living presence in Pateman's

(1988) and Lister's (1997) feminist studies. Marx appears in Barbalet's (1988) stress on the tensions between citizenship and capitalism, or in Dalton and Kuechler's (1990) account of social movements as collective actors in struggles for inclusion. Toennies hovers nearby in Wrong's (1994) revisiting of the Hobbesian/Parsonian 'problem of order,' and so of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as modes of belonging. Durkheim resurfaces in Lockwood's (1996) stress on the contradictory dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, or in Alexander's (1997) discussions of citizenship as a civic religion. Weber is front-stage in Turner's (1997) account of citizenship and the city. Blends of those classical themes recur in claims that the shifts in the practice and theorisation of belonging seen in the turn to 'multicultural' or 'cultural' citizenship mark a transition from the modern to the postmodern (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Pakulski 1997).

Now, many writers have noted the teleological strain in modernisation theory in general and in Marshall's 'progressive' evolutionary model in particular. The corollary assumption of a distinct human nature, however, has attracted less attention in the field. Yet the drawing of a purifying line between humans and the rest of nature, or the assumption of a dualistic Great Divide, is a characteristic feature of accounts of modernity (Latour 1991). Marshall's use of this move from the classical accounts of the state of nature adds another dissonant note to his rhetoric, in the way that he naturalised social change through his evolutionary image while simultaneously separating humans from that nature. Further, by invoking the liberal 'political man' endowed with 'rights' who emerged from the state of nature he also invoked the cognate 'economic man' in all his rationally calculating and utility-maximising glory. This was given to some extent in the context of his early papers on citizenship. He engaged there with Alfred Marshall, who, he said:

while examining one face of the problem of social equality from the point of view of economic cost, came right up to the frontier beyond which lies the territory of sociology, crossed it, and made a brief excursion to the other side. His action could be interpreted as a challenge to sociology to send an emissary to meet him at the frontier... (Marshall 1950: 67).

He was such an emissary, and he invoked 'economic man' to make negotiation possible. But his privileging here of the self-interested creator of the wealth of nations over the sharer in moral sentiments created a problem in his argument. To take civil, political and social moments first as analytically distinct and then as historically successive is already to privilege the analytical rationality defining 'political/economic man,' and so to disrupt the rhetoric of 'stages.' Two related solutions to this difficulty are implicit in the literature. For example, when Parsons (1965) responded to Marshall by seeing a nation as a 'societal community,' the 'cultural' element in citizenship that he stressed was effectively an

arational supplement to Marshall's analytical privilege. Pakulski (1997) reached a similar point in reading Marshall as a theorist rather than as an historian of citizenship, and then in taking his civil, political and social moments as co-emergent instead of successive. Marshall himself made both these moves, in his second tripartite model.

Here is the 'other' and less discussed Marshall (Rees 1995). When he wrote on the 'value problems' in welfare-capitalism and on inconsistencies between the capitalism, democracy and welfare of the 'hyphenated society' (Marshall 1972, 1981), he imbued citizenship with a cultural aura and suggested that its civil/capitalist, political/democratic and social/welfare moments were interfused rather than successive. That is, he hinted that his civil, political and social moments entailed forms of rationality other than the strictly analytical. Despite its promise, however, this shift in ordering strategy still left a privileging of 'political/economic man.' Thus while Marshall increasingly queried the individualised 'rights' assumed in his first tripartite model, he also increasingly approached an individually liberal and formally procedural restriction of 'citizenship' to the political sphere (Rees 1995). 'Collective rights,' like those at issue in union activity, remained an 'anomaly' (cf. Marshall 1950: 111). The problem he faced and left uncertain, then, was to how to reconcile his inclusion of the cultural and collective effects of citizenship with the individualism in both his analytical privilege and his proposed solution. The more nuanced his historical sense, and the more he invoked or suggested the classical tradition, the more acute this problem became, for he then displayed collective and cultural rationalities in his own practice while effectively denying them in the analytical rationality that follows from his dualistically modern sense of human nature. Even so, Marshall had suggested, but left undeveloped, a way of accommodating this effect: triadic ordering.

To order by threes is not the only means of keeping in play the tensions preempted in the partisan foreclosure and hierarchical ranking so widely identified with the binary divisions that give rise to 'economic man.' But it is the simplest. As Simmel noted in his account of small groups, "the triad is a structure completely different from the dyad, but not, on the other hand, specifically distinguished from groups of four or more members;" and the "appearance of the third party indicates transition, conciliation, and abandonment of absolute contrast" (1908: 141, 145). Rhetorically, to order by threes is to suggest that more cases could be mentioned, and thus to stress the generality of the instances listed, while at the same time producing a sense of climactic closure (Potter 1995: 195-7). Studies of party political speeches and of everyday talk have shown the effectiveness of the provisional but still dynamic syntheses that follow from this move (e.g. Atkinson 1984; Heritage and Greatbatch 1986; Jefferson 1990).

This is where Mannheim is useful in reading Marshall. In his early sociology of knowledge-politics he focussed on the problem that Marshall exemplifies: how can social analysis be possible when the analysis itself is existentially emergent from the processes studied within? But where Marshall had hinted through his tripartite models at different political rationalities, Mannheim used triadic models to make that point specifically. Where Marshall moved from a sequential to a co-existent schema but did not develop the implications, Mannheim took this move as a starting-point and elaborated its consequences. Where Marshall tended to preempt the complexities he had suggested, through his assumption of human nature, Mannheim, for a time at least, kept the tensions in play by refusing that assumption. So we now turn to Mannheim.

Mannheim and knowledge-political action

Just as Rees (1995) looked to the 'other' Marshall, so we look to an 'other' Mannheim to invent the collegial relation with Marshall. The periodic returns to Mannheim as a political theorist are usually focused on his attempt to set the 'relatively free-floating intellectuals' as the legislators of political life (e.g. Heeren 1971; Ashcraft 1981; Turner 1993b: 170, 1997: 12-13). We argue below, however, that this attempt marked a transition from the promise of his early work. By the time of his actual colleagueship with Marshall, Hitler's rise to power had "tragically aborted" his sociology of knowledge (Kettler *et al.* 1990: 1470), and he had begun to foreclose on his own openings in the study of 'knowledge-political action' (cf. Pels 1996). We focus instead on the essays that he wrote from the early to the late 1920s, and on the tensions that he sustained in them. We should also stress that our (re)uniting of Marshall and Mannheim is not a claim that Marshall was 'influenced' by Mannheim in a hitherto unnoticed way. Since Marshall said that from his earliest work he had used Hobhouse's "threefold categorization of kinship, authority and citizenship as the basic principles of social order" (1973: 95), his typical ordering strategy was set before Mannheim moved to the LSE. And since recollections of each are marked by silence over the other (e.g. Lockwood 1974; Halsey 1984; Floud 1959), there seems to have been little obvious interaction between them.

Our first step in filling that gap is to go back to the origins of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim shares with Max Scheler the title of its 'founding father,' and he entered the field through engaging with Scheler. A link to the knowledge-politics of citizenship was then given from the start. In one of his first papers in what would become the sociology of knowledge Scheler had prefigured Marshall's move from his first to his second tripartite

model, by defending Comte's social approach to epistemology while attacking Comte's own law of three stages. He held that:

Religious, metaphysical, and positive thinking and knowing are not historical stages of the development of knowledge but permanent attitudes of mind and forms of knowledge given with the human mind as essential features of it. None of them can ever substitute for or represent any other (Scheler 1921: 164).

That is, the positive thinking of 'economic man' or 'scientific man' could never stand apart from the other two ways of knowing. The three were co-emergent and remained in permanent tension:

Religion, metaphysics, and positive science rest on three different motives, on three entirely different groups of acts of the knowing mind, three different aims, three different personality types, and three different social groups. Also the historical forms of movement of these three mental powers are essentially different (1921: 165).

Although Scheler granted that one of those three ways of knowing was sure to be more salient than the others at any given time, he held that the interaction between them is continuous.

In developing that sense of rationalities in tension, Scheler set what became axiomatic in the field: that knowledge "is not empirical but '*a priori*' knowledge;" and that any individual's "relative natural world view" was "essentially the intuition of a human 'community'" (Scheler 1925: 67; 1913-4: 168). On that basis he claimed to have resolved what was and has remained a bugbear in the study of knowledge, the issue of relativism. Accepting the standard charge against relativism, of self-refutation, he claimed to escape it through a phenomenologically accessible and religiously infused "eternal hierarchy of values" that was given in human nature and that was as objective as mathematical truth (e.g. Scheler 1915: 72-3).

Mannheim objected to both this framing of the problem and its solution. He held that Scheler should not have taken seriously the epistemologists' "classic anti-relativist argument, repeated *ad infinitum* and *ad nauseam*" (Mannheim 1924: 130), and that the appeal to human nature was no answer (Mannheim 1925: 83). If the phenomenologically given were seen as dynamic rather than as static, then there was "an existentially determined truth content in human thought at every stage of its development" (Mannheim 1925: 101), including in epistemology, and there could be no analytical refuge from the resulting tangles. Knowledge required instead a study "which accentuates the difficulties of its task" (Mannheim 1924: 130). But if he departed from Scheler in this way,

Mannheim resembled him in another, in his independently developed insistence that the study of knowledge required three distinct elements being kept in tension.

He set this theme early, when he held that epistemological assumptions of both the knowing subject and the adequacy of strict analysis occluded the analysts' psychological, ontological and logical precommitments. Knowledge, he said, emerged as a relation between the knower (subject), the known, and the to-be-known (object); if the subject was always an intersubject and if the known was always selectively drawn from tradition, then the to-be-known was always historically contingent. "Every epistemological systematization is based upon this triad," he claimed, "and every conceivable formulation of the problem of knowledge is given by these three terms in some combination" (Mannheim 1922: 58). He himself was to use a range of combinations. We sketch two of these, in the genealogical and political moments of his work.

For all the limits of epistemology, Mannheim held that the self-relativisation it entailed was crucial to the development of a sociology of knowledge. The individualising trend from Descartes' *cogito* to Kant's account of the subject gave one element in any knowledge under study. It had been followed, interactively, by the attention to collective subjects in Marxist ideological analysis and by the emergence of 'the social' as an "ontological 'terminus' of the motion transcending theoretical immanence" (Mannheim 1925: 68). As with Scheler's reading of Comte, once those genealogical moments had emerged they remained in permanent tension, and the sociology of knowledge required all three of them. This approach, furthermore, was inescapably political.

On the assumption that nothing became an intellectual problem until it was a practical issue, Mannheim linked his sociology of knowledge to political movements. The interactively emergent movements of liberalism, socialism and nationalism/conservatism each entailed a distinct 'thought-style,' each thought-style entailed a distinct link between theory and practice, and each link was recursively enacted in the academy (Mannheim 1927; 1928a: 248-50; 1929: 117-46). The formal contesting of knowledge was then inextricably entangled in broader conflicts. Through acknowledgment of and allowance for that effect, the sociology of knowledge was a 'dynamic synthesis' of the three practical thought-styles. At the same time liberally individual, dialectically collective and arationally conservative, this synthesis was both an effect of the complex from which it emerged and a means of attaining a "continually receding viewpoint" on that complex (Mannheim 1928a: 256). Mannheim treated the triadic distinction between its elements more as a preliminary and heuristic ordering than as a means of exhaustive description, for as he showed most elaborately in his study of conservatism, any one thought-style contains numerous variants (Mannheim 1927; cf. Nelson 1992). The important point here

is that Mannheim's ordering strategy of keeping the three elements in play was a means of being analytical while still insisting on the limits of strict analysis.

In their studies of knowledge-political action, then, Scheler and Mannheim had both used variants of the trinary ordering that Marshall was to adopt, and both had treated their triads through the co-presence of Marshall's hyphenated model. However, whereas Scheler and Marshall had assumed versions of 'human nature,' Mannheim showed a way of treating the human as emergent. That is the point of our merging of Marshall and Mannheim.

(Re)uniting Marshall and Mannheim

First of all, it is easy to see why Marshall himself did not align his work with Mannheim's. He had too much good sense. By the time they were actual colleagues, Mannheim's interpretive 'dynamic synthesis' had become a legislative 'total perspective.' This is the shift in his much-criticised account of the intellectuals.

He had come to see intellectuals in general, sociologists in particular and sociologists of knowledge even more so, as uniquely authoritative. Despite intellectuals' varied backgrounds, he saw them as relatively united by an education that "tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession and wealth" (Mannheim 1929b: 155). Losing the "illusion that there is only one way of thinking" (Mannheim 1936a: 12), they had "a maximum opportunity to test and employ the socially available vistas and to experience their inconsistencies" (Mannheim 1932b: 106). By collectively agreeing on those vistas, and by working in political parties and academia, they could fulfil "their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole" (Mannheim 1929b: 158). If intellectuals in general were uniquely able to achieve this, sociologists were uniquely placed among them. Each social science had its uses, but since only sociologists aimed at "a complete theory of the totality of the social process" (Mannheim 1936b: 203), their discipline was fundamental. Since intellectuals could achieve their required self-awareness only in sociology, their dynamic and synthetic mediation should be focused there. Mannheim increasingly gave this claim a quasi-religious cast (cf. Pels 1993). Given the rise of fascism, the Depression, and impending war, the risks of social dissolution were such that "the successful organization of society cannot be left to chance" (Mannheim 1935: 7). Sociologists of knowledge had to save liberal democracy from itself. Planning was needed for the renewal of a spiritual sense in the body politic, and a planned society

would require experts “somehow similar to the priests, whose task it will be to watch that certain basic standards are established and maintained” (Mannheim 1943: 119). Through ‘social techniques’ such as the propaganda or behaviourist reconditioning that had been used so effectively under fascism, “groups with determined political will, equipped with the necessary psychological and sociological knowledge” should educate the masses in their duties (Mannheim 1937: 300).

This sad retreat warrants the criticism that Mannheim has attracted for his work on the intellectuals, and makes it easy to understand why Marshall did not adopt his work. Where Scheler initiated the sociology of knowledge by, *inter alia*, departing from Comte, Mannheim returned in the 1930s to a floridly Comtean *savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pouvoir*. For all his own focus on ‘planning,’ Marshall was hardly likely to find this sympathetic. But Mannheim’s claims for intellectuals do not inevitably follow from his early work, and if he himself had left this work behind, his readers need not. Specifically, it is useful in addressing the puzzles in Marshall’s account of citizenship that we identified.

These puzzles were Marshall’s implicit and typically modern assumption of human nature, his privileging of the analytical rationality that follows from it, and the disjunction between the fixity of that rationality and the ‘evolution’ of his central metaphor. Just as Turner (1997: 7) claimed that in discussions of citizenship it is “conceptually parsimonious to think of three types of resource: economic, cultural and political” - although we might note the recurrence here of analytical privilege in the economic metaphor of ‘resource’ - we hold that Mannheim’s triadic knowledge-politics allows a parsimonious approach to Marshall’s ‘participation as a full member of a community.’ In Mannheimian terms, citizenship is an effect of three types of ‘thought-style:’ the individual and calculating rationality of liberalism (the economic), the arational sharing of symbols of conservatism (the cultural), and the dialectical rationality of collective action (the political). Citizenship as both a concept and a practice emerges from the interaction between these three.

The parsimony follows, first, from the taking of Ockam’s razor to the assumption of human nature, and then from the triadic ordering of the sense of emergence that is required to replace it. Mannheim’s stress on mutually generative thought-styles entailed inductive description rather than prescriptive deduction from any axiom of the truly human. Economic/political man does exist in this sense, but as one effect among others rather than as a starting-point (cf. Callon 1998). Since Marshall’s privileging of analytical rationality had followed from that assumption, this Mannheimian move restores the interaction that Marshall had first suggested in his hyphenated model, and then preempted. To treat humanity as emergent rather than as given also remedies the

preemption of evolution in Marshall's first model, where his linear 'stages' and 'progress' were at odds with his analytical assumptions. So long as 'thought-styles' have the grounding in existential conditions of Mannheim's derivation, the interaction between them gives an evolutionary mechanism. A second source of parsimony lies in the trinary couching of that interaction. As we noted earlier, while triadic ordering is not the only means of keeping tensions in play, it is the next simplest move after the closures of either/or choices in general and of the Great Divide in particular. Restriction to the 'continually receding viewpoint' it opens is a small price to pay for the recursive inclusiveness it also allows.

Further, to focus on this ordering strategy is both to look back to the classical intimations in Marshall's work and to look forward to contemporary work on evolution. Classically, a stress on the interactive and contingent stability resulting from the play of three distinct moments has been routine in the practice and study of politics for as long as 'citizenship' has been at issue. A few familiar examples of what we can retrospectively call Mannheimian and triadic 'dynamic syntheses' are enough to show this. Polybius and Machiavelli used versions of the ordering strategy in their accounts of the modes of belonging under monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. Montesquieu and the authors of the Federalist Papers gave another, in their stress on tensions between the executive, legislative and judicial arms of governance. And Weber gave yet another, in his descriptions of charismatic, rational-legal and traditional bases of authority. It is not necessary to adopt the fully cyclical view of history that Polybius or Machiavelli derived from and attributed to this effect to argue that every turn in knowledge-political life is at the same time a culturally infused and Vichian return. The discontinuous continuity from Aristotle to Marshall shows this. Widening 'spirals' of taken-for-grantedness, in each of the analytical/individual, dialectical/partisan and cultural/collective moments of any dispute, give more purchase than 'stages' on the knowledge-political action of citizenship.

To stretch Marshall's under-developed evolutionary metaphor, we could even say that the contested emergence of citizenship entails a triple helix of thought-styles as well as the double helix that Crick and Watson proposed at around the same time. The transhistorical and trans-situational recurrence of triadic ordering might even suggest something in human nature, but in a way that bridges the Great Divide. It is consistent with contemporary neo-Darwinian accounts of human evolution. The egoistic, nepotistic and altruistic dynamics identified there (e.g. Boehm 2001), dynamics that are seen as permanently in tension, match the individual, group-specific and diffusely collective forms of political rationality we have distinguished.

Conclusion

The fact that so many writers have continued to use Marshall's work is evidence in itself that his account of citizenship had raised central issues in the theorising of socio-political life. Even if his modern assumption of 'human nature' meant that he himself foreclosed on what he had suggested, he set an itch that later writers have continued to scratch. Mannheim's work is similar. Frequently revisited but never absorbed, it is a reminder of the intractable difficulties in studying the knowledge-political action epitomised in disputes over citizenship.

By inventing a collegial interaction between Marshall and Mannheim, we have highlighted dynamics in Aristotle's 'participation' or in Marshall's 'full membership of a community.' We have argued that the evolution of citizenship implies a triple helix of 'thought-styles,' where the individual and calculating rationality of Marshall's economic/political man is agonistically co-emergent with both the arational sharing of symbols definitive of culture and the dialectical rationality of collective action. This is consistent with Marshall's observation that conflicting principles arise "from the very roots of our social order" (1950: 122). Since the three conflicting principles we have stressed are familiar from the classical social theories that Marshall variously invoked and that are richly reworked in contemporary enrolments of him, our reading is a way of making explicit what has always already been a feature of debates over citizenship, and that are relevant again in changing times. In particular, Mannheim's triadic attention to crises in the liberalism of the Weimar Republic is worth revisiting now that liberalism is under reconstruction in attempts to govern through the freedom and capacities of the governed (Kettler and Meja 1995; Pels 1997, 2001; Dean 1999; Rose 1999).

Our reunion of Marshall and Mannheim is then a heuristic, or a reminder of what is lost when any one form of political rationality is privileged *a priori* in the theorising of citizenship. It is certainly not a panacea, for the detail of how individual, dialectical and diffuse rationalities are played out remains a matter of case-by-case study. While the reunion then does not allow us to say what citizenship *is*, beyond Marshall's fluid 'participation as a full member of a community,' it does alert us to what is involved in *how* this participation is contested, in academic accounts of citizenship and in the struggles for belonging in specific national communities. This heuristic is what Mannheim's self-conscious use of an ordering strategy similar to Marshall's can contribute to the field.

Mannheim was only partially in need of the recovery work we have undertaken here, for we have derived our senses of 'ordering' and 'modernity' from work that is explicitly

post-Mannheimian (e.g. Law 1994). Even so, his value as an exemplar is worth repeating. At the very least he provides a cautionary tale of what happens to politically engaged intellectuals who over-stabilise their own perspectives within the ever-receding viewpoints open to them. Conversely, had Marshall couched his work in terms of the interactions between ways of seeing and knowing that are characteristic of particular ways of life and that Mannheim described as 'thought-styles,' he may have developed a more complex account of the evolution of citizenship.

Finally, Mannheim's stress on human emergence foreshadowed Latour's (1991) crossing of the Great Divide in the argument that 'we have never been modern.' In that case, he both shows the limits of theories of a transition to a 'late' or 'high' or 'post' modernity that depend on preemptive versions of the modern and is open to enrolment in extensions of moral belonging beyond strictly human communities (e.g. Latour 1998). But to pursue that possibility would take us too far afield. For the moment, our joint reading of Marshall and Mannheim is a useful addition to their separate sociopolitical understandings.

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